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Chapter 1
Introduction
The first studies in the economics of education were concerned with recogniz-
ing human capital as an investment good (Schultz, 1959, 1961; Becker, 1993)
and to overcome the fact that “our knowledge about national wealth is almost
wholly restricted to the non-human components, that is, to reproducible
physical capital and land” (Schultz, 1959, p. 110). Nowadays, investments in
education are seen as “one of the top priority policy areas of governments
around the world [...] [and] an essential element in global economic compe-
tition” (Hanushek, 2009, p. 39). Accordingly, there is large interest by both
policy makers and researchers with respect to the determinants of educa-
tional achievements, the outcomes of education, and the lessons to be learned
from and for educational policies.
Generally, educational policy aims at both remedying market imperfec-
tions and establishing equality of opportunity. Market imperfections with
respect to education aremainly produced by the fact that education exerts pos-
itive externalities, resulting in individual human capital investments below
the social optimum. Moreover, imperfect information about costs and benefits
of education provides another rationale for intervention—both for efficiency
and equity reasons. Apart from that, equity considerations themselves give
rise to public involvement in the provision and financing of education. There-
fore, the common ground is typically to secure equality of opportunity, so
that all people have equal opportunities to access education—irrespective of
their socio-economic background.
This dissertation consists of two separate parts. The first part seizes on
the determinants of educational achievement, whereas the second part is
1
2concerned with students’ behavior towards federal interventions aiming at
achieving efficiency and equality of opportunity.
The first part of this dissertation builds on the main idea that economists
model the determinants of educational achievement in an education produc-
tion function where student and family characteristics, but also institutional
and school factors, influence test scores. Institutional factors comprise the
form of funding, the autonomy of schools, and age of tracking, while school-
related factors include class size, instruction time, and teacher quality.
Among the school-related factors—and probably even among all topics
ever studied in the economics of education—, class size has received most
attention by scholars and policy makers. Research of the past decades has
shown that class size reductions are a very costly, though relatively ineffective,
means to improve students’ performance (see Hanushek (1999) or Hanushek
(2006) for a review of the literature).
A school-level factor that has received far less scientific attention is school
starting time. Though parents, teachers, and the media favor later school
starting times with well rested students, the question whether ringing the
school bell later increases students’ school performance is still unresolved. On
the one hand, circadian rhythms are tied to the light-dark cycle and getting
up early in the dark might be related to shorter bed hours. Many studies
suggest, indeed, a positive correlation between hours slept and grades in
middle and high school (Wolfson and Carskadon, 2003; Shochat et al., 2014).
Yet, on the other hand, recent evidence on whether later school start times
cause increased achievements yields mixed results (Edwards, 2012; Carrell
et al., 2011; Hinrichs, 2011; Heissel and Norris, 2015).
Johanna Sophie Quis, Guido Heineck, and I take a broader perspective
to investigate the relationship between sleep and students’ performance in
Chapter 2 of this dissertation: We provide first evidence on whether the
spring transition from standard to daylight saving time (DST) induces short-
run consequences on elementary school students’ test performance. Based on
the public discussion and the pertinent literature from medicine, psychology,
and biology, we hypothesize that elementary school children might suffer
from sleep deprivation in the week after the clocks were advanced by one
hour.
We exploit the fact that six European states collected data on more than
22,000 students in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) and the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS)
during the transition to DST in spring 2011. In a regression discontinuity
design, we compare the performance of students randomly allocated to testing
3dates in the week before the clock advance with those allocated to testing
dates in the week after the clock advance.
Our estimates for the DST-effect are very small in magnitude and not
statistically significantly different from zero. Therefore, our results challenge
the prevailing public opinion that daylight saving time should be abandoned
because of its detrimental effects on school children’s performance.
The second part of this dissertation shifts the focus to equality of oppor-
tunity in higher education and students’ reaction to offers of different forms
of student financial aid.
Student financial aid aims at overcoming credit constraints resulting from
capital market imperfections: Human capital theory (Becker, 1993) argues
that human capital cannot serve as a collateral for a loan as “Free men are
not for sale” (Schultz, 1959, p. 111) and lenders cannot force graduates to
deploy their full potential productively to prevent moral hazard. Therefore,
access to higher education will depend on parents’ assets if students are
credit constrained and student financial aid is unavailable. Although most
industrialized countries provide student financial aid to secure equality of
opportunity, the intergenerational persistence in educational attainment
is still high (Hertz et al., 2008; Heineck and Riphahn, 2009; Riphahn and
Schieferdecker, 2010; Blossfeld et al., 2016). The results of Cameron and
Heckman (1998, 2001) and Carneiro and Heckman (2002) provide a potential
explanation for this finding: The authors argue that only long-run factors
such as the parents’ permanent income and endowment restrict the transition
to higher education, and that short-run liquidity constraints are no relevant
obstacle. According to them, intergenerational persistence of educational
attainment is an artifact of a failure to account for the high unobserved ability
or motivation of those students who make their way successfully through the
educational system. Once these long-run constraints and dynamic sample
selection are accounted for, they find no effect of parental income on US
students’ access to higher education in the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth. They argue that mitigating short-run liquidity constraints cannot
increase enrollment and graduation rates substantially.
The findings of Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001) are, however, chal-
lenged by several more recent studies: Belley and Lochner (2007), for example,
use the same database but draw upon cohorts born 20 years later. While they
can replicate Heckman and co-authors’ findings for the older cohorts, they
find a large increase in the impact of family income on college enrollment
for the younger cohort, even after long-run factors have been accounted for.
Furthermore, the impact of parents’ income on completion of at least 2 years
4of college persists and is equally large. The authors do not account for sample
selection, though.
The evidence for Germany is limited. Nevertheless, Riphahn and Schiefer-
decker (2010) investigate the importance of parental background factors in
the transition from high school to university in Germany. With data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), they show that parental
income remains a large and significant predictor of enrollment probabilities,
even though long-run characteristics such as parental education and sample
selection into the pool of high school graduates are accounted for.
With respect to future governmental intervention, it is important to
understand why the inter-generational educational mobility to German uni-
versities is relatively low (OECD, 2014, p. 93), although higher education
institutions do not charge tuition, and student aid transfers based on the
Federal Education and Training Assistance Act (BAföG) provide lucrative
funding that should facilitate studying for students from low-income families.
Our analysis in chapter 3 is an attempt to offer new insights into this
matter. Michael Kalinowski and I study whether low-income students eligible
to receive BAföG do indeed claim their benefits or whether features in the
design of the federal aid scheme prevent students from claiming their need-
based student aid amounts.
We construct amicrosimulationmodel for the SOEP 2002–2013 to estimate
the respective aid amounts students would have received, had they filed an
application for need-based aid. The results indicate that about two fifths of
the eligible low-income students do not take up their entitlements.
In a second step, we consider several potential explanatory factors shed-
ding light on the reasons for students’ non-take-up of BAföG. More specif-
ically, we employ instrumental variable techniques and a sample selection
model to investigate whether different utilities from claiming, information
constraints, parents’ claiming of other welfare benefits, cultural differences,
and time-inconsistent preferences can explain students’ behavior. We find
that the expected duration of benefit receipt and students’ financial need are
inversely related to non-take-up. Nevertheless, increasing benefits by 10%
decreases non-take-up by only 4.1% on average. In addition, students who
can draw upon past experience of older siblings in filing the complex applica-
tions for BAföG are considerably more likely to claim the benefits. Therefore,
these findings provide evidence that information asymmetries contribute to
explaining why student financial aid may not work as intended. Moreover,
we include a variable indicating whether parents lived in the former socialist
East Germany before reunification to proxy inherited preferences about the
5welfare state. We find that significantly more students socialized in East
Germany choose to take up student aid compared to similar West German
students. Lastly, our results suggest that, although BAföG as a combination
of grant and zero-interest loan is by construction rather profitable, it seems
to favor debt aversion of highly impulsive and impatient students in line
with the predictions from the “Economic Theory of Self-Control” (Thaler and
Shefrin, 1981).
Although we abstain from claiming causality for the mechanisms we in-
vestigate, our results provide indications that the German need-based student
financial aid scheme may not be suited to provide equality of opportunity
if non-claiming students have to spend a considerable time on working to
earn their living. Students who have to work many hours and can devote
less resources to studying are, consequently, more susceptible to prolong
studying (Avdic and Gartell, 2015), perform worse academically (Stinebrick-
ner and Stinebrickner, 2003; Callender, 2008), or drop out without a degree
(Triventi, 2014). The students we are analyzing have already made their way
to university. Nevertheless, dropping out is harmful to equality because of the
non-trivial monetary returns accruing from completing higher education, the
“sheepskin effect” (Heckman et al., 2006, e.g.). It remains an open question to
which extent the factors fostering higher education students’ decisions not
to claim also carry over to high school graduates. It is, however, plausible
to assume that high school students’ level of information about BAföG and
their ability to cope with the complex paperwork is, if anything, lower than
that of higher education students. The high complexity of BAföG and its
design might, therefore, also dissuade a significant share of credit-constrained
students from studying at all. Bettinger et al. (2012) substantiate this assump-
tion for the US. They show that assisting low-income families in filling out
student aid application forms increases aid take-up, college enrollment, and
completion substantially.
While chapter 3 studies federal need-based aid, the subsequent chapter 4
is devoted to the analysis of federal merit-based aid. The main goal of merit-
based scholarships is not to provide equal access for all students but rather
to efficiently promote the most talented ones. This efficiency goal, currently
budgeted with almost EUR 244 million of fiscal revenue in Germany, implies
that themost talented students, irrespective of their social background, should
receive a scholarship.
Yet, two thirds of all German merit-based aid holders come from fami-
lies where at least one parent achieved a college degree, though students of
academic background only make up half of the overall student population
(Middendorff et al., 2009, p. 24). The magnitude of this difference is sur-
6prising, considering that differences in university grades between students
from college-experienced and college-inexperienced families are very small
(Delaney et al., 2011; Aspelmeier et al., 2012). Furthermore, the findings
that information asymmetries even plague students’ claiming of broad and
therefore well-known need-based aid (see chapter 3 but also Dynarski and
Scott-Clayton (2006); King (2006); Bettinger et al. (2012)) make it very likely
that information asymmetries also play a role with respect to merit-based
aid: Only 1% of all German higher education students receive a scholarship
so that the mere existence of this funding possibility might be unknown to
many students from families unacquainted with higher education. Moreover,
while eligibility for need-based aid is unequivocally regulated by law, the
eligibility criteria to successfully apply for merit-based aid are vague and
vary between the privately-owned foundations distributing the federal funds
to students. Insider information and encouragement from parents might thus
be all the more helpful and necessary for students to consider applying. If
information asymmetries kept eligible students off applying, scholarships
would not meet the efficiency goal to further promote the talent of promising
students.
Although only 1% of all German students are funded by merit-based schol-
arships, investigating social selectivity in the German merit-based aid system
is important: Besides the risk of talent loss, being funded by a scholarship
in Germany opens up access to several other non-monetary privileges such
as mentoring and support by influential previous scholarship holders, and
serves as a strong signal in the curriculum vitae of those who succeeded in the
highly competitive selection procedure. A social selective scholarship system
based on a considerable amount of public funds raises thus also normative
equality concerns.
Chapter 4 explores whether information asymmetries between students
able to draw upon the guidance of at least one college-experienced par-
ent (“academic students”) and those from families where no one studied
(“non-academic students”) are one of the causes for different application
probabilities.
There are two reasons for why I focus on students’ applications for
scholarships rather than on their successes. First, I want to assess which
share of the non-academic students’ under-representation in the scholarship
body is caused by their scant or distorted information about the scholarship
system. I cannot isolate this channel when investigating success probabilities
because many more factors influence the scholarship award. On the one
hand, for example, scholarship providers may (consciously or unconsciously)
discriminate against “educationally deprived” students. On the other hand,
7these students’ performance in the assessment centers may be under threat
if they feel stereotyped as a minority (Steele et al., 2002). Second, even
if scholarship foundations are able to objectively select the best students,
their choice is limited to the pool of applicants. Therefore, from a policy
perspective, increasing the share of eligible applicants from non-academic
homes provides the basis to secure an efficient allocation of funds.
A causal effect of information asymmetries could not be isolated even
if data on students deciding for or against applying for a scholarship were
available. Therefore, I conducted a web-based field experiment between the
years 2013 and 2015, based on a sample of more than 5,000 German higher
education students. I randomly assigned students either to the control group
or one of two treatment groups. The first treatment group read a general
primer about scholarships, based on the scholarship information publicly
available. In the second treatment group, participants additionally read an
interview with a real, current scholarship holder. He or she provided tailored
information on the detailed application process and probabilities of success.
To ease identification, the scholarship holder resembled the participant in
several characteristics, acting as a role model.
At baseline, the results indicate indeed that non-academic students apply
less often than students from academic homes, keeping a range of eligibility
characteristics constant. Of the non-applicants at baseline, non-academic
students are moreover significantly worse informed, suggesting that the de-
cision to abstain from applying might not be well-grounded. Accordingly,
both treatments increase the knowledge of non-academic students about
scholarships significantly. Yet, only the role model treatment increases non-
academic students’ application probabilities for federally funded merit-based
scholarships significantly. Information asymmetries are therefore one factor
why non-academic students are underrepresented in the German scholar-
ship system. Moreover, the public information about scholarships currently
provided online is not sufficient to compensate for the existent knowledge
differentials by parental background. Interpreting the role model treatment
as a simulation of the custom-fit insider information many academic students
can access through their parents, the decisive information is a glance behind
the scenes and the assurance that a similar person made it. As a consequence,
establishing mentoring programs at schools is a promising and inexpensive
endeavor to increase both efficiency and equality of opportunity in the merit
aid system.

Chapter 2
Does the Transition into
Daylight Saving Time Affect
Students’ Performance?
Stefanie P. Herber, Johanna Sophie Quis, and Guido Heineck
2.1 Introduction
80 countries around the world1 are currently exposed to a shift in sleep
patterns twice a year when they switch between daylight saving time (DST)
and standard time (ST): In the northern hemisphere, clocks are set forward by
one hour in spring to DST and set backward by one hour in fall to ST. While
the phase delay in fall rewards us with an additional hour of sleep, the phase
advance in spring implies that we have to get up one hour earlier—while the
sunlight lags one hour behind.
Ever since its first introduction, the change to DST has been critically
discussed. Germany and Austria-Hungary introduced DST in 19162 in order
to save energy and to better match sleep-wake cycles with daylight times.
Various recent studies challenge that DST saves energy (e.g., Kellogg and
Wolff, 2008; Aries and Newsham, 2008; Kotchen and Grant, 2011; Sexton and
Beatty, 2014). Another strand of research discusses whether the shift to DST
increases traffic and work-related accidents (e.g., Hicks et al., 1983; Barnes and
Wagner, 2009) or not (e.g., Ferguson et al., 1995; Lahti et al., 2011), influences
stock market returns (e.g., Kamstra et al., 2000) or not (e.g., Gregory-Allen
1 Data compiled from the CIA World Factbook Central Intelligence Agency (2013).
2 Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBI) 1916. Bekanntmachung über die Vorverlegung der Stunden
während der Zeit vom 1. Mai bis 30. September 1916, RGBl 1916, p. 243.
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et al., 2010), affects individuals’ subjective well-being negatively (Kountouris
and Remoundou, 2014; Kuehnle and Wunder, 2015), or might even increase
the risk of heart attacks (e.g., Janszky et al., 2012) or not (e.g., Sandhu et al.,
2014), to name just some.
So far, no clear conclusions can be drawn as to whether DST is indeed
harmful enough to affect outcomes measurably and whether its potential
costs outweigh its supposed benefits. Most previous studies suffer from small
sample sizes (as already noted by Gregory-Allen et al., 2010) or fail to control
for unobserved structural differences before and after the time change or
between DST- and non-DST-countries. Nevertheless, a recent representa-
tive survey puts the share of DST-opponents in the German population at
nearly three quarters (forsa Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistische
Analysen mbH, 2015) and there, as well as in many other countries, regular
petitions urge parliaments to break with the tradition of changing clocks
twice a year.
In addition, and although one can set one’s clocks to reading regularly in
the newspapers that DST should be abandoned because it is detrimental to
school children’s performance (e.g., Schmidt, 28.03.2009; Draper, 05.03.2015),
there is hardly any scientific evidence on whether the time change affects
school performance. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study
(Gaski and Sagarin, 2011) on the long-run impact of the semiannual clock
changes and students’ performance in the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)
in Indiana, USA. The authors report SAT scores in DST-adopting counties
to be lower by 16 points (which equals 16% of a standard deviation). Yet,
we doubt that the difference the authors find can be explained by the clock
change as Gaski and Sagarin (2011) do not account for potential structural
differences between counties that might drive the results. Moreover, most
US states experience changes of more than 10 points in mean SAT scores in
reading and math over time (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013),
half of the SAT-taking schools experience a rise or fall in scores by 10 points
every year, and about 20% tend to have 20 points higher or lower test scores
when compared to the previous year (College Board, 2014).
This chapter is the first to study whether the clock advance induces
short-run consequences on students’ performance in six European states.
We exploit the fact that several countries collected data for the international
student assessments Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) and Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) during
the transition from ST to DST in spring 2011. This approach provides us
with a sample of more than 22,000 students. Hypothesizing that elementary
school children might suffer from sleep deprivation and a relatively “earlier”
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school start in the week after the switch to DST, we mimic the underlying
basic structure of a regression discontinuity design by investigating whether
moving the clock forward by one hour affects students’ performance.
This mechanism is backed up by a rich literature on the relationship
between sleep and performance, which indicates that cumulative or complete
sleep deprivation decreases cognitive test performance (e.g., Astill et al.,
2012; Van Dongen et al., 2003; Banks and Dinges, 2007; Goel et al., 2009).
Whether the rather mild and short-term disturbances of the circadian system
introduced by the clock change are large enough to affect children’s school
performance significantly is, however, unknown. If so, this would not only
make a case for another debate on whether to abandon DST or not, but
would also call into question the validity of exams and international student
achievement tests timed around the clock change. If the shift into DST does
not cause large enough drops in students’ performance, this would cast doubt
on the trustworthiness of the claim that children suffer measurably from the
clock change.
Our results challenge the predominant expectation that the clock change
introduces strong and measurable changes in children’s school performance.
Although we do find small decreases in performance after the clock change in
most countries for math and science, these effects are very small in magnitude
and not significantly different from zero at neither point of the performance
distribution. Moreover, the treatment effects for reading are pointing to the
opposite direction and are of similar magnitude, though also not statistically
significant. Our results are moreover robust to varying the time window
around the clock change and cannot be explained by the young age of the
fourth-graders in our main sample.
2.2 Effects of the clock advance
2.2.1 The circadian clock
In each of us ticks a circadian clock that determines when we sleep and when
we wake. Daylight serves as a zeitgeber to our inner clock and synchronizes
our sleep-wake patterns approximately (circa) to the daily (dian) rotation of
the Earth. Our organism is tied to that inasmuch as the hormone melatonin
regulates our sleep-wake-cycle by sending us to sleep. When it gets dark,
our bodies produce melatonin and we begin to feel sleepy. At dawn, the
production is stunted and we awake.
In Europe, this bio-chemical system is disturbed each spring when the
clock is set forward by one hour in the very early morning hours of the last
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Sunday in March, and our alarm clock conflicts with our inner clock: While
school or work still start at, say, 8 a.m. clock time, our bodies continue to
follow the light-dark cycle that still lags one hour behind. In the mornings,
melatonin levels are still up and we feel sleepy. In the evenings, we have
difficulty falling asleep. This deprivation of sleep persists until the DST and
the light-dark cycle are synchronized, or in other words, until we have settled
the dispute between the alarm and inner clock (Valdez et al., 2003, p. 146).
2.2.2 Sleep, light, and cognitive performance
Both sleep and light are also correlated with cognitive performance. Light
does not only affect vision but exerts a direct positive effect on the functioning
of the brain and its availability increases cognitive performance (Heschong
et al., 2002; Vandewalle et al., 2006, 2009).
The positive association between sleep duration and cognitive test per-
formance of adults is well documented (e.g., Van Dongen et al., 2003; Banks
and Dinges, 2007; Goel et al., 2009).3 A recent meta-analysis shows that also
for 5-12 years aged children, sufficient sleep is significantly related to higher
cognitive performance, less internalizing (e.g., anxiety, sadness) and exter-
nalizing (e.g., aggression, hyperactive behavior) behavioral problems, and,
especially, better performance in school (Astill et al., 2012, and references
therein). At the same time, children’s attention, memory, and intelligence
seem to be unaffected by sleep duration (Astill et al., 2012).
Correlational studies draw the picture of a positive relationship between
self-reported hours of sleep and grades in middle and high school (consult
Wolfson and Carskadon (2003) or Shochat et al. (2014) for a review). Children
seem to be sensitive to small or modest changes in sleep duration. In that
vein, Vriend et al. (2013) show that reducing habitual sleep duration of 32
children by one hour for four consecutive nights affected children’s mood and
emotional regulation negatively and decreased their cognitive performance.
2.2.3 Sleep and performance after the clock change
It is not clear, in how far all these processes carry over to the clock change,
especially with respect to elementary school children who are the subject of
this study.
3 The performance enhancing effects of sleep even seem to pay off in monetary terms.
Instrumenting sleep duration with the local sunset time, Gibson and Shrader (2014) estimate
the causal effect of hours slept on wages. Speculating that an earlier sunset drives people to
bed earlier, the authors provide evidence that sleeping one hour more each night increases
wages by 16%.
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First, there is mixed evidence on how long the sleep-wake cycle needs
to adapt after the clock change. Results from both early and recent studies
indicate that children and adolescents lose between 40 and 50 minutes of
sleep following the switch from ST to DST (Reese, 1932; Barnes and Wagner,
2009). Schneider and Randler (2009) report that school children showed a
higher daytime sleepiness after the time change. The adaption process to
the new regime can take up to several weeks, depending on chronotype and
sleep patterns during weekends (Valdez et al., 2003; Schneider and Randler,
2009). In contrast, adjustments to phase delays as encountered when clocks
are reset to ST, traveling westwards, or moving from daytime shift work to
night shift work are easier and faster (Hauty and Adams, 1965a,b; Lemmer
et al., 2002; Niu et al., 2011).
Second, the impact of a single small short-term shift in the circadian clock
is only rarely studied and if so with small sample sizes and in an artificial
setting. For instance, Burgess et al. (2013) simulate small disturbances of the
circadian clock in 11 adults, who reacted with significantly slower reaction
times in a Psychomotor Vigilance Test. Monk and Aplin (1980) analyze the
performance of 39 adults during the shift fromDST to ST, i.e., during the phase
delay in fall. After waking under the standard clock time, subjects showed
enhanced performance in calculation tests. Yet, the authors cannot separate
this effect from the simultaneous effect of a better mood on awakening.
A separate strand of the literature analyzes how delaying school starting
times affects educational achievements. Although these studies are rather
focused on medium-term outcomes than on the effects of short-term distur-
bances of the circadian clock, we want to briefly review this literature as
delaying school start by one hour mimics the reverse of the shift into DST at
least temporarily.
Recently, three economic studies provided quasi-experimental evidence
of a later school start time on students’ achievements. Although these studies
can rely on larger samples and exogenous variation instead of self-reported
measures from survey data, the results are, again, mixed.
Edwards (2012) exploits the fact that US middle schools start the school
day at different times to reduce the costs of the public transportation system.
Using between and within variation, he finds a 2-3 percentage point increase
in standardized math and reading test scores when school starts one hour
later.
Carrell et al. (2011) show that delaying course start times by 50 minutes
increased students’ achievements at a US-military post-secondary institution
by as much as a one standard deviation increase in teacher quality. The
authors use variation from two sources: First, starting times were shifted
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step-wise from 7:00 to 7:30 and finally to 7:50 a.m. Secondly, some students
were randomly allocated to early courses only, others to later courses only,
and the rest attended both early and late courses. Note, however, that students
allocated to later courses could not use the additional time in the mornings
to sleep longer because they were required to attend the early breakfast with
their fellow students. Carrell et al. (2011) argue that late-starting students
could have taken a nap between breakfast and their first class, thereby getting
more sleep and performing better throughout the day. Given that the military
institution prohibited napping (p. 78), it is contradictory that additional sleep
should be the main driver of higher performance. To us, it seems equally
likely that students in late courses achieved higher grades because the empty
time-slot allowed them to repeat and, thereby, better remember the course
content. This could also explain why the treatment estimates of attending
an early class lose their statistical significance once student fixed effects are
included.
In contrast to Carrell et al. (2011), Hinrichs (2011) uses longitudinal indi-
vidual data on the US high school achievement test ACT and exploits, in his
main analysis, exogenous variation from a policy change in the US: While
Minneapolis and some of its surrounding districts shifted school starting
hours backwards, its Twin City St. Paul and surroundings retained the old
starting times. The author does not find evidence for the hypothesis that
ringing the school bell later increased students’ performance.
Heissel and Norris (2015) take a different approach to investigate the
effect of school starting times on students’ performance. They exploit the
differences in the availability of sunlight before school between time zones
both in an instrumental variable approach and a geographic regression dis-
continuity design. Within-comparisons of students who move across the
time zones in Florida show that starting schools one hour later increases
test scores up to 0.1 standard deviation for pubescent adolescents, whereas
the effects are smaller and insignificant for prepubescent children. Their
estimates from the regression discontinuity design in Tennessee generally
support these findings.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study on the relationship
between DST and performance of students. Using the variation in DST-
regimes between counties of the US State of Indiana, Gaski and Sagarin (2011)
identify the long-run effects of DST on county-wide SAT test performance.
The authors find test results to be significantly worse in counties that advance
and set back their clocks each year when compared to counties sticking to
ST permanently.
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Note that our approach, outlined in the following section, is different.
Gaski and Sagarin (2011) compare long-run average performance in counties
that do or do not change their clocks and interpret their results as persistent
difference in performance. Their approach comes at the risk of mistakenly
interpreting structural differences between counties as causal effects. The
authors do, for instance, not control for the proximity to large cities outside
Indiana. It seems plausible that the counties close to Chicago, Cincinnati, or
Louisville change the clocks to synchronize working times for commuters
from Indiana. Worse SAT scores could then, e.g., be due to the reduced
time commuting parents and their children spend at home together or a less
privileged background. The latter would also explain why the families cannot
afford living closer to the city. In contrast to that, our study focuses on short-
run effects of the clock change within DST-adapting countries. Exploiting the
random allocation of schools to test dates before and after the clock change
as a natural experiment allows us to separate the effect of the transition into
DST from structural or institutional differences. If the mild disturbance of
the inner clock affects sleep patterns so much that performance in the week
after the change suffers, we should be able to observe a short-run dip in
performance.
2.3 Method
We analyze the shift to DST as a natural experiment to study before-after
differences in students’ performance. As sleep-wake cycles and human per-
formance are thought to synchronize within about one week after the clock
change (Valdez et al., 2003), we restrict the sample to schools tested within
one week before and one week after the change to DST.4
More specifically, we regress the test score TS ijc of student i in school j
and country c on the treatment indicator, DST ijc, a set of controls, xijc, and
the constant η0. α0 is the coefficient of interest as it captures the effect of
the switch to DST on student test scores. We run hierarchical linear models
(HLM) with maximum likelihood to account for the nested structure of the
data.5 The error term is, therefore, a composite taking care of the different
4 As we show in the robustness checks, our results are not sensitive to the time restriction.
5 We also estimated ordinary least squares (OLS)-models with standard errors clustered on
the highest level, i.e., on the school level in the country-specific regressions or the country
level in the pooled sample. The coefficients estimated with OLS were similar. Moreover, all
our results are very similar in a typical regression discontinuity design where the running
variable is equal to the number of days away from DST.
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variance between schools, υj , countries, νc, and the remaining individual
errors, ϵijc:
TS ijc = η0 + α0 ·DST ijc + x′ijc · β + υj + νc + ϵijc. (2.1)
As students are only tested once—either before or after the clock change—
our research design relies on the identification assumption that the assign-
ment to test dates before (control group) and after (treatment group) the shift
to DST was random. The TIMSS and PIRLS testing dates are restricted to
a given time span determined by the end-dates of the school year. Within
this time window, school coordinators and testing agencies agree on a spe-
cific date. Given sufficient capacity on the test agency’s side, the students’
performance is assessed on that day.6 The sampling is, therefore, unrelated
to regional characteristics (south/west, rural/urban) that might have also
driven the test score results.7 This procedure might, however, open up the
possibility of self-selection into treatment and control group. For example,
if coordinators of good schools preferred test dates before the shift to DST
because they anticipate a dip in their students’ performance, we may mistak-
enly contribute a negative treatment effect to the clock change, while it only
captures a generally worse performance of students tested later.
Although we cannot fully rule out that consideration of the clock change
mattered when school coordinators proposed a testing date, we consider it
unlikely that coordinators were aware of the clock change and its potential
harmful effect on their students’ performance as dates were scheduled well in
advance.8 Moreover, assessments took place towards the end of the respective
school terms, i.e., during a period where schools schedule examination board
meetings, field days, or other activities filling the students’ and teachers’
timetables. Therefore, we expect that it is challenging enough to arrange
a test date that fits the students’, teachers’, and testing agencies’ schedule
without consideration of the clock change. Apart from that, it is impossible
to identify single schools in the data later, reducing any possible incentive
6 Most schools were tested only on one day per study. In 3.57% of TIMSS- and 3.35% of
PIRLS-schools, a few students were tested after the clock change, although their school was
sampled before the clock change—probably because they were ill during the main testing
time and data for the missing students was collected later.
7 A systematic geographical sampling would have introduced the risk of mistaking structural
differences or differences in the availability of daylight between eastern and western areas
within a country for a performance difference with respect to the DST-shift.
8 According to the National Research Coordinators of the five TIMSS countries in our sample,
the majority of schools was first contacted some 6 to 8 months prior to the testing day.
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for school coordinators to optimize their students’ performance with respect
to test time selection, given that they were indeed aware of the clock change
date.
We check the plausibility of the identifying assumption by comparing
treatment and control group students on variables that might drive test
performance. To do this, we test whether covariate means differ statistically
significantly between treatment and control group. To account for the fact
that very small differences between treatment and control group lead to
high values for the t-statistic if the sample size is large, we also calculate the
scale-free normalized differences as suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009, p. 24). More specifically, we take the differences in means between
covariates before, xbefore , and after, xafter , the treatment and normalize them
by their sample standard deviations, using the respective sample variances
before, s2before , and after, s2after , the treatment:
∆x =
xafter − xbefore√
s2before + s
2
after
. (2.2)
Following the authors’ rule of thumb, we interpret differences larger than
a quarter of a standard deviation as indication of selection bias and sensitivity
of linear regression with respect to model specification.
To account for potential differences in performance over the week, e.g., a
“blue Monday effect” or exhaustion over the week (Laird, 1925; Guérin et al.,
1993), but also to investigate whether the DST-effect fades out over the week,
we include control variables for each testing day of the week, day , and its
interaction with the treatment indicator:9
TS ijc =η1 + α1 ·DST ijc +
5∑
d=2
γd · day id +
5∑
d=2
δd · day id ·DST ijc
+ x
′
ijc · β + υj + νc + ϵijc.
(2.3)
We use Monday as the reference category. Therefore, α1 represents the
treatment effect for Mondays after the treatment. The marginal effect of
the time change on the Tuesday under DST equals then, for instance, the
9 Please note that we thereby allow the treatment effect to vary non-linearly over days of the
week. We also investigated whether imposing a more restrictive functional form, such as
quadratic or cubic time trends, change our results. As we did not find evidence of increased
fit and our results remained similar, we decided in favor of the specification presented here.
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treatment dummy, α1, plus the coefficient of the treatment interacted with
the performance on d = 2 after the clock change, δ2.
2.4 Data
The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
(IEA) has been assessing fourth- and eighth-graders’ reproduction, applica-
tion, and problem solving skills in several areas of math and science since
1995 in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS).
Moreover, the IEA measures trends in fourth-graders’ reading literacy and
comprehension every five years in the Progress in International Reading Liter-
acy Study (PIRLS).
We can make use of several fortunate coincidences in the latest currently
available waves of 2011 which we use for the following analyses: First,
2011 is the only year for which we can use assessment data for all three
testing areas (math, science, and reading) because both TIMSS and PIRLS
data were collected. Secondly, while data on the exact date of the testing
was not contained in previous waves, this information is available in the
2011 waves. Lastly, as student achievement data were collected in the last
months of the respective countries’ school terms, the field phases of several
countries coincided with the transition into DST. In TIMSS 2011, there was
an overlap between fourth-graders’ testing dates and the clock change in
seven countries. Being especially interested in performance differences on
the Monday after the clock change (which was March 28, 2011), we have to
exclude the two countries that lack test data onMondays (Finland and Ireland).
After excluding four students who were tested on a Sunday and 309 cases
with missings on our covariates, our analytic sample from TIMSS contains
8,813 fourth-graders in 364 schools from Denmark, Lithuania, Norway, Spain,
and Sweden.10 As Denmark did not participate in PIRLS 2011, our PIRLS
sample includes Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, and Spain, but also Finland
where students’ reading performance was assessed on all weekdays. After
listwise deletion of 357 cases with missing values, our analytic PIRLS sample
sums up to 13,255 fourth-grade students clustered in 508 schools.
TIMSS and PIRLS follow a matrix-sampling approach, meaning that there
are many more questions asked in total than answered by a single student in
the assessment booklets. Whereas students answer only one booklet, each
10 We focus on students in grade 4 as the data for eighth-graders do only include two countries
(Sweden and Finland) for the respective time period and reading literacy is not assessed in
grade 8. We do, however, draw on the eighth-graders sample in our robustness checks.
19
item is contained in more than one booklet. The IEA uses this overlap to
construct an estimate of the achievements in the student population with the
help of scaling methods from item-response theory (see Mullis et al. (2009a,
p. 123), Mullis et al. (2009b); Yamamoto and Kulick (2012)). To account for
the uncertainty introduced by imputing the scores, the IEA provides five
plausible values of the achievement scores. We retain this uncertainty by
using all five plausible values in the following analyses.11
Achievement scales range usually from 300 to 700 points. To establish
comparability over time and between countries, the IEA scaled achievement
test scores in 1995 (TIMSS) and 2001 (PIRLS) to an international mean of 500
and a standard deviation of 100.
Note that we focus on TIMSS for the following short description of our
data in order to save space. We provide statistics for our PIRLS sample in the
appendix (tables A2.1 and A2.2) and outline only main points in this section.
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the plausible values for the countries in
our sample, showing that students perform between the intermediate and
the high international benchmark, which are set at 475 and 550 points. On
average, students achieve scores of about 509 points in math (S.D.≈72) and
515 points in science (S.D.≈70). Spanish students score lowest and Danish
as well as Lithuanian students highest in math. In the science assessment,
test scores are highest for Swedish and lowest for Norwegian children. For
PIRLS, we find an average of 536 points in reading (S.D.≈68), and that the
best readers in our sample are the Finnish students, while the elementary
school children in Norway achieve the lowest scores (cf. appendix table A2.1).
Table 2.1 contains further descriptive statistics on our later controls. We
include gender and age in months to investigate heterogeneous effects and
to account for potential differences between treated and controls. All of our
students are in grade 4 and the average student is about 10 years old. Half
of the sample is female. The high performing Danish, Finnish, Swedish, and
Lithuanian students are, on average, one year older than the lower performing
Norwegian and Spanish children.
11 More specifically, we apply Rubin’s Rules (Rubin, 1987) to combine adjusted coefficients
and standard errors from all plausible values as implemented in the multiple imputation
(mi) commands in Stata.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics (TIMSS)
Pooled Denmark Lithuania Norway Spain Sweden
Student Performance
Math 509.14 537.29 537.47 496.54 490.41 505.95
(71.97) (68.66) (71.57) (68.81) (69.15) (67.50)
Science 515.47 528.38 518.35 496.23 515.67 534.84
(69.90) (71.01) (65.32) (64.13) (70.93) (74.84)
Student demographics
Female 0.50 0.54 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.48
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age (months) 122.70 130.55 128.30 116.59 117.40 128.76
(7.28) (4.59) (4.28) (3.48) (5.00) (3.93)
Test language spoken at home
always 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.74 0.78
(0.41) (0.37) (0.37) (0.40) (0.44) (0.41)
sometimes 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.21
(0.39) (0.37) (0.36) (0.39) (0.39) (0.41)
never 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01
(0.16) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.26) (0.11)
Books at home
< 1 shelf ( <=10) 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.06
(0.28) (0.28) (0.33) (0.24) (0.29) (0.24)
1 shelf (11-25) 0.25 0.27 0.36 0.19 0.26 0.20
(0.44) (0.45) (0.48) (0.39) (0.44) (0.40)
1 bookcase (26-100) 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.34
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47)
2 bookcases (101 - 200) 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.20 0.16 0.22
(0.37) (0.37) (0.30) (0.40) (0.36) (0.41)
> 2 bookcases (>200) 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.19 0.15 0.18
(0.35) (0.31) (0.25) (0.39) (0.36) (0.38)
Day covariates
Monday 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.15
(0.35) (0.35) (0.30) (0.35) (0.37) (0.36)
Tuesday 0.27 0.17 0.24 0.22 0.35 0.29
(0.44) (0.38) (0.43) (0.42) (0.48) (0.46)
Wednesday 0.30 0.48 0.29 0.34 0.24 0.28
(0.46) (0.50) (0.45) (0.47) (0.43) (0.45)
Thursday 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.18
(0.40) (0.37) (0.41) (0.42) (0.40) (0.39)
Friday 0.09 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.09
(0.28) (0.19) (0.37) (0.25) (0.21) (0.28)
Observations 8813 564 2116 2328 2208 1597
Notes: Own calculations for the pooled sample based on TIMSS 2011. Mean values and
standard deviations (in parentheses) of the pooled and country-specific samples. The day
covariates indicate the percentage of students tested on that day. We used all five plau-
sible values and applied Rubin’s rule (Rubin, 1987) to calculate the appropriate standard
deviations of the average student performances.
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We include an indicator for whether students wrote the test in the lan-
guage they speak at home to control for language-related differences in test
scores. About 80% do indeed always stick to the test language at home and
only 2-3% indicate to never use it at home. To control for the children’s socio-
economic background by proxy, we add the number of books at home.12
Most children indicate that their parents have 26-100 books (one bookcase)
at home. In 14% of the cases, children report more than two bookcases (more
than 200 books) at home. The average number of books at home is relatively
high in Sweden, Norway, and Finland, though relatively low in Lithuania.
When turning to test days, the table shows that most students were tested
on Tuesdays or Wednesdays. In our TIMSS-sample, 14% of the overall sample
was tested onMondays (table 2.1), thereof 43% before and 57% after the switch
to DST. 15% of the PIRLS-students were tested on a Monday (appendix table
A2.1), 28% of them under ST and 72% under DST.
As outlined in the previous section, we test for (normalized) differences
between students treated before and after the clock change. The results are
reported in table 2.2 for TIMSS and appendix table A2.2 for PIRLS. While
absolute differences are statistically significantly different from zero for most
variables, they show neither a systematic pattern nor are the normalized dif-
ferences above the critical value of 0.25 suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009, p. 24). Including these covariates in the following regressions controls
for slight differences between groups that should not substantially affect our
results.13
12 There are three main reasons why we favor this often used proxy for the educational,
social, and economic background of the family. First, the number of books at home is easily
comparable across countries (Wößmann, 2004). Second, the predictive power of the books
variable with respect to student performance is higher than that of parents’ educational
background (Wößmann, 2003). Third, while books at home are reported for nearly all
students, parents’ educational achievement is systematically missing for about one third
of the cases in our TIMSS sample and about 12% in our PIRLS sample. Missing cases are a
selective sample of students with a low number of books at home.
13 We also investigate differences in other proxies for the students’ socio-economic status
between “treated” and “untreated” students, e.g., own possessions including books, study
desks, or computers. We do not find a systematic pattern within and over countries that
would point to a selection of specific students or schools to the treatment or control group.
Moreover, our results are very similar after including these variables as additional controls.
22
Ta
bl
e
2.2
:D
iff
er
en
ce
si
n
co
va
ria
te
sb
ef
or
e
an
d
af
te
rt
he
tre
at
m
en
t(
TI
M
SS
)
Be
fo
re
A
fte
r
Be
fo
re
-A
fte
r
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
di
ffe
re
nc
e
M
ea
n
(S
.D
.)
M
ea
n
(S
.D
.)
D
iff
.(
P-
va
lu
e)
St
ud
en
td
em
og
ra
ph
ic
s
Fe
m
al
e
0.5
0
(0
.50
)
0.5
0
(0
.50
)
0.0
0
(0
.93
)
–.
00
1
Ag
e
(m
on
th
s)
12
3.5
1
(7
.11
)
12
2.0
3
(7
.36
)
1.4
8
(0
.00
)
–.
14
4
Te
st
la
ng
ua
ge
at
ho
m
e
–
al
w
ay
s
0.7
7
(0
.42
)
0.8
1
(0
.39
)
–0
.04
(0
.00
)
0.0
76
–
so
m
et
im
es
0.2
1
(0
.41
)
0.1
6
(0
.37
)
0.0
5
(0
.00
)
–.
09
0
–
ne
ve
r
0.0
2
(0
.15
)
0.0
3
(0
.17
)
–0
.01
(0
.11
)
0.0
24
Bo
ok
s
at
ho
m
e:
–
le
ss
th
an
on
e
sh
el
f(
<
=
10
)
0.0
8
(0
.27
)
0.0
9
(0
.29
)
–0
.01
(0
.03
)
0.0
32
–
on
e
sh
el
f(
11
-2
5)
0.2
4
(0
.43
)
0.2
7
(0
.44
)
–0
.02
(0
.01
)
0.0
38
–
on
e
bo
ok
ca
se
(2
6-
10
0)
0.3
4
(0
.48
)
0.3
6
(0
.48
)
–0
.01
(0
.19
)
0.0
20
–
tw
o
bo
ok
ca
se
s(
10
1
-2
00
)
0.1
7
(0
.38
)
0.1
6
(0
.37
)
0.0
2
(0
.06
)
–.
02
9
–
m
or
e
th
an
tw
o
bo
ok
ca
se
s(
>
20
0)
0.1
6
(0
.37
)
0.1
3
(0
.33
)
0.0
3
(0
.00
)
–.
06
9
D
ay
of
te
st
:
–
M
on
da
y
0.1
3
(0
.34
)
0.1
5
(0
.35
)
–0
.01
(0
.05
)
0.0
29
–
Tu
es
da
y
0.2
0
(0
.40
)
0.3
2
(0
.47
)
–0
.12
(0
.00
)
0.1
95
–
W
ed
ne
sd
ay
0.3
7
(0
.48
)
0.2
4
(0
.43
)
0.1
3
(0
.00
)
–.
20
3
–
Th
ur
sd
ay
0.1
9
(0
.39
)
0.2
1
(0
.41
)
–0
.02
(0
.00
)
0.0
44
–
Fr
id
ay
0.1
0
(0
.30
)
0.0
7
(0
.26
)
0.0
3
(0
.00
)
–.
07
1
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
40
00
48
13
88
13
N
ot
es
:
Th
e
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
st
he
m
ea
n
va
lu
es
an
d
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
ns
of
al
lc
ov
ar
ia
te
sf
or
th
e
co
nt
ro
lg
ro
up
(te
st
ed
be
fo
re
th
e
tr
an
sit
io
n
in
to
D
ST
)a
nd
th
e
tr
ea
tm
en
tg
ro
up
(te
st
ed
af
te
rt
he
tr
an
sit
io
n)
.T
he
th
ird
co
lu
m
n
co
nt
ai
ns
th
e
di
ffe
re
nc
e
in
m
ea
ns
an
d
th
e
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
p-
va
lu
es
fro
m
te
st
in
g
th
e
hy
po
th
es
is
th
at
th
e
tw
o
m
ea
ns
ar
e
eq
ua
l.
Th
e
la
st
co
lu
m
n
re
po
rt
st
he
no
rm
al
iz
ed
di
ffe
re
nc
es
as
su
gg
es
te
d
by
Im
be
ns
an
d
W
oo
ld
rid
ge
(2
00
9,
p.
24
).
Ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
ba
se
d
on
TI
M
SS
20
11
.
23
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Performance-effects of the clock change in the pooled
sample
Table 2.3 reports the effects of the clock change on students’ performance
in math, science, and reading for the pooled sample of all countries. Note
that the students tested in math were also tested in science and vice versa,
because both fields were part of the TIMSS study. Most of the TIMSS students
did also participate in the PIRLS reading assessment, but not all of them.14
Table 2.3: Impact of the clock change on students’ perfor-
mance (pooled sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: TIMSS (8,813 observations)
a) Mathematics
DST effect –4.042 –9.131 –3.462 –8.139
(3.512) (8.742) (3.074) (7.663)
b) Science
DST effect –3.892 –10.601 –3.433 –9.439
(3.444) (8.586) (2.909) (7.293)
Sample: PIRLS (13,255 observations)
c) Reading
DST effect 0.506 8.180 0.309 4.072
(2.695) (6.626) (2.306) (5.686)
Sociodemographic controls X X
Days & interactions X X
Notes: Own calculations for the pooled sample based on TIMSS and
PIRLS 2011. Sociodemographic controls: gender (reference: male),
age (centered), age (centered, squared), books at home (refer-
ence: one bookcase), test language spoken at home (reference: al-
ways); day and interaction controls: weekday (reference: Monday),
weekday×DST. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In the HLM specification without covariates (table 2.3, column 1), students
scored about 4 points lower in both math and science when tested during
14 We would have liked to also present within-analyses for students who participated in both
TIMSS and PIRLS and completed one study before and the other one after the clock change.
Unfortunately, TIMSS and PIRLS were always conducted at consecutive days within the
same week. Nevertheless, we verified that the results presented here are not sensitive to
the order in which the tests took place.
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the week after the clock change. Given a standard deviation of about 72 and
70 points, test scores in the week after the clock change drop by roughly 6%
of a standard deviation. Yet, these effects are neither substantial in terms
of statistical significance nor in terms of magnitude. This gets even clearer
when looking at the estimate for reading, indicating that students performed
less than 1% of a standard deviation better when sampled after the clock
change. Again, the effect is not statistically different from zero.
Two points stand out after including weekday dummies and weekday-
treatment interaction terms as of equation 2.3 in column 2. First, students’
patterns of performance in the week before the time shift are rather stable
(figure 2.1).15 Second, as the Monday before the time change is our refer-
ence category, the treatment coefficient in column 2 shows the reduction
in students’ test scores at the Monday immediately after the switch to DST.
We would expect the treatment effects to be largest for the first day of the
week when only one night passed since the clock had been advanced. For
both math and science, the coefficients imply that the negative effect on
students’ test scores is indeed strongest on Mondays after the shift where
students might suffer most from sleep deprivation. Contradictory to that,
PIRLS students performed slightly better in reading on the Monday after
the clock change when compared to the average over the week. Yet, as the
standard errors increase by about the same rate, all point estimates remain
statistically insignificant. Plotting the average performance levels shows that
students’ achievement scores decrease only slightly after the clock change as
can be seen from the dashed line in figure 2.1 for math (panel a) and science
(panel b). For reading, we observe a very small positive effect (panel c). Please
keep in mind, however, that these differences are not statistically significant
and equal to the magnitude of normal fluctuations over weekdays.
15 To the best of our knowledge, there are only two studies on day-of-week effects in students’
performance with contradictory results. Laird (1925) finds students’ performance highest on
Wednesdays. While Laird (1925) uses a multi-faceted measure of cognitive abilities, Guérin
et al. (1993) test 8- to 10-year old girls’ attention, mental speed, and visual scanning abilities
in a letter cancellation test. Guérin et al. (1993) do not find a pattern for 8-year-olds but do
find peaks in performance for the 10-year-old girls on Tuesdays or Fridays.
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Figure 2.1:
Performance before (solid line) and after (dashed line) the clock change over
weekdays
Notes: Own calculations based on TIMSS and PIRLS 2011. The ordinate was scaled to a range
of roughly 0.5 standard deviations above the average performance in reading and 0.5
standard deviations below the average performance in math.
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Adding covariates for gender, age, age squared, books at home, and
whether test language is spoken at home instead (column 3) does only slightly
decrease the estimates of the treatment effects when compared to column
1, confirming our identification assumption.16 As given in full detail in the
appendix tables A2.3 to A2.5, the signs of all covariates moreover follow
expected patterns with female students scoring lower in math and science
but higher in reading, and diminishing positive effects of students’ age on test
scores.17 In the TIMSS-sample, students who never talk in the test language
when at home score at least one third of a standard deviation below those
who always speak it. Obviously, this effect is even larger for reading abilities:
Children who never use the test language at home score half a standard
deviation lower than children who took the test in their mother tongue. The
coefficients for books at home also show the expected signs: Students with
low socio-economic status and up to 10 books at home score nearly 75% of a
standard deviation lower in science than those with a socio-economic status
close to the sample average. The respective effects in math and reading are a
bit smaller (68% and 63% of a standard deviation).
Considering the full model (table 2.3, column 4), where DST needs to be
interpreted as the treatment effect on Mondays after the shift, yields slightly
different estimates for reading but not for math and science when compared
to column 2. In terms of effect sizes, the DST effect on students’ performance
in math and science is about as large as the respective gender differences,
though insignificant. In reading, the DST effect is about three times smaller
than the gender difference.
We test whether girls’ or boys’ performance is more sensitive to sleep
deprivation in table 2.4, columns 1-2. We find no indication of gender effects,
which is in line with Monk and Aplin (1980).
Children’s sleep deprivation might be dependent on their socio-economic
background if the latter is correlatedwith factors that determine the children’s
sleep duration as well, e.g., parents’ weekend work. We report heterogeneous
treatment effects by students’ confidence with the test language (table 2.4)
and the number of books at home (table 2.5).18 Although students who report
a very large number of books on their parents’ shelves were most strongly
affected on Mondays after the clock change in the TIMSS-sample, this effect
16 Adding country fixed effects does not affect our results. As we do not have enough degrees
of freedom in all testing areas, we report the most parsimonious models only.
17 Older students achieve better test score results as we already noted on the descriptive level.
As higher age is, however, also a sign of grade repetition or late school enrollment due to
possible developmental delay of the child, test scores do not proportionally rise with age.
18 For these and all other following estimations, we only give the treatment effects in order to
save space. We display full results in the appendix.
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is still far from being significantly different from zero and not backed up by
the PIRLS-sample. We also do not find coherent indication of heterogeneous
effects when we split the sample by whether the test language is spoken at
home.
Table 2.4: Students’ performance by gender and by whether test
language is spoken at home
Gender Test language spoken at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female Male Always Sometimes Never
Sample: TIMSS
a) Mathematics
DST effect –1.969 –3.977 –3.556 –4.861 –4.450
(3.471) (3.625) (3.195) (4.453) (12.214)
b) Science
DST effect –3.391 –2.919 –3.359 –5.686 –1.980
(3.276) (3.248) (2.936) (4.961) (12.302)
Observations 4393 4420 6977 1600 236
Sample: PIRLS
c) Reading
DST effect –0.303 1.902 0.338 –1.934 8.364
(2.608) (2.590) (2.433) (3.571) (9.759)
Observations 6595 6660 10845 2083 327
Notes: Own calculations based on TIMSS and PIRLS 2011. Regressions include
the following socioeconomic controls: gender (reference: male), age (cen-
tered), age (centered, squared), books at home (reference: one bookcase), test
language spoken at home (reference: always). Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
2.5.2 Performance-effects of the clock change in the
country-specific samples
Table 2.6 presents the treatment effect estimates by countries. It can be seen
that the pattern we described previously for the pooled sample is also reflected
in most of the country-specific samples. The effects on students’ performance
are strongest in Norway and Sweden. Norwegian and Swedish students score
about one third (29% and 37% respectively) of a standard deviation lower in
math on Mondays after the clock change. The equivalent treatment effects
for science are approximately 22% of a standard deviation in Norway and a
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Table 2.5: Students’ performance by books at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0-10 11-25 26-100 101-200 200+
Sample: TIMSS
a) Mathematics
DST effect –1.804 –0.623 –3.076 –4.084 –6.001
(6.212) (4.235) (3.609) (4.528) (5.858)
b) Science
DST effect –3.464 –0.231 –2.981 –3.900 –5.547
(6.626) (3.988) (3.355) (4.738) (5.732)
Observations 758 2245 3096 1456 1258
Sample: PIRLS
c) Reading
DST effect 3.066 4.463 –0.255 0.614 –0.388
(4.687) (3.056) (2.975) (3.539) (3.855)
Observations 1048 3043 4871 2401 1892
Notes: Own calculations based on TIMSS and PIRLS 2011. Regressions include
the following socioeconomic controls: gender (reference: male), age (cen-
tered), age (centered, squared), test language spoken at home (reference: al-
ways). Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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31% of a standard deviation drop in performance in Sweden. But again, none
of these effects is significantly different from zero.
Table 2.6: Country-specific impact of the clock change on students’ per-
formance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Denmark Finland Lithuania Norway Sweden Spain
Sample: TIMSS
a) Mathematics
DST effect 28.546 1.028 –19.950 –24.616 –4.667
(25.547) (20.757) (15.614) (15.186) (16.502)
b) Science
DST effect 14.143 –1.307 –14.185 –22.154 –6.867
(29.155) (21.109) (12.003) (14.392) (14.249)
Observations 564 2116 2328 1597 2208
Sample: PIRLS
c) Reading
DST effect –10.880 12.194 15.132 –7.796 11.487
(9.435) (16.242) (14.067) (24.206) (10.140)
Observations 3502 2125 2267 1773 3588
Notes: Own calculations based on TIMSS and PIRLS 2011. Gender (reference: male),
age (centered), age (centered, squared), books at home (reference: one bookcase),
test language spoken at home (reference: always), weekday (reference: Monday),
interaction weekday×DST included as controls. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A word of caution is in order when investigating the test results for
Denmark. In Denmark, only 17 control and 64 treatment group students were
tested on aMonday. What is more is that no students were tested on the Friday
before the phase delay. Therefore, we do not only lack power to identify any
significant effect for Mondays and Fridays but get highly imprecise estimates
for the treatment effect which might explain the rather large positive though,
again, insignificant rise in test scores after the transition into DST.19
The results for reading are equally mixed, and estimates show even
positive signs in Lithuania, Sweden, and Spain, although all treatment effects
are not significantly different from zero.
19 Moreover, Lithuania sampled only 93% of the international target population, namely those
students taught in Lithuanian (Joncas, 2012), whereas all other countries in our sample
did not impose a restriction with respect to language of instruction. This sample selection
might be one reason why the Lithuanian treatment effects are slightly different.
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2.5.3 Extensions and robustness checks
Two weeks before and after the clock change
If the insignificant decreases in performance in the week after the clock
change were just noisy deviations from zero, we would expect that our
estimates of the test results two weeks after the clock change are also not
clear-cut. If, to the contrary, our one-week effects are factual decreases in
performance that are not harmful enough to become significant, we would
expect one of the following patterns for treatment effects two weeks before
and after the time shift: Either the mildly disrupted circadian clocks have
synchronized to the light-dark cycle and two-week treatment effects are
consistently and remarkably smaller than the one-week effects. Or students’
sleep deficits have accumulated because they did not or only slowly adapt
their bed hours to the new system. In the latter case, we would expect
systematically larger and potentially significantly negative treatment effects.
Considering the longer observation period of two weeks before and after
the clock change moves most of our estimates of the average performance in
the two weeks after the clock change closer to zero, but only very slightly
and not consistently (table 2.7). When we break down the analysis to the
five countries in our TIMSS-sample and compare the already discussed per-
formance estimates on Mondays immediately after the clock change (table
2.6) with our new estimates for the 2-week-window (table 2.8), we do also
not find a clear trend: The average TIMSS-performance of the two Mondays
after the time change is lower in Denmark and Sweden (in the latter does
the estimate even turn significantly negative), but higher in Lithuania. This
ambiguity is also mirrored in the PIRLS-sample.
Age effects
The fact that we do not find negative effects on performance in school might
be due to the young age of the children in our sample. As children need
more sleep in general and are rather morning-chronotypes getting sleepy
early in the evenings, they might have less trouble falling asleep when sent
to bed earlier (Gau and Soong, 2003) and recover fast from a sleep deficit. In
line with this reasoning, Gau and Soong (2003) find Taiwanese students in
fourth and fifth grade significantly more morning-oriented and with longer
hours of nighttime sleep than sixth- to eighth-graders. Likewise, Edwards
(2012) reports that older middle school students in the US are more positively
affected when delaying school starting times than younger middle school
students. At the same time, he finds no treatment effects for elementary
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Table 2.7: Impact of the clock change in the pooled sample, 2
weeks before and after
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: TIMSS (14,942 observations)
a) Mathematics
DST effect –1.132 –7.164 –0.871 –3.920
(2.932) (7.230) (2.556) (6.286)
b) Science
DST effect –1.757 –10.057 –1.552 –6.260
(2.947) (7.281) (2.467) (6.073)
Sample: PIRLS (21,379 observations)
c) Reading
DST effect –1.193 4.324 –1.333 1.524
(2.408) (5.671) (2.080) (4.974)
Sociodemographic controls X X
Days & interactions X X
Notes: Own calculations for the pooled sample based on TIMSS and
PIRLS 2011. Sociodemographic controls: gender (reference: male),
age (centered), age (centered, squared), books at home (reference: one
bookcase), test language spoken at home (reference: always); day and
interaction controls: weekday (reference: Monday), weekday×DST.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.8: Impact of the clock change by countries, 2 weeks before and
after
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Denmark Finland Lithuania Norway Sweden Spain
Sample: TIMSS
a) Mathematics
DST effect 13.378 17.113 –9.175 –27.847** –8.245
(21.675) (18.155) (13.050) (13.496) (13.445)
b) Science
DST effect 3.076 16.361 –9.827 –24.831* –8.951
(21.615) (17.469) (9.808) (13.210) (12.154)
Observations 1213 3755 2971 3522 3481
Sample: PIRLS
c) Reading
DST effect –8.349 12.633 11.605 1.003 2.373
(8.754) (16.182) (14.519) (14.226) (9.844)
Observations 4600 3664 2870 3458 6787
Notes: Own calculations based on TIMSS and PIRLS 2011. Gender (reference: male),
age (centered), age (centered, squared), books at home (reference: one bookcase),
test language spoken at home (reference: always), weekday (reference: Monday),
interaction weekday×DST included as controls. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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school students—either because these are younger or because elementary
school starts one hour later than middle schools.
Furthermore, if parents anticipate the clock change and slowly familiarize
their children to the new time regime in the days before the switch to DST,
the sleep deprivation of young children after the time change would be
minimal and our assumption of perfect compliance with the treatment would
be violated.20
Adolescents are not as easily convinced to go to bed one hour earlier.
Additionally, chronotypes shift to evening types during puberty, and ado-
lescents have trouble to go to bed early and to rise early in the mornings
(Carskadon et al., 1993). Ages 11 and 12 are usually seen as the transition
ages from morningness to eveningness (Carskadon et al., 1993). As girls enter
puberty earlier, sleep patterns of same-aged students are often found to be
gender-specific (Wolfson and Carskadon, 1998; Laberge et al., 2001; Gau and
Soong, 2003; Randler, 2011; Heissel and Norris, 2015). More specifically, the
relevant transition to puberty affecting sleep patterns (approximately Tanner
stage 3, see Campbell et al. (2012)) occurs at median age 11 for girls and at
median age 13 for boys as recent evidence from the US suggests (Heissel and
Norris, 2015). Heissel and Norris (2015) show, furthermore, that the impact of
changing school starting times on students’ academic performance increases
not only with age but rises markedly for students at ages 11 (girls) and 13
(boys).
Drawing on this literature, we test two additional hypotheses to inves-
tigate the robustness of our null results: First, we hypothesize that female
students of age 11 or older are significantly more negatively affected by the
clock change than younger females, whereas treatment effects for boys above
and below age 11 do not differ significantly. Second, we expect that our
treatment effects are significantly larger in a sample of eighth-graders than
in our fourth-graders sample we have been studying up to now.
To investigate the first hypothesis, we run separate regressions for boys
and girls in our fourth-graders sample and interact the DST effect with a
dummy equal to one if the student is at least 11 years old. Table 2.9 repeats
the results of the regressions without interactions as a benchmark (columns 1,
4) and displays additionally the specifications including interactions (columns
2-3, 5-6). We find no support for the hypothesis that more mature girls are
more affected by the clock change: The interactions are small in magnitude
and not statistically significantly different from zero.
20 Note, however, that TIMSS and PIRLS are low-stakes tests where test performance is without
consequences for students so that the risk of imperfect compliance is low.
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Table 2.9: Fourth graders’ performance by gender and age
Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: TIMSS
a) Mathematics
DST effect –1.969 –1.205 –1.143 –3.977 –4.814 –4.771
(3.471) (3.707) (3.685) (3.625) (3.843) (3.825)
11 years or older 15.016*** 15.226*** 10.760** 10.947**
(4.669) (4.668) (4.732) (4.732)
DST × 11 years or older –2.774 –2.820 3.147 3.126
(5.560) (5.552) (5.223) (5.219)
Country Fixed Effects X X
b) Science
DST effect –3.391 –2.585 –2.419 –2.919 –4.809 –4.710
(3.276) (3.461) (3.445) (3.248) (3.513) (3.498)
11 years or older 17.135*** 17.434*** 7.997* 8.171*
(4.520) (4.520) (4.715) (4.713)
DST × 11 years or older –2.842 –2.773 7.437 7.549
(5.076) (5.073) (5.397) (5.386)
Observations 4393 4393 4393 4420 4420 4420
Country Fixed Effects X X
Sample: PIRLS
c) Reading
DST effect –0.303 –0.296 –0.254 1.902 2.668 2.690
(2.608) (2.626) (2.617) (2.590) (2.874) (2.866)
11 years or older 13.471*** 13.612*** 17.134*** 17.227***
(3.663) (3.662) (3.472) (3.471)
DST × 11 years or older 0.050 0.072 –2.848 –2.787
(4.029) (4.025) (3.949) (3.947)
Observations 6595 6595 6595 6660 6660 6660
Country Fixed Effects X X
Notes: Own calculations based on TIMSS and PIRLS 2011. Regressions include the following so-
cioeconomic controls: gender (reference: male), age (centered), age (centered, squared), books
at home (reference: one bookcase), test language spoken at home (reference: always). Standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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To shed some light on our second hypothesis, i.e., whether our insignif-
icant results are driven by the fact that the students in our sample are, on
average, only 10 years old, we repeated all analyses with 2011-TIMSS-data on
eighth-graders who are right in the middle of puberty (about 15 years old).
The chronotypes of eighth-graders should have shifted to eveningness so that
these students are more at risk to detrimental sleep deficits after the clock
change. Only Finland and Sweden sampled 5,591 students in 199 schools
within the time period we are interested in. Descriptive statistics show that
the Finnish and Swedish students in the sample are very similar and mir-
ror the descriptives of Finnish and Swedish fourth-graders we presented
previously.21
Table 2.10 contains our estimation results for a time window of one week
before and after the clock change, estimated with sociodemographic controls
in a pooled model (columns 1-2) and separately for Finland (columns 3-4) and
Sweden (columns 5-6). To explore, again, whether older students are more
affected and whether the age effect varies with the students’ gender, we add
interactions between gender, age, and the DST effect in columns 2, 4, and 6.
Comparing the size of the general treatment effects for eighth-graders in
math and science as reported in table 2.10 with the effects of fourth-graders
in the respective fields (table 2.3, column 3) shows that the effects for eighth-
graders are even smaller and not statistically significantly different from zero.
The treatment effects for eighth-graders tested on a Monday (not shown) are
slightly larger than the fourth-graders effects, though also not statistically
significantly different from zero. Moreover, as can be seen from column
2, we find neither convincing evidence that the clock change had a more
detrimental effect for older students nor that girls were more negatively
affected than boys.
We draw the same conclusions from our country-specific analyses (columns
3-6): We find a slightly positive DST effect in Finland and a negative DST ef-
fect in Sweden; both effects are not significantly different from zero (columns
3, 5). Size and significance of the treatment effects reject our hypothesis of
more harmful effects for pubertal students.
In sum, all these results do not confirm the hypotheses that DST is more
harmful to older students or to more mature girls.
21 Again, we do not present tables for most of our age effects analyses. All tables are available
upon request.
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Table 2.10: Impact of the clock change on eighth-graders, 1 week before
and after
Pooled Finland Sweden
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math
DST effect –1.489 –2.945 3.111 1.841 –8.914 –11.087*
(3.550) (3.907) (4.467) (4.861) (5.708) (6.683)
Age –0.947*** –1.490*** –1.541*** –2.362*** –0.179 –0.617
(0.199) (0.348) (0.265) (0.520) (0.289) (0.446)
Female –3.652** –4.764** –3.904 –4.935 –3.060 –4.251
(1.790) (2.318) (2.459) (3.145) (2.962) (3.248)
Age × DST 0.607 1.096* 0.346
(0.530) (0.657) (0.857)
Female × DST 3.030 2.352 4.439
(3.469) (4.108) (7.083)
Female × Age 0.688 1.132 0.372
(0.513) (0.756) (0.723)
Age × Female × DST 0.003 –0.914 0.925
(0.822) (1.052) (1.214)
Science
DST effect –0.842 –2.017 2.562 1.924 –7.554 –8.941
(3.647) (4.074) (4.376) (4.847) (6.613) (7.951)
Age –0.772*** –1.598*** –1.125*** –2.034*** –0.350 –1.095*
(0.208) (0.384) (0.244) (0.457) (0.370) (0.596)
Female –5.336*** –6.158** –3.949* –4.379 –7.330* –8.169*
(1.960) (2.577) (2.271) (2.944) (3.876) (4.649)
Age × DST 1.157** 1.107 1.324
(0.538) (0.682) (0.929)
Female × DST 2.261 1.010 2.763
(4.087) (4.185) (9.318)
Female × Age 1.070* 1.359* 0.697
(0.587) (0.697) (0.947)
Age × Female × DST –0.594 –1.002 –0.099
(0.789) (0.987) (1.406)
Observations 5591 5591 3547 3547 2044 2044
Notes: Own calculations based on TIMSS 2011. Gender (reference: male), age (in months,
centered), books at home (reference: one bookcase), test language spoken at home
(reference: always) included as controls. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Dependence on students’ position in the distribution of test scores
If students at different ranges of the test score distribution were significantly
but reversely affected, our analysis of students’ average performances could
mask these effects. Figures 2.2a to 2.2c present the overall distribution of test
scores before and after the shift into DST. Especially in math and science,
the test score distributions after the clock change are nice copies of the
distribution before the clock change, though slightly shifted to the left. These
results are very similar to our very small negative regression estimates (table
2.3, column 4). In reading, the differences between both density curves
are even smaller and also in line with the regression results. All in all,
we do neither find substantial treatment effects nor meaningful differences
between the magnitude of treatment effects at any point of the performance
distribution.
Testing times
Unfortunately, we lack data on the exact times of the assessment, except for
Lithuania where the National Research Coordinator provided us with addi-
tional information. While the official IEA instruction for schools required to
take the tests in the morning hours, we cannot rule out that schools conducted
the tests at different times or had different school starting times. As cognitive
performance typically increases over the morning hours (Vandewalle et al.,
2009), students who took the test later might have performed better. Yet, this
would only affect our results if the schools sampled after the clock change
had started the assessment systematically later. At least in the Lithuanian
case, however, we do not find an indication of assessments being scheduled
to later time slots after the clock was advanced by one hour.
2.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we investigate whether the transition into daylight saving
time in spring and a potentially associated sleep loss in the following nights
affect students’ performance in international assessment tests. Our findings
challenge the prevalent public feeling that the clock change harms school
children’s performance.
We exploit the fact that schools participating in the large-scale interna-
tional student assessment studies TIMSS and PIRLS were randomly allocated
to testing times before and after the time shift. We mimic the underlying
basic structure of a regression discontinuity design by studying differences
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Figure 2.2:
Distribution of performance before (solid line) and after (dashed line) the
clock change
Notes: Own calculations for the pooled sample based on all plausible values of TIMSS and
PIRLS 2011. The density plots make use of the predicted values from the full model,
including all covariates, weekdays and interactions with weekdays.
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in performance between students tested before and after the clock change.
We do not find elementary school children to be measurably affected by the
clock change as our treatment effects are small in magnitude and not statisti-
cally significantly different from zero. The estimated treatment effects are
most consistent with the hypothesis of a sleep deprivation effect in Norway
and Sweden. But even for these countries we fail to find statistically signifi-
cant effects in the week after the clock change. If these effects, nonetheless,
pointed to the Norwegian and Swedish children’s higher sensitivity to yet
another phase change introduced by DST,22 we should find large effects for
Finland as well. The treatment effects for Finnish students are, however,
small, sometimes of positive sign, and not statistically significantly different
in all cases. Moreover, for the other countries in our sample and for the
testing area reading, we even find positive, yet insignificant, effects.
To investigate several further hypotheses and possible explanations for
our findings, we vary the time window around the clock change. Having
found no indication of an accumulating or decreasing sleep deficit in elemen-
tary school children, we conclude that these young children do not suffer
from a harmful sleep deficit. This might be due to the fact that one hour
of sleep loss is not enough to disbalance circadian clocks by so much that
performance within the following week suffers measurably.
Sleep patterns change with pubertal development and are gender-specific
(Carskadon et al., 1993; Gau and Soong, 2003; Heissel and Norris, 2015). If the
harmfulness of DST depended on the students’ age and maturity in general,
we would expect larger treatment effects for more mature girls beyond age 10
and for a sample of older students. To explore these hypothesis, we interact
the treatment effect with age and gender. Moreover, we repeat our analyses
with a smaller TIMSS sample of 15-year-olds. Having found no indication
that treatment effects are larger for pubertal students or higher for more
mature girls, we conclude that our null results cannot be explained by the
fact that we use a sample of fourth-graders in our main analyses.
All in all, we cannot substantiate the advice that “class and school perfor-
mance tests should not take place in the first week(s) after the transition into
DST” (Schneider and Randler, 2009, p. 1047). We are also cautious to interpret
our results as indicative of DST introducing permanent disruptions of the
circadian system as Gaski and Sagarin (2011) do for the US because many
previous studies show recovery effects in sleep patterns and adaption of the
circadian clocks that should not be observed if circadian clocks stay out of
22 Northern students’ circadian rhythms are more often affected by a long, dark winter and a
long, bright summer. Previous studies provide evidence that this impairs (mental) health
(Rosen et al., 1990; Björkstén et al., 2009).
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step. Based on our research, it is fair to say that neither parents nor children
nor competence testing agencies (or even policy makers) have reason to
worry about allegedly harmful effects of the transition into daylight saving
time.
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2.7 Appendix
Table A2.1: Descriptive statistics (PIRLS)
Pooled Finland Lithuania Norway Spain Sweden
Student Performance
Reading 536.35 566.81 536.16 509.48 523.06 539.89
(67.51) (63.50) (64.29) (61.19) (65.81) (66.95)
Student demographics
Female 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.50
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age (months) 123.70 129.30 128.35 116.59 117.43 128.87
(7.28) (4.19) (4.26) (3.51) (4.93) (3.95)
Test language at home
always 0.82 0.89 0.83 0.81 0.77 0.77
(0.39) (0.31) (0.37) (0.39) (0.42) (0.42)
sometimes 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.22
(0.36) (0.30) (0.36) (0.38) (0.38) (0.41)
never 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02
(0.16) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.24) (0.13)
Books at home
< 1 shelf ( <=10) 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.08
(0.27) (0.22) (0.33) (0.24) (0.29) (0.27)
1 shelf (11-25) 0.23 0.15 0.35 0.19 0.27 0.20
(0.42) (0.36) (0.48) (0.39) (0.44) (0.40)
1 bookcase (26-100) 0.37 0.42 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.34
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47)
2 bookcases (101 - 200) 0.18 0.23 0.10 0.20 0.16 0.20
(0.39) (0.42) (0.30) (0.40) (0.37) (0.40)
> 2 bookcases (>200) 0.14 0.15 0.06 0.18 0.14 0.18
(0.35) (0.36) (0.25) (0.39) (0.35) (0.38)
Day covariates
Monday 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.26 0.04
(0.36) (0.33) (0.37) (0.29) (0.44) (0.19)
Tuesday 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.32
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.46)
Wednesday 0.26 0.27 0.20 0.30 0.22 0.36
(0.44) (0.45) (0.40) (0.46) (0.41) (0.48)
Thursday 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.13 0.17
(0.39) (0.42) (0.40) (0.42) (0.34) (0.38)
Friday 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.12
(0.33) (0.32) (0.38) (0.31) (0.33) (0.32)
Observations 13255 3502 2125 2267 3588 1773
Notes: Own calculations for the pooled sample based on PIRLS 2011. Mean values and stan-
dard deviations (in parentheses). The day covariates indicate the percentage of students
tested on that day. We used all five plausible values and applied Rubin’s rule (Rubin, 1987)
to calculate the appropriate standard deviations of the average student performance.
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Table A2.2: Differences in covariates before and after the treatment (PIRLS)
Before After Before - After Normalizeddifference
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Diff. (P-value)
Student demographics
Female 0.50 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.01 (0.45) –.009
Age (months) 124.52 (7.15) 123.00 (7.32) 1.52 (0.00) –.148
Test language
always 0.81 (0.39) 0.83 (0.38) –0.02 (0.02) 0.028
sometimes 0.17 (0.37) 0.15 (0.35) 0.02 (0.00) –.042
never 0.02 (0.14) 0.03 (0.16) –0.01 (0.01) 0.030
Books at home
< 1 shelf ( <=10) 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.28) –0.01 (0.08) 0.021
1 shelf (11-25) 0.21 (0.41) 0.25 (0.43) –0.04 (0.00) 0.067
1 bookcase (26-100) 0.38 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.02 (0.05) –.024
2 bookcases (101 - 200) 0.19 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38) 0.02 (0.00) –.036
> 2 bookcases (>200) 0.15 (0.36) 0.14 (0.34) 0.01 (0.05) –.024
Day of test
Monday 0.09 (0.29) 0.20 (0.40) –0.10 (0.00) 0.209
Tuesday 0.32 (0.47) 0.23 (0.42) 0.09 (0.00) –.139
Wednesday 0.27 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.01 (0.11) –.020
Thursday 0.18 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40) –0.02 (0.02) 0.028
Friday 0.14 (0.34) 0.12 (0.32) 0.02 (0.00) –.041
Observations 6159 7096 13255
Notes: The table reports the mean values and standard deviations of all covariates for the
control group (tested before the transition into DST) and the treatment group (tested
after the transition). The third column contains the difference in means and the re-
spective p-values from testing the hypothesis that the two means are equal. The last
column reports the normalized differences as suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009, p. 24). Calculations based on PIRLS 2011. “Test language” indicates whether
students speak the test language at home.
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Table A2.3: Impact of the clock change on performance in math (pooled
sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Part
DST effect –4.04 (3.51) –9.13 (8.74) –3.46 (3.07) –8.14 (7.66)
Day of test
Tuesday –6.26 (8.25) –3.62 (7.32)
Wednesday 0.69 (7.97) 1.87 (7.03)
Thursday –6.39 (8.20) –3.73 (7.27)
Friday 0.02 (9.99) 3.55 (8.92)
Interactions
Tuesday × after 12.18 (10.75) 9.53 (9.56)
Wednesday × after 1.11 (10.71) 2.98 (9.41)
Thursday × after 8.10 (11.01) 7.18 (9.73)
Friday × after 0.92 (13.99) 1.76 (12.29)
Demographics
Female –9.71*** (1.51) –9.69*** (1.51)
Age 0.15 (0.19) 0.15 (0.19)
Age2 –0.06*** (0.01) –0.06*** (0.01)
Test language
sometimes –10.98*** (2.14) –10.95*** (2.14)
never –23.54*** (5.66) –23.46*** (5.67)
Books at home
<=10 –48.69*** (3.77) –48.74*** (3.78)
11-25 –21.19*** (1.90) –21.19*** (1.90)
101-200 9.44*** (2.29) 9.46*** (2.29)
>200 10.88*** (2.71) 10.85*** (2.70)
Constant 511.92*** (9.26) 514.31***(11.14) 529.56*** (9.92) 530.07***(11.33)
Random Part
σ2υj 392.86***(261.88) 386.50***(258.11) 456.33***(300.87) 447.90***(295.84)
σ2νc 870.46***(83.63) 862.70***(83.66) 608.83***(63.19) 603.51***(63.35)
σ2ϵijc 3973.37***(73.97)3972.80***(74.16)3692.35***(67.18)3691.83***(67.42)
Observations 8813 8813 8813 8813
Model F-test 1.32 .49 53.7 33.3
p-value .25 .88 .00 .00
Notes: Own calculations for the pooled sample based on TIMSS 2011. “Test language”
indicates whether students speak the test language at home. Age is the centered
students’ age in months. Reference categories used are the following: Test lan-
guage is always spoken at home, the student reports one bookcase (26-200) of
books at home, and the student was tested on a Monday before the transition into
DST. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A2.4: Impact of the clock change on performance in science (pooled
sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Part
DST effect –3.89 (3.44) –10.60 (8.59) –3.43 (2.91) –9.44 (7.29)
Day of test
Tuesday –5.99 (7.90) –3.00 (6.87)
Wednesday 1.25 (7.66) 2.37 (6.50)
Thursday –3.99 (7.97) –1.16 (6.84)
Friday –0.01 (9.51) 3.06 (8.20)
Interactions
Tuesday × after 14.26 (10.72) 10.83 (9.27)
Wednesday × after 4.00 (10.55) 5.75 (8.96)
Thursday × after 9.20 (11.01) 7.56 (9.43)
Friday × after 1.91 (14.07) 3.39 (11.92)
Demographics
Female –7.52*** (1.38) –7.50*** (1.38)
Age 0.24 (0.18) 0.24 (0.18)
Age2 –0.06*** (0.01) –0.06*** (0.01)
Test language
sometimes –19.60*** (2.10) –19.56*** (2.10)
never –30.73*** (4.93) –30.69*** (4.93)
Books at home
<=10 –51.79*** (2.55) –51.87*** (2.55)
11-25 –19.87*** (2.34) –19.87*** (2.33)
101-200 12.67*** (2.93) 12.70*** (2.93)
>200 14.21*** (2.91) 14.18*** (2.89)
Constant 517.11*** (6.52) 518.77*** (8.81) 534.58*** (6.51) 534.31*** (8.15)
Random Part
σ2υj 173.58***(121.19) 173.72***(121.48) 164.29***(112.89) 164.29***(112.96)
σ2νc 868.10***(87.57) 863.16***(88.80) 536.64***(59.55) 533.96***(60.94)
σ2ϵijc 3884.66***(82.24)3883.66***(82.30)3534.70***(72.04)3533.53***(72.15)
Observations 8813 8813 8813 8813
Model F-test 1.28 .517 71.5 44.8
p-value .26 .86 .00 .00
Notes: Own calculations for the pooled sample based on TIMSS 2011. “Test language”
indicates whether students speak the test language at home. Age is the centered
students’ age in months. Reference categories used are the following: Test lan-
guage is always spoken at home, the student reports one bookcase (26-200) of
books at home, and the student was tested on a Monday before the transition into
DST. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A2.5: Impact of the clock change on performance in reading (pooled
sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Part
DST effect 0.51 (2.70) 8.18 (6.63) 0.31 (2.31) 4.07 (5.69)
Day of test
Tuesday 11.46* (5.91) 6.29 (5.15)
Wednesday 0.48 (6.15) –1.49 (5.31)
Thursday 6.12 (6.77) 2.93 (5.77)
Friday –5.99 (7.05) –7.13 (6.01)
Interactions
Tuesday × after –14.07* (7.95) –8.30 (6.86)
Wednesday × after –6.87 (7.89) –2.81 (6.73)
Thursday × after –12.70 (8.81) –7.36 (7.48)
Friday × after 8.60 (9.65) 8.31 (8.18)
Demographics
Female 11.69*** (1.07) 11.68*** (1.07)
Age 0.08 (0.13) 0.08 (0.14)
Age2 –0.07*** (0.01) –0.07*** (0.01)
Test languagee
sometimes –14.59*** (1.76) –14.56*** (1.76)
never –34.59*** (3.78) –34.57*** (3.79)
Books at home
<=10 –42.55*** (2.28) –42.54*** (2.28)
11-25 –20.30*** (1.69) –20.25*** (1.69)
101-200 12.29*** (1.64) 12.23*** (1.64)
>200 13.07*** (2.08) 13.00*** (2.08)
Constant 532.23*** (9.45) 528.09*** (10.71) 538.11*** (8.38) 536.87*** (9.49)
Random Part
σ2υj 427.16***(275.23) 437.80***(281.92) 330.71***(214.23) 336.58***(217.96)
σ2νc 635.66*** (53.35) 621.55*** (51.90) 397.54*** (37.70) 389.02*** (36.62)
σ2ϵijc 3548.62*** (67.01) 3546.38*** (66.76) 3222.66*** (54.10) 3221.55*** (53.92)
Observations 13255 13255 13255 13255
Model F-test 0.04 1.68 113 69.2
p-value 0.85 0.08 0.00 0.00
Notes: Own calculations for the pooled sample based on PIRLS 2011. “Test language” indi-
cates whether students speak the test language at home. Age is the centered students’
age in months. Reference categories used are the following: Test language is always
spoken at home, the student reports one bookcase (26-200) of books at home, and the
student was tested on a Monday before the transition into DST. Standard errors in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A2.6: Students’ math performance by books at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0-10 11-25 26-100 101-200 200+
Fixed Part
DST effect –1.804 –0.623 –3.076 –4.084 –6.001
(6.212) (4.235) (3.609) (4.528) (5.858)
Student demographics
Female –12.504** –10.493*** –12.246*** –9.502** –2.659
(5.702) (3.050) (2.459) (3.782) (4.498)
Age (months, centered) –0.325 –0.152 0.436 0.767* 0.418
(0.533) (0.370) (0.344) (0.431) (0.554)
Age2(centered) –0.038 –0.033 –0.081*** –0.058* –0.057
(0.032) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.040)
Test language at home
– sometimes –8.578 –13.263*** –12.057*** –13.990** –9.554*
(7.017) (3.689) (3.527) (5.498) (5.185)
– never –8.783 –25.655*** –21.409** –39.881*** –35.765**
(12.718) (8.810) (8.594) (12.222) (17.434)
Constant 472.500*** 505.752*** 532.322*** 544.438*** 537.253***
(13.650) (11.605) (8.989) (10.733) (9.213)
Random Part
σ2υj 633.584*** 603.725*** 351.534*** 464.932*** 262.189***
(465.891) (405.745) (239.585) (327.337) (235.418)
σ2νc 374.251*** 600.191*** 531.319*** 535.118*** 1041.771***
(203.040) (101.916) (93.050) (114.725) (220.566)
σ2ϵijc 4434.005*** 3721.909*** 3570.920*** 3374.711*** 3570.616***
(372.464) (137.408) (102.430) (167.562) (198.026)
Observations 758 2245 3096 1456 1258
Model F-test 1.57 5.58 8.78 5.06 1.8
p-value .15 0.00 0.00 0.00 .10
Notes: Own calculations based on TIMSS 2011. Reference categories used are the
following: Test language is always spoken at home, and the student is male. * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A2.7: Students’ science performance by books at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0-10 11-25 26-100 101-200 200+
Fixed Part
DST effect –3.464 –0.231 –2.981 –3.900 –5.547
(6.626) (3.988) (3.355) (4.738) (5.732)
Student demographics
Female –9.896* –10.090*** –9.876*** –7.292** 1.699
(5.321) (2.893) (2.618) (3.320) (4.060)
Age (months, centered) –0.364 –0.047 0.641** 1.285*** 0.446
(0.493) (0.319) (0.299) (0.445) (0.513)
Age2(centered) –0.049* –0.037 –0.080*** –0.067** –0.054
(0.029) (0.023) (0.025) (0.032) (0.038)
Test language at home
– sometimes –24.927*** –22.086*** –18.529*** –21.566*** –19.994***
(6.353) (3.818) (3.235) (4.928) (4.899)
– never –20.850 –34.616*** –27.707*** –45.888*** –40.706***
(13.457) (8.399) (8.839) (12.909) (15.588)
Constant 477.537*** 512.425*** 536.594*** 552.222*** 544.524***
(10.130) (6.893) (5.666) (6.014) (8.393)
Random Part
σ2υj 323.847*** 154.591*** 88.463*** 91.727*** 215.352***
(283.227) (119.601) (72.132) (84.800) (167.073)
σ2νc 406.496*** 522.330*** 466.957*** 391.436*** 913.834***
(181.373) (96.731) (78.063) (108.923) (210.660)
σ2ϵijc 4154.278*** 3496.890*** 3346.028*** 3440.415*** 3501.204***
(294.887) (128.923) (104.421) (150.893) (176.000)
Observations 758 2245 3096 1456 1258
Model F-test 3.89 10.5 11.3 7.59 4.19
p-value .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Own calculations based on TIMSS 2011. Reference categories used are the
following: Test language is always spoken at home, and the student is male. * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A2.8: Students’ reading performance by books at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0-10 11-25 26-100 101-200 200+
Fixed Part
DST effect 3.066 4.463 –0.255 0.614 –0.388
(4.687) (3.056) (2.975) (3.539) (3.855)
Student demographics
Female 4.774 5.802*** 10.493*** 15.875*** 19.880***
(4.425) (2.225) (2.028) (2.621) (3.103)
Age (months, centered) –0.618 –0.445* 0.238 1.396*** 0.347
(0.395) (0.256) (0.208) (0.318) (0.398)
Age2(centered) –0.051** –0.034** –0.083*** –0.056** –0.117***
(0.026) (0.016) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025)
Test language at home
– sometimes –22.337*** –17.405*** –12.654*** –16.461*** –9.367**
(5.576) (3.075) (2.734) (3.870) (4.323)
– never –38.956*** –43.315*** –33.597*** –41.030*** –24.884**
(9.043) (6.998) (7.709) (8.720) (11.157)
Constant 493.939*** 516.362*** 540.384*** 551.015*** 551.422***
(10.013) (8.923) (7.445) (6.719) (9.312)
Random Part
σ2υj 397.711*** 361.984*** 238.491*** 175.009*** 356.214***
(284.590) (242.106) (158.843) (124.227) (251.569)
σ2νc 347.269*** 355.208*** 414.946*** 328.800*** 404.640***
(137.585) (67.142) (53.356) (69.759) (98.998)
σ2ϵijc 3668.163*** 3157.304*** 3072.398*** 3108.141*** 3423.860***
(230.197) (98.878) (77.784) (105.872) (150.476)
Observations 1048 3043 4871 2401 1892
Model F-test 7.49 14.5 16.7 15.9 13.3
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Own calculations based on PIRLS 2011. Reference categories used are the
following: Test language is always spoken at home, and the student was tested on
a Monday before the transition into DST. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A2.9: Students’ math performance by gender and by whether test
language is spoken at home
Gender Test language spoken at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
female male always sometimes never
Fixed Part
DST effect –1.969 –3.977 –3.556 –4.861 –4.450
(3.471) (3.625) (3.195) (4.453) (12.214)
Demographics
Female –9.053*** –13.265*** –12.473
(1.719) (3.497) (10.849)
Age 0.144 0.198 0.350 –0.567 1.265
(0.243) (0.309) (0.223) (0.368) (0.782)
Age2 –0.048*** –0.055*** –0.054*** –0.044* 0.018
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.024) (0.084)
Books at home
< 1 shelf (<=10) –52.103*** –50.151*** –50.338*** –49.996*** –43.265***
(4.332) (4.686) (4.360) (6.076) (14.598)
1 shelf (11-25) –21.374*** –22.611*** –20.495*** –24.888*** –22.566*
(2.628) (2.691) (2.077) (4.442) (12.225)
2 bookcases (101-200) 11.698*** 8.518** 10.504*** 10.493* –5.320
(2.905) (3.824) (2.468) (6.046) (15.287)
> 2 bookcases ( >200) 16.332*** 6.343* 11.581*** 13.281** –5.117
(3.553) (3.703) (2.723) (6.612) (17.929)
Constant 519.236*** 530.766*** 528.879*** 521.369*** 494.728***
(10.915) (9.199) (9.754) (11.455) (14.296)
Random Part
σ2υj 547.636*** 368.686*** 434.414*** 541.115*** 0.000
(362.138) (253.431) (288.645) (373.489) (0.000)
σ2νc 575.952*** 605.084*** 597.647*** 444.245*** 1592.131***
(76.291) (83.316) (66.573) (131.136) (668.232)
σ2ϵijc 3484.272*** 3896.057*** 3640.317*** 3919.167*** 3634.655***
(95.922) (97.238) (83.412) (177.383) (550.371)
Observations 4393 4420 6977 1600 236
Model F-test 35.1 30.8 47.9 18.5 1.61
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .12
Notes: Own calculations based on TIMSS 2011. Age is the centered students’ age
in months. Reference categories used are the following: the student reports one
bookcase (26-200) of books at home, and the student is male. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table A2.10: Students’ science performance by gender and by whether
test language is spoken at home
Gender Test language spoken at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
female male always sometimes never
Fixed Part
DST effect –3.391 –2.919 –3.359 –5.686 –1.980
(3.276) (3.248) (2.936) (4.961) (12.302)
Demographics
Female –6.661*** –9.986*** –15.650
(1.695) (3.819) (10.307)
Age 0.094 0.424 0.450** –0.282 0.605
(0.247) (0.259) (0.193) (0.458) (0.866)
Age2 –0.058*** –0.056*** –0.060*** –0.043* –0.019
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.025) (0.095)
Books at home
< 1 shelf (<=10) –54.492*** –54.342*** –50.198*** –59.950*** –48.874***
(4.145) (3.418) (2.965) (5.864) (15.582)
1 shelf (11-25) –20.795*** –20.551*** –18.505*** –26.688*** –23.729*
(3.052) (3.366) (2.510) (4.395) (12.785)
2 bookcases (101-200) 14.432*** 12.019*** 13.219*** 14.056** 4.510
(3.370) (3.933) (3.188) (5.874) (18.114)
> 2 bookcases ( >200) 19.678*** 9.719** 15.076*** 13.880** 3.345
(3.389) (3.868) (3.159) (5.588) (19.227)
Constant 527.994*** 534.467*** 533.705*** 519.398*** 501.774***
(7.051) (6.290) (6.332) (8.533) (15.118)
Random Part
σ2υj 194.037*** 126.471*** 146.189*** 237.683*** 0.000
(137.412) (92.653) (101.849) (173.809) (0.000)
σ2νc 501.946*** 526.170*** 518.059*** 530.045*** 1158.402***
(72.855) (73.867) (63.769) (128.065) (790.192)
σ2ϵijc 3402.029*** 3667.406*** 3447.463*** 3681.465*** 4256.135***
(103.288) (93.695) (75.528) (153.635) (565.125)
Observations 4393 4420 6977 1600 236
Model F-test 46.4 42.4 51.6 21.3 1.88
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
Notes: Own calculations based on TIMSS 2011. Age is the centered students’ age
in months. Reference categories used are the following: the student reports one
bookcase (26-200) of books at home, and the student is male. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table A2.11: Students’ reading performance by gender and by whether
test language is spoken at home
Gender Test language spoken at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
female male always sometimes never
Fixed Part
DST effect –0.303 1.902 0.338 –1.934 8.364
(2.608) (2.590) (2.433) (3.571) (9.759)
Demographics
Female 12.414*** 8.364*** 0.748
(1.138) (2.800) (8.565)
Age 0.114 0.027 0.377** –0.886*** 0.757
(0.196) (0.179) (0.149) (0.291) (0.927)
Age2 –0.058*** –0.071*** –0.067*** –0.058*** –0.014
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.018) (0.065)
Books at home
< 1 shelf (<=10) –47.256*** –42.840*** –40.846*** –50.983*** –45.519***
(3.236) (3.010) (2.573) (5.102) (12.417)
1 shelf (11-25) –22.700*** –19.432*** –19.038*** –26.676*** –28.506***
(2.311) (2.358) (1.793) (3.603) (10.414)
2 bookcases (101-200) 15.653*** 9.850*** 13.233*** 10.271** 9.834
(2.470) (2.273) (1.645) (4.738) (13.267)
> 2 bookcases ( >200) 18.863*** 8.922*** 13.439*** 12.107** 22.871
(2.837) (2.882) (2.107) (4.832) (15.138)
Constant 549.682*** 538.700*** 537.002*** 528.775*** 499.871***
(8.795) (7.953) (7.905) (9.326) (12.246)
Random Part
σ2υj 364.305*** 285.232*** 291.196*** 358.528*** 95.196*
(236.928) (188.270) (189.308) (247.165) (235.515)
σ2νc 357.049*** 405.995*** 402.682*** 361.163*** 721.900***
(42.826) (47.988) (42.370) (74.956) (472.802)
σ2ϵijc 3105.701*** 3317.985*** 3154.296*** 3309.876*** 4011.707***
(67.001) (70.707) (53.613) (158.299) (541.070)
Observations 6595 6660 10845 2083 327
Model F-test 66.4 56.8 96.8 29.9 3.7
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Own calculations based on PIRLS 2011. Age is the centered students’ age
in months. Reference categories used are the following: the student reports one
bookcase (26-200) of books at home, and the student is male. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Chapter 3
Non-Take-Up of Student
Financial Aid: A
Microsimulation for Germany
Stefanie P. Herber and Michael Kalinowski
3.1 Introduction and background
Imagine you are a student in financial need and the government offers you
about EUR 38,000 to finance your studies at the following conditions: Given
your earnings five years after finishing your studies are sufficiently high, you
have to repay 20% of the present value in small rates over the next 20 years.1
Would you accept the offer?
From a traditional economic perspective, it seems irrational not to claim
this huge amount of money. This chapter shows, however, that about two
fifths of the eligible German students turn down the offered means-tested
student financial aid amounts, called “BAföG”. We draw upon rich house-
hold data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study2 for the years 2002
through 2013 to calculate individual taxes and net incomes in a detailed
microsimulation model. Drawing upon the simulated data, we determine
those students eligible to receive BAföG and calculate their student financial
aid amounts. Subsequently, we give insights into potential explanations why
1 The numbers are in present values, calculated at an interest rate of 2%, see Grave and
Sinning (2014).
2 Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), data for years 1984-2013, version 30, SOEP, 2015,
doi:10.5684/soep.v30.
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students, who would receive lucrative amounts of student financial aid if
they filed an application, do not take up BAföG.
Studying non-take-up of means-tested student financial aid is important
for three main reasons.
First of all, BAföG aims at reducing inequalities in educational opportuni-
ties for students from low-income families. Federal need-based aid wouldmiss
its targets if its design prevented eligible students from claiming their benefits
and consequently endangered their enrollment at university or fostered later
drop out. Previous research shows indeed that, also for Germany where
studying is relatively inexpensive, financial factors are related to students’
lower transition rates to university (Schindler and Reimer, 2010; Hübner,
2012) and the intergenerational educational mobility is low (OECD, 2014, p.
93). Moreover, students who decide in favor of studying but against taking
up need-based aid have to spend a considerable time working to earn their
living. This is generally associated with a higher likelihood to prolong study-
ing (Avdic and Gartell, 2015), dropping out of higher education without a
degree (Triventi (2014) provides a review), and performing worse academi-
cally (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2003; Callender, 2008). Against the
background that completing higher education goes hand in hand with a
non-trivial monetary return, the “sheepskin effect” (Heckman et al., 2006,
e.g.), social inequalities can corroborate even if students make their way to
university.
Apart from that, evidence on the existence of non-take-up or its low
elasticity with respect to the benefits available would moreover contribute
to explaining the low responsiveness of students’ university enrollments to
higher student financial aid amounts in industrialized countries (Dynarski,
2002; Rubin, 2011; Steiner and Wrohlich, 2012).
Last but not least, our results have consequences for researchers and
policy makers wanting to anticipate or evaluate student financial aid reforms.
As shown by Wiemers (2015), ignoring non-take-up when considering an
increase in social assistance benefits leads to striking overestimation of the
fiscal costs and the number of (factual) beneficiaries involved.
We contribute to two separate strands of literature on non-take-up: One
large strand of literature investigates non-take-up of social benefits, especially
social assistance, unemployment, and pension benefits. This literature builds
mainly on a straightforward utility maximization of consumers who take up
benefits as long as the expected amounts exceed the anticipated claiming costs
(Moffitt, 1983; Blundell et al., 1988; Anderson and Meyer, 1997).3 Previous
3 An extensive review of the literature is beyond the scope of this chapter. Currie (2004),
Hernanz et al. (2004), and Finn and Goodship (2014) provide comprehensive reviews.
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studies found that the benefits amount available as well as the anticipated
duration (Anderson and Meyer, 1997) of support increase the probability that
people take up benefits. The counterweight to these encouraging factors are
barriers especially introduced by high transaction costs associated with the
claiming process, such as complex forms (Currie, 2004), but also information
gaps (Strauss, 1977), and stigma costs (Weisbrod, 1970; Moffitt, 1983).
The unifying feature of the literature on non-take-up of social benefits
is that benefit amounts have to be calculated for those who do not claim
the benefits and for whom data on benefits received is naturally unavailable.
Explaining non-take-up requires then finding suitable proxy variables for the
expected costs and benefits of (not) taking up.
Although we stick, methodologically, to this strand of literature, we
combine it with insights from a second, separate, strand concerned with debt-
averse behavior and students’ under-usage of student financial aid, mostly
students loans.
So far, only few papers have investigated non-take-up of means-tested
student financial aid. Among the related previous studies, Kofoed (2015)
draws upon data from the National Center for Education Statistics. The
dataset already contains imputed needs for students who did not file the Free
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) which is essential for applying
for most federal student aid programs in the US. He finds that about one
fifth of eligible US-students fail to complete the FAFSA. Although a minor
percentage of the non-takers receives financial assistance from elsewhere
(King, 2006; Kofoed, 2015), students still forgo significant amounts of aid they
would have been entitled to (Kofoed, 2015). Bird and Castleman (2014) show
that even after having completed the application process once, 20% of eligible
first semester Pell Grant recipients do not re-file the FAFSA in the subsequent
year.
Existing US-studies do not account for the potential endogeneity likely
to arise from omitted variables driving both the levels of means-tested bene-
fits and the decision to claim the benefit. We contribute methodologically
to this literature by addressing endogeneity with an instrumental variable
regression and a sample selection model. More specifically, we instrument
the factual, means-tested benefit amount with the BAföG system’s generos-
ity and with an indicator for whether the student is independently funded.
The implications of the latter are twofold: On the one hand, students who
are independently funded have been working before their higher education
enrollments. Accordingly, they are also likely to have lower benefits, ceteris
paribus. On the other hand, parents’ income is not considered in the means
test if students are independently funded. Therefore, the level of benefits is
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higher, ceteris paribus. Empirically, benefit amounts and being independently
funded are highly positively correlated. Our sample selection model relies, by
contrast, on the exclusion restriction that students who have completed a vo-
cational training before studying are more likely to earn high incomes when
studying and selecting themselves out of the sample of eligible, financially
needy students.
We are not aware of any study analyzing systematically why students
forgo these substantial aid amounts. Previous studies provide, however,
mixed evidence as to whether information constraints and complexity of the
claiming process can explain non-take-up of student financial aid (Bettinger
et al., 2012; Booij et al., 2012; Herber, 2015), while the results are heavily
dependent on the design of the aid scheme.
Non-take-up might, however, be higher if student aid is provided as a loan
but students are not inclined to bear the psychological costs of having debts
(Field, 2009; Oosterbeek and van den Broek, 2009; Cho et al., 2015).4 This debt
aversion is mainly driven by risk aversion and the fear to be unable to repay
the loan, but also by cultural differences (Boatman et al., 2014). Regarding the
zero interest loans studied in this chapter, debt averse behavior is possible
(and rational) for individuals who are willing to save but lack self-control to
prevent overspending of the benefit amounts (Cadena and Keys, 2013).5
For the German case which we focus on here, only some descriptive
statistics stemming from a broad survey of students indicate possible reasons
why students do not file the application for BAföG (Middendorff et al., 2013,
p. 312). Unfortunately, the survey data do not allow to distinguish between
eligible and ineligible students. Therefore, it is not surprising that the most
frequently reported reasons are high incomes of parents’ or partners’ (80%),
high own incomes and assets (30%), and low anticipated benefits (14%). Yet,
25% of the students also name debt aversion as a reason why they did not file
an application. Information constraints and perceptions of the complexity of
claiming are, however, not questioned.
Our study confirms the previous finding that longer expected duration of
benefit receipt and higher benefits are important factors of higher take-up
rates. Nevertheless, the elasticity of the level of benefits with respect to the
probability not to take up BAföG is rather inelastic with an estimate of -.41.
4 Note however that, contrary to BAföG, most loans are supplementary and not means-tested.
5 Cadena and Keys (2013) exploit that eligible US-students who have to pay for room and
board and live off-campus can receive a part of the interest-free Stafford loan payed in
cash rather than as a credit to their university account. The authors show that if students
regard different assets as nonfungible and lack self-control to limit their expenses to prevent
overspending, non-take-up can be a rational reaction to avoid overspending.
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Furthermore, our analyses yield very robust evidence that students socialized
by East German parents are considerably less likely to turn down the money,
controlling for various characteristics of students and their parents. Moreover,
in line with findings from behavioral economics, suggesting that students at
risk to exert too little self-control to restrict their consumption to necessary
expenditures (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Cadena and Keys, 2013), we detect
debt-averse behavior of students low in self-control and high in impatience.
Last, being able to draw upon older siblings’ experience in the application
process is related to substantially higher probabilities to claim BAföG.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: After giving an overview of
the German funding scheme BAföG, we elaborate on potential explanations
for non-take-up and suitable proxy variables, drawing upon the literature
presented above and with an eye on the restrictions of our data. We define
the non-take-up rate and outline the empirical models in section 3.4. A
description of the data and the sample follows, before we present results in
section 3.6 and robustness checks in section 3.7. We close with the discussion.
The appendices provide more detailed information on the official calculation
of the BAföG benefits (section 3.9.1), how we simulate these benefits (section
3.9.2), and additional sensitivity analyses for our microsimulation model
(section 3.9.3).
3.2 The German BAföG scheme for higher ed-
ucation students
Need-based income-contingent aid is regulated in the Federal Training Assis-
tance Act (Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz), called “BAföG”. BAföG was
introduced in 1971 and aims at providing equal educational opportunities
for all students, irrespective of their social or financial background. While
a special form of BAföG is available under certain conditions for students
at (higher) secondary schools, this chapter is concerned only with the most
frequent target group of BAföG: students enrolled in higher education.
For students in higher education, funding is generally provided for the
standard period of studying and intends to support the costs of living and
studying. Being the most common form of financial aid for higher education
students in Germany, BAföG supported approximately 647,000 students in
2014 at public expenses of about EUR 2.28 billion (Federal Statistical Office,
2015a, p.32). Based on the recent official data from 2012 (German Bundestag,
2014), 66.7% of all students were formally eligible for BAföG, i.e., they met
the prerequisites to apply but might have been rejected if they did not pass
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the means test. 28% of these formally eligible received funding—this equaled
18.7% of all enrolled students in Germany.
As can be seen from figure 3.1, the funded students’ percentages of all
formally eligible students (upper line) and of all students (lower line) show
an upward trend since 1998. The lines reflect the BAföG reforms of 2001,
2008, and 2010 (see tables A3.10 and A3.11 for details). The reforms increased
the relative scope of BAföG by raising basic income allowances and made
BAföG relatively more attractive by increasing the available aid amounts.
Yet, the BAföG scheme is neither indexed to the development of incomes or
assets nor inflation-adjusted so that reforms are rather used as readjustment
to higher price and income levels.
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Figure 3.1: Funded students’ percentage of the formally eligible and of all
students in Germany
Notes: Own figure based on the numbers reported in German Bundestag (2014) and German
Bundestag (2010).
BAföG is designed as a grant-loan combination: Half of the amount is
generally granted as a subsidy, the other half as a federal zero interest loan.
The loan must be repaid within 20 years after a grace period of five years in
installments of at least EUR 105 a month. BAföG provides insurance against
default risks inasmuch as the repayment is capped at EUR 10,000 and its start
can be delayed in case the single, childless claimant’s monthly income does
not exceed EUR 1,070. The maximum repayment burden for students with
very low incomes amounts, therefore, to 9.8%. This burden is in range with
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proportions of debt usually considered reasonable and bearable (Baum and
Schwartz, 2006). Graduates repaying their loan upfront can save monetary
amounts up to half of their debts. Grave and Sinning (2014) sum up all direct
(grant and loan cap) and indirect subsidies (subsidies of the interest rate).
They calculate that students can receive subsidies of up to EUR 30,381, i.e.,
about 80% of the total BAföG amount (Grave and Sinning, 2014, p. 112).6
Before the students’ and parents’ incomes are considered, students have
to meet institutional and personal requirements in order to determine if they
are formally eligible at all. The most important requirements (see Appendix
3.9.2 for details) are: Students have to be enrolled in their first degree at
higher education institutions, i.e., universities, universities of applied sciences,
colleges for professional education, or academies. Furthermore, students must
hold German citizenship or have prospects of permanent residency, and, in
general, have started their studies before they turn 30 (or 35 for consecutive
programs). All students who pass these eligibility checks are formally eligible
to receive funding.
Whether formally eligible students are also eligible for positive funding
amounts is then assessed in a means test that proceeds in two steps:
First, the means test takes the students’ levels of needs (see table A3.11)
as a base value and deducts his or her own economic capabilities. Moreover,
the economic capabilities of parents—if they have the legal obligation to
support their children—or spouses (or registered partners) are assessed and
deducted. If students are older than 30 or have been working for at least five
years7 before enrolling at university, students are independently funded and
parents’ incomes are not considered for the BAföG calculation. Contrary
to the United States’ student financial aid system where students’ expected
expenses resulting from visiting a specific school are imposed, BAföG uses
fixed amounts based on the students’ living situation. Therefore, students
who are not living at the parents’ home, have children, or have to cover
social security contributions themselves are considered to have additional
financial needs which are addressed by (fixed) additions to the basic need
levels. Until autumn 2016, the maximum BAföG amount offered to a student
who lives outside of the parents’ home, has no children but has to pay own
social security contributions equals EUR 670. Consequently, the maximum
6 The maximal subsidy cited here is based on the maximum monthly benefits of EUR 670, a
repayment of EUR 105 a month, starting after the grace period, and given an interest rate
of 2%. The upfront repayment implies another implicit subsidy of the interest rate, though
upfront payment is not worthwhile for high BAföG amounts (Grave and Sinning, 2014,
p. 113).
7 These five years of working experience may include having completed vocational training
of up to three years prior to studying.
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BAföG amount corresponds roughly to the minimum subsistence level of a
single person (German Bundestag, 2015, p. 8). Parents are required to support
their offspring up to this maximum rate if the means test results in lower
BAföG amounts. The maximum BAföG amount granted reduces to EUR 495
if the student is still living at home.
Second, own income and assets, but also the spouse’s, partner’s, or par-
ents’ income exceeding the respective levels of allowances are subtracted
from these general lump-sum amounts, see section 3.9.1 for details. While
students’ current incomes and assets are relevant, the parents’ or spouse’s or-
partner’s incomes as of the second last year’s tax assessment enter the means
test. Students can, however, request that their parents’ or spouse’s/partner’s
last year’s or current income is used if this is considerably lower than the
second last year’s income.
The student can generally earn own income from a minor employment
paying up to approximately EUR 400 amonth without any deductions (see sec-
tion 3.9.1). Higher earnings are subject to social insurance contributions, per-
sonal income tax, and require the student to opt out of the non-contributory
dependents’ co-insurance, so that most of the students work in jobs that
usually pay EUR 400 at a maximum (Middendorff et al., 2013, p. 395).
After accounting for the students’ own and familial financial situation,
the remaining amount is automatically cashed as a monthly upfront payment
to the students’ bank account. We refer to all students whose remaining
funding amount is positive as “eligible” in the following. In 2014, the average
per person per month funding amount (based on the average of the monthly
expenditures and assuming that students were funded all year round) was
EUR 448; 38% of the funded students received the maximum amounts (Federal
Statistical Office, 2015a, p. 32).
3.3 Potential explanations for non-take up of
BAföG
From a traditional economic perspective, the student is liquidity constrained,
i.e., cannot borrow on the capital market because she cannot offer a collateral
for human capital investments. She faces a problem of intertemporal choice
where she decides whether or not to take-up BAföG. Given this choice, she
maximizes utility from the study and repayment period. In the study period,
she can consume both her own income and BAföG or invest it at the capital
market to save at the market interest rate. After graduation, the student is
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constrained by her current income and the repayment of the interest-free
loan.
The availability of BAföG during the study period relaxes her budget
constraint by allowing her to borrow. Moreover, the subsidies shift her
budget constraint outwards so that she can reach a higher indifference curve
as long as her preferences are (weakly) monotone and non-satiated. It would,
therefore, be rational for the student to accept the money. Even if she does
neither want to spend nor invest BAföG at the capital market, she should keep
the money at home and pay back the (not inflation-adjusted) loan component
some years later.
There might be various reasons for the (seemingly) irrational non-take-
up of BAföG. From a rational choice perspective, we can model take-up
as the student weighing claiming costs against benefits as has been widely
done in the literature analyzing the non-take-up of other social benefits
(Blundell et al., 1988; Anderson and Meyer, 1997; Riphahn, 2001; Whelan,
2010; Bruckmeier and Wiemers, 2012, e.g.). Unfortunately, available data sets
lack direct measures of the determinants of non-take-up. We discuss suitable
proxies and the hypotheses we can investigate with the data at hand in the
following.
3.3.1 Utility from claiming BAföG
Previous studies have identified that both the degree and duration of needs
influence the utility derived from social benefits positively (Moffitt, 1983;
Anderson and Meyer, 1997; Hernanz et al., 2004, e.g.). Accordingly, the
probability not to claim BAföG should be higher if students are in higher
semesters and closer to the completion of their studies, i.e., the expected
duration of the receipt of BAföG is lower. In line with previous research, we
proxy the degree of needs by the level of individual, means-tested benefits
which result from our simulation. We expect that higher benefits decrease
the probability to turn down BAföG, ceteris paribus and that the students
will take up BAföG as long as the level of benefits exceeds the claiming costs.
As the students’ factual costs of living are not accounted for by the BAföG
calculation—apart from a rent subsidy if living outside the parents’ home—
, we include further proxies associated with the students’ factual level of
needs. Student financial aid addresses a very homogeneous group of mainly
childless, unmarried persons that is similar with respect to age, previous
education, and current living situation. Moreover, the BAföG calculation
already takes into account contextual factors such as the students’ and parents’
or partners’ living situation and financial capabilities, so that we can restrict
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our proxies to the individual level. We add a dummy for whether students still
live at home because this may decrease their financial need over and above
its consideration of the students’ place of living in the BAföG calculation.
Furthermore, we include an indicator for whether the student lives in East
Germany where rents8—and therefore need, controlling for parents’ income—
are lower. To control for differences in living costs but also differences in
availability (and accessibility) of minor employment, we also include a dummy
for whether the student is living in an urban or rural area.
Compared to the expected family contribution in the US, the German
law expects parents to support their dependent children with the amount
of their incomes exceeding the respective thresholds (for more details see
section 3.9.1). Therefore, we implicitly control for the parents’ transfers to
their children when keeping the amount of benefits constant. Yet, the official
BAföG calculation takes parents’ incomes in the second-last year as a default,
unless students request using the current, lower, incomes. For that reason,
very high current incomes might be associated with higher transfers to the
offspring not reflected in the BAföG amount. Consequently, we also add the
log of parents’ monthly current gross labor income in 2007-EUR.9
3.3.2 Disutility from claiming BAföG
Studies investigating social assistance benefits (Riphahn, 2001; Whelan, 2010;
Bruckmeier and Wiemers, 2012, e.g.) usually decompose claiming costs into
information and stigma costs. Nevertheless, we doubt for three reasons
that BAföG involves a social stigma comparable to that possibly felt by
persons dependent on social assistance: College is seen as an investment
in aspirant future labor market participants. The fact that students do not
work (enough to fully finance themselves) is a productive and voluntary
“joblessness” because they study full-time and are expected to contribute
taxes on their later high incomes after finishing their studies. Moreover, the
main calculation basis falls off the person who applies and receives aid so
that the reasons for being eligible cannot be attributed to one party. Lastly,
the BAföG status cannot be easily inferred from just knowing that someone
8 See Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development
(2013), p. 3.
9 We are able to separate the level of benefits and the parents’ monthly labor income because
the BAföG calculation uses a special, non-deflated income measure. Owing to extensive
means-testing and imposition of complex allowances and exemptions, labor income and
BAföG benefits are non-linearly related. We report further robustness checks on parents’
transfers in section 3.7.2.
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is studying. The identification as being poor is, however, a necessary feature
of external stigma costs (Weisbrod, 1970).
Different preferences about the welfare state
Nevertheless, we hypothesize that the preferences and perceptions of the
welfare state might be different for students socialized in families living
in the former socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR) before 1989.
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show that socialism increased the East
German’s approval of redistribution and provision of social services. While
the authors expect the large differences in preferences to prevail for one
to two generations (20–40 years) after reunification, i.e., for the sample we
consider here, others have shown that differences in social behavior are
even more persistent (Brosig-Koch et al., 2011; Heineck and Süssmuth, 2013).
Moreover, a recent report demonstrates that East Germans have stronger
preferences for high levels of social security and equality and more frequently
agree that the state is responsible to achieve these goals (DESTATIS et al.,
2013, p. 370ff).
Therefore, we hypothesize that East German families are more likely to
regard it as the state’s responsibility to provide student financial aid. They
should, consequently, find it more natural to take up the assistance they are
eligible for than students without an East German background. If this were
the case, students with parents living in the East before 1989 should show
higher take up rates than similar children to West German parents socialized
in an environment more focused on individual responsibility.
To investigate this hypothesis, we include a dummy for whether at least
one parent10 was living in East Germany in 1989 and refer to this variable as
“East German background” interchangeably.
Information constraints and complexity of claiming
Students must be aware of the existence of federal aid, be able to understand
the aid scheme and file the application. A lack of knowledge and high com-
plexity of claiming the benefits, by contrast, increases claiming costs. A large
strand of the literature casts doubt on the assumption of perfectly informed
students (Bettinger et al., 2012; Loyalka et al., 2013; Herber, 2015), emphasizes
the complexity of federal aid applications (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2006;
10 In more than 98% of these cases, both parents were living together either in East or West
Germany.
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Dynarski and Wiederspan, 2012), and shows that information deficits drive
non-take-up of other social benefits (Coady et al., 2013).
Our expectations of the role of information constraints and the com-
plexity of claiming aid for the German case are ambiguous: One the one
hand, BAföG is the only broad federal student aid scheme and adminis-
trated by the student service departments of the universities which makes
BAföG a well-known funding source. Moreover, calculators to approximate
the prospective benefits are available online (e.g., www.bafoeg-info.de or
www.bafoeg-rechner.de/Rechner). On the other hand, students and their par-
ents perceive the 170 questions of the BAföG application forms as confusing
and hard to understand; the average time to file the application amounts to
4.5–5.5 hours (Bundeskanzleramt and Nationaler Normenkontrollrat, 2010,
p. 41). Apart from that, students might have flawed expectations about their
eligibility because the calculation of benefits and the means test are also very
complex. In this regard, students might not even consider the possibility that
they are eligible, especially if their parents’ current labor incomes are high
and they are unaware of the fact that the BAföG calculation uses parents’
incomes two years ago.
To shed light on the competing mechanisms, we include an indicator
for the parents’ current labor income, arguing that a higher current labor
income decreases not only the perceived level of needs as described in the
last section but contributes to the misconception of eligibility. Families with
higher current income should, therefore, show a lower probability to take up
BAföG if high labor income and high misconception of benefits are correlated,
over and above the fact that the need for additional resources is lower.
Moreover, we include an indicator for parents’ college degree, assuming
that parents with a college degree are, ceteris paribus, better informed about
higher education, show higher levels of financial literacy, and might have
more resources to assist their children in filing the complex forms. The
relationship between non-take-up of BAföG and parents’ college degree
should, consequently, be negative if a lack of information is important.
In the same line of reasoning, we control for whether students can draw
upon the assistance of older siblings who claimed BAföG themselves and are,
therefore, well acquainted with filing the forms.
Finally, different groups might lack awareness of the attractiveness of
BAföG or the student financial aid system in general. First of all, migrants
might suffer from (parents’) language barriers or little (parental) knowledge
about German student financial aid, making them less likely to file the ap-
plication. Furthermore and contrary to the positive relationship between
East German background and take-up described above, East Germans might
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equally well show higher non-take-up rates because they have gained less
institutional experience with BAföG which was established in West Germany.
They might moreover have trouble to file the application because East Ger-
mans still lag behind with respect to financial literacy (Bucher-Koenen and
Lamla, 2014). If information gaps were more important than different welfare
preferences, we would expect a higher non-take-up probability of students
with East German background. The existence and direction of the overall
effect of the East German background variable is, consequently, unclear.
Parents’ experience with public transfers
If East German families or families with a migration background are more
likely to be in contact with the public administration, for example, because
they receive other welfare benefits already or because they need to file ap-
plications for work and residence permits, an economies of scales argument
moderates the mechanisms described above: A closer contact to administra-
tion officers or receipt of other welfare benefits implies economies of scale
when getting informed and filing the applications for BAföG (Dorsett and
Heady, 1991).
At the same time, parents’ experiences with receiving public benefits may
also capture a part of the intergenerational persistence of welfare receipt
(“welfare trap”): It might be more socially acceptable for students to claim
BAföG if they grew up in a family that received welfare benefits (see, for
example, Black and Devereux (2011, p. 1530f) for a review).
To control for these mechanisms, we include a variable for whether
someone in the parents’ household received public transfers (except maternity
benefits and student financial aid) in the previous year. Lacking data on
parents’ complete welfare receipt histories, we cannot disentangle to which
extent our coefficient captures a short-run scale effect or some part of a
long-run preference.11 As both mechanisms point to the same direction, we
can, however, hypothesize that parents’ (successful) experience with filing
forms decreases the likelihood that students reject BAföG if they are eligible.
Time inconsistent preferences, self-control, and debt aversion
Above, we have implicitly assumed a constant exponential discount function
resulting in dynamically consistent preferences. Or, in other words, the
11 In our case, the scale effects argument seems more plausible, however, because we have to
restrict parents’ welfare receipt to a single year, resulting usually in a downward biased
degree of inter-generational persistence in welfare receipt (Page, 2004).
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student’s time preferences when deciding about whether or not to take up
the aid amount equal those when deciding how to shift consumption between
periods. Allowing for hyperbolic discounting relaxes this assumption and
can create settings in which consumers wanted to behave patiently in the
long-run but are tempted by the immediate gratification of the moment and
choose impatiently (Berns et al., 2007, and references cited therein). While
impulsivity is the contrary of self-control and associated with impulsive and
impatient behavior (Duckworth and Kern, 2011, p. 259),“Self-control refers to
the capacity for altering one’s own responses, especially to bring them into
line with standards such as ideals, values, morals, and social expectations,
and to support the pursuit of long-term goals” (Baumeister et al., 2007, p. 351).
Low self-control involves the susceptibility to succumb to impulses, a lack of
thinking before acting, not finishing boring or difficult tasks, and striving for
exiting, possibly dangerous, activities (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001).
Anticipating their own difficulty to spend the borrowedmoney reasonably
as to limit unnecessary debt—or even anticipating that it might be tough
to restrict themselves to pay back the loan after graduating—, sophisticated
students might abstain from borrowing completely.
Following the “Economic Theory of Self-Control” (Thaler and Shefrin,
1981), we can think of the student being composed of two selves, one of the
selves acting as a far-sighted planner and one as a myopic (low self-control)
doer. The far-sighted planner might want to save a part of the benefits not
necessarily needed to repay the loan faster. Foreseeing that they will not be
able to save because they succumb to their impulses, students might rationally
choose a “debt ethic” completely prohibiting borrowing (Thaler and Shefrin,
1981, p. 397). This debt aversion is then not at all irrational but “the logical
conclusion of the desire to precommit one’s future economic activity” (Strotz,
1955, p. 173). Indeed, Cadena (2008) and Keys (2009) show theoretically and
empirically that, if a sophisticated student is sufficiently impatient and her
discount function is quasi-hyperbolic, she rejects an interest-free loan offer
in order to limit her own overspending during the study period.
Consequently, we expect present-biased sophisticated students low in
self-control not to take out the money and spend it carelessly but rather to
show debt-averse behavior and turn down the aid offer completely. As we
discuss in more detail in section 3.5, we add two self-reported indicators of
low self-control/high impulsivity and impatience and their interaction to
our model to test for the existence of the effects elaborated on above. We
expect that students are more likely to reject BAföG if they are high both in
impulsivity and impatience.
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Because the estimated impact of time preferences significantly depends
on whether risk aversion is allowed for or not (Andersen et al., 2008), we
also control for willingness to take risk, although we do not expect to find an
independent effect of risk aversion due to the specific design of the BAföG
scheme.12
3.4 Method
3.4.1 Definition of non-take-up
Defining a non-take-up rate as the percentage of students who do not take
up the benefits available, although they are eligible, requires data on whether
the student receives the benefits or not. As eligibility for BAföG is unobserv-
able, eligibility and the respective funding amounts the student would have
received had she claimed the benefits must be determined in our microsimu-
lation model.
Four situations can arise when we compare take-up and eligibility: 1.,
Students simulated as being eligible report funding (take-up), 2., students
simulated as eligible do not report funding (non-take-up), 3., students sim-
ulated as ineligible report funding (misclassified), 4., students simulated as
ineligible do not report funding.
We are mainly interested in why eligible students do or do not claim
(cases 1 and 2). Let E denote the number of students simulated as eligible to
receive BAföG and let T denote the number of those students who report
funding in our data. Let upper bars of these variables represent the contrary,
i.e., ineligible E and no take-up of the benefit reported T . The non-take-up
rate (NTU ) is then defined as the percentage of those who report not to take
up the benefits though eligible, (T | E ), to all eligible:
NTU =
E − (T | E )
E
=
(T | E )
E
. (3.1)
WhileNTU exploits the first two cases arising from our microsimulation
model, we can confidently discard the fourth case as ineligible, non-claiming
students are of no interest to us.
12 Wemoreover tested whether our results were affected by omitted variable bias of personality
traits that are also strongly associated with self-control (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001). As
adding personality traits increases neither fit nor changes our results remarkably, we decided
for the more parsimonious models in the following.
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Even with high-quality data, it is possible that we classify students as
ineligible although they are in fact eligible (case 3). This happens when
incomplete or erroneous survey information results in measurement errors.
Other than that, students might be classified erroneously as eligible by the
public authorities, the administrative process and the students filling in the
forms also not being devoid of errors. We use the number of misclassified
students to calculate the beta error rate. The beta error rate is defined as
the percentage of the students classified as ineligible but reporting benefit
receipt (T | E ), divided by the sum of all who report to take up the benefits:
β =
(T | E )
T
. (3.2)
The beta error rate is often seen as a measure of quality of the simulation.
This is somewhat misleading because a very detailed eligibility check and a
precise calculation of the benefitswith the data at hand (potentially containing
measurement error) increase the beta error rate (Frick and Groh-Samberg,
2007). Nevertheless, we follow Bargain et al. (2012) and interpret NTU as
the upper bound of the non-take-up rate because it ignores those students
classified as ineligible by our simulation and calculate a lower bound of the
NTU that subsumes misclassified cases under the eligible cases:
NTUL =
(T | E )
E + (T | E ) . (3.3)
3.4.2 Baseline specification
We can model take up of eligible students in a standard binary choice model
where the latent non-take up of BAföG is equal to one if the utility from
claiming is larger than the claiming costs (or the utility from non-take-up)
and equal to zero otherwise (Moffitt, 1983; Blundell et al., 1988). In our
baseline specification, we run a straightforward pooled Probit model and
regress our dependent variable NTU on the controls discussed above plus
time dummies, age, and gender of the student. We use cluster-robust standard
errors to account for the fact that the similarity between observations of
a single individual over time is higher than the similarity of observations
between different individuals.13
13 In addition to the models presented in the following, we also ran various panel data models.
Although the results were mostly identical, we decided in favor of cross-sectional analyses
because of the small sample size, the fact that we observe students only twice on average,
and the resultant low within and between variations.
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3.4.3 Endogeneity of the benefits amount
As students’ labor income is deducted from their respective needs, students
can influence their level of benefits by earning more or less. If unobserved
variables like ability or motivation drive both the level of benefits by higher
or lower earnings as well as the decision to file the complex application for
BAföG, endogeneity of the level of benefits might bias our estimates. Al-
though incentives to increase own incomes above the threshold of maximum
allowances are low, we want to investigate the possibility that endogene-
ity of the level of benefits affects our results. Thus, we estimate a pooled
instrumental variable (IV) Probit model with the structural equation
NTU ∗ = z1δ1 + αb+ u1, (3.4)
NTU = 1[NTU ∗ > 0], (3.5)
and the first stage for the level of benefits
b = z1δ12 + z2δ22 + u2 = zδ2 + u2. (3.6)
We assume a bivariate normal distribution of the errors u1, u2, independence
between the errors and the explanatory variables z (which includes our
vector of instruments z2), and normality of our reduced form. If u1 and
u2 are correlated, our baseline specification suffers from endogeneity. As
u1|u2 = ρu2+ ϵ and E(ϵ|u2) = 0, we can formally test whether the benefits
level b is exogenous by testing H0 : ρ = 0. We estimate the set of equations
by conditional maximum likelihood with clustered standard errors.
As a reference point, we also run a linear two-stage least-squares re-
gression (TSLS) because TSLS requires less distributional assumptions, e.g.,
errors need not be multivariate normal. Because TSLS ignores the fact that
NTU is binary, we again calculate heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors,
accounting for the clustered nature and inherent heteroskedasticity of our
pooled data.
Similar to McGarry (1996), Whelan (2010), Bruckmeier and Wiemers
(2012), and Wiemers (2015), we instrument the level of benefits by the gen-
erosity of the system, i.e., the maximum amount of benefits available. Con-
trary to previous studies on the take-up of social assistance, we can calculate
individual exogenous maximum benefit amounts because we can exploit the
fact that students’ benefits do not only depend on their own, endogenous
incomes but also on exogenous other features, such as parents’ income or
family situation. Individual exogenous maximum benefits are more powerful
88
than general maximum amounts: Individual amounts exploit both varia-
tion between students due to different exogenous characteristics but also
within students over time because of changes in the parents’ exogenous
characteristics or reforms of the BAföG scheme.
We calculate individual maximum benefit amounts as follows: We take
the maximum level of individual needs as a base value by assuming that the
student is not living with her parents and receives the maximum rent subsidy.
We keep all other factors that determine the student’s needs (e.g., whether
the student has to pay health insurance herself because she is older than 25
years or has own children) at their observed values as these are arguably
not endogenous. From this sum, we deduct only the parents’ or the spouse’s
allowable incomes but not the student’s own income or assets. The resulting
maximum amounts are, of course, highly correlated with the factual amounts
students receive but should, apart from that, not directly drive whether the
student claims the money or not.
Our second instrument is an indicator for whether the student is indepen-
dently funded. The relevance of this instrument exploits the fact that benefit
levels and being independently funded are highly correlated: Independently
funded students have had the possibility to accumulate higher incomes and
assets likely to be deducted from the BAföG funding amounts.14 Yet, as the
parents’ income is not deducted, the direction of the effect of being inde-
pendently funded on the expected level of benefits is, a priori, ambiguous.
Exogeneity of the instrument requires that the students’ funding states do
not directly explain why they accept or reject the money if their income and
assets are low enough to yield positive funding amounts.
3.4.4 Selection on eligibility
A last issue we address here is the possibility that students may self-select out
of the sample by earning so much that they lose their eligibility to positive
funding amounts. Ineligible students are not considered by the non-take-up
rate defined above. If sample-selection was relevant, instrumental variable
techniques could not account for endogeneity introduced by dropping out of
the sample.
Self-selection is a cause of concern as the decision to work and drop out
is very likely to be non-random, and the same factors driving this decision
might also be correlated with the take-up of benefits. Picking up on the
example delineated above, the unobserved motivation and ability of students
14 The incomes reported by independent students in our sample are about 50% higher than
the incomes reported by dependent students.
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might simultaneously determine the probability to earn very high additional
incomes and the likelihood to successfully file the BAföG application, whereas
the direction of this bias is a priori ambiguous. In the example discussed in the
last section, the respective level of benefits is simply reduced by the additional
income. Here, students’ incomes lead to a complete loss of eligibility.
To take into account the incidental truncation caused by the endogenous
choice of students’ own incomes and assets, we specify a pooled Heckman-
type binary response model (Van de Ven and van Praag, 1981):15
NTU = 1[x1β1 + αb+ u1 > 0] (3.7)
y2 = 1[xδ2 + αb+ u2 > 0], (3.8)
where b represents, again, the level of benefits. The explanatory variables
x1 are a subset of x, the cluster-robust errors (u1, u2) are independent of
x and normally distributed with a mean of zero, a variance of one, and
corr(u1, u2) = ρ. Equation (3.7) is the regression equation with NTU being
the binary non-take-up of student financial aid equal to one if the eligible
students do not take up their benefits and equal to zero if they do take up. The
selection equation is represented by equation (3.8). y2 is an indicator equal
to one if the student’s income and assets are below the individual threshold
of eligibility and equal to zero if the student’s income and assets are above
the threshold so that she loses eligibility. The non-take-up decision NTU
is only observed if y2 = 1, i.e., if the student’s income and assets are below
their individual thresholds.
To calculate students’ individual thresholds, we take the sample of stu-
dents fulfilling the formal eligibility criteria, including parents’ or spouses’
incomes, but irrespective of the students’ own incomes and assets. We calcu-
late the threshold as the maximum amount a specific student can earn and
hold as assets before her simulated benefit amount drops to zero and leads to
her self-selection out of the sample. If this drop-out is systematically related
to u1, the estimates of β1 might be inconsistent.
To identify our system of equations by more than functional form alone,
we need at least one variable that is in x but not in x1. As our exclusion
restriction, we use a dummy indicating whether the student completed any
form of vocational training before studying. Having completed vocational
training proxies labor market experience and implies a higher likelihood to
15 Previous to our study, Kayser and Frick (2001) and Frick and Groh-Samberg (2007) used a
Heckman-type approach to correct for sample selection into non-take-up of social assistance.
Wilde and Kubis (2005) address the issue of sample selection in a simultaneous equation
model.
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have a job and to earn high incomes while studying. We have to assume that
having completed vocational training influences the take-up decision only
via the income-channel but does not directly explain (non-)take-up.
3.5 Data and variable construction
Our microsimulation, see section 3.9.2 for details, is based on the Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP v30)16, which is a representative micro data source
for Germany and includes detailed information on household and individual
characteristics, as well as extensive information on income (Wagner et al.,
2007).
The BAföG calculationwas subject to several substantial structural changes
between 2001 and 2002, e.g., the unification of needs over Germany and
changes in the regulation on additional need amounts, making the system
before and after 2001 difficult to compare. Therefore, we restrict our analyses
to the waves between 2002 and the most recent wave of 2013. Because we cal-
culate BAföG benefits on an annual basis and according to the law applicable
in that year, changes in the BAföG regulation induced by reforms between
2002 and 2013 are taken care of by our microsimulation model.
On the one hand, microsimulation requires high quality data on income
and household composition. Analyzing the factors of non-take-up at the
same time requires, on the other hand, also suitable proxy variables to be
constructed from survey scales. Although the SOEP is generally well-suited
for the purpose of microsimulation, not all questions to construct the proxies
previously discussed are available for each and every year as we outline in
the following.
3.5.1 Constructing the sample and variables
To construct our sample, we proceed in three steps. We keep all students,
1., surveyed between 2002 and 2013, 2., formally eligible for BAföG but not
receiving any different student financial aid amounts and, 3., for whom we
have enough information to perform the means test and simulate BAföG
amounts.
For the last step, we require information on the student’s complete family,
i.e., parents, siblings, and the student’s partners if married or in a registered
16 Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), data for years 1984-2013, version 30, SOEP, 2015,
doi:10.5684/soep.v30.
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partnership. Yet, full information on the parents’ incomes17 is only available
for students raised in families drawn as a part of the SOEP—andwhere parents
therefore answer the survey—, but not for cases where students have been
drawn as a separate SOEP household after moving out. In order to keep the
maximum number of cases for our descriptive analyses, we check whether
the student is independently funded or whether the parents died, both cases
implying that the parents’ income is not relevant for the assessment of
eligibility. In these cases, we can keep the student in the sample, although
parents’ income information is unavailable.
This procedure leaves us with a sample size of 2,827 cases formally eligible
to receive BAföG and where enough information on parents’ income and
living situation is available. Among the formally eligible, about 28% reported
to receive BAföG. 53% of all formally eligible cases do not receive BAföG
in the SOEP and are also deemed ineligible for positive founding by our
simulation. 22% both claim BAföG as reported in the data and are simulated
as eligible. 18% are eligible as of our simulation but do not claim the benefits.
About 6% of all theoretically eligible observations are beta error observations
allegedly claiming benefits but failing eligibility in our simulation.
Some part of this simulation error may be explained by the fact that the
SOEP contained only an aggregate measure for all forms of student financial
aid through 2006. Consequently, we cannot distinguish between receivers of
merit-based aid and those of need-based aid through 2006. Yet, less than 1% of
all German students received merit-based aid at this time (Federal Ministry of
Education and Research, 2014a). Therefore, this lack in distinction between
BAföG and other aid should not be substantive. Accordingly, neither does
the simulation quality differ significantly before and after 2007, nor does
restricting the sample to the survey years of 2007–2013 affect our results
much as we show in the robustness checks later (see section 3.7.3).
For most of the following descriptive analyses, we focus on the group
of students simulated as eligible, irrespective of whether they claim BAföG
or not, i.e., 1,315 observations. With respect to the sample used for our
multivariate analyses, we face the issue that not all of the covariates needed
in order to address the possible mechanisms as intended above are available
for all years. Moreover, information on parents never questioned by the SOEP
could not always be generated from the students’ answers. The sample used
for our multivariate analysis is, therefore, smaller (i.e., 986 observations).
17 The SOEP provides readily imputed income measures so that we do not lose cases due to
item non-response.
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In order to prevent a loss of too many observations, we combine responses
by parents and information by children about their parents to construct
parental background information.
More specifically, we use parents’ answers to the question “Where did
you live in 1989?” to derive students’ East or West German background.
If at least one parent indicates to have lived in the East during the fall of
the wall, we set the East German background dummy to one and to zero
otherwise. The answer to this question is missing only if parents have never
been part of the SOEP or were already dead at the time the question was
asked. To prevent systematic missings of these cases, we fill the East German
background dummy with information on the students’ own place of living in
1989 for students already born before 1989.
We face the same issue for the parents’ educational degrees. After ex-
ploiting the parents’ direct information on educational degrees, we substitute
missings by using the childrens’ information on parents’ educational degrees,
which is also available if the parents have never been surveyed.
Our indicator for whether the parental household received public transfers
in the previous year is, however, unavailable if parents are not part of the
SOEP. Accordingly, we can only replace missings as 0 if we know that both
parents were already dead last year. All these missings due to the student
being sampled as a new SOEP household and the parents never having been
surveyed are, however, not systematically related to the factors of non-take-
up.
We use survey measures to assess the students’ time and risk preferences,
all of them measured on a 11-point scale from 0 “not at all” to 10 “very much”.
The survey questions are worded as follows:
• Impulsivity: “Do you generally think things over for a long time be-
fore acting—in other words, are you not impulsive at all? Or do you
generally act without thinking things over a long time–in other words,
are you very impulsive?”
• Impatience:18 “Are you generally an impatient person, or someone
who always shows great patience?”
• Willingness to take risk: “Are you generally willing to take risks, or do
you try to avoid risks?”
Data on impulsivity and impatience were collected only in 2008 and
2013, data on willingness to take risks were collected in 2006 and between
18 This item was originally reversely coded with 0 representing “very impatient” and 10 “very
patient”. We reverse the scale to harmonize it with our other measures.
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2008–2013 so that we have to assume stability of the concepts over time.19
Mainly due to the fact that not all eligible students participated in one of
the waves where these scales were questioned, our sample is reduced to 986
observations. Yet, again, we see no reason why the year when the student
was part of the sample should be systematically related to her non-take-up-
behavior. We take the upper quartiles of our impulsivity and impatience
scales to construct indicators of high impatience and high impulsivity.
3.5.2 Descriptives
Table 3.1 gives an overview over the weighted analytic sample in general
(column 1) and by whether students forgo funding (column 2) or not (column
3). We stick to discussing overall averages, highlighting striking differences
by non-take-up in the following.
On average, students are eligible for EUR 314 a month, and, surprisingly,
the amount left on the table is only EUR 36 lower on average than the amount
taken. Students in our sample are about 23 years old and about half of them is
female. Migrants (18% of our sample) are significantly more likely to forgo the
benefits (weighted t-test p < 0.05). Moreover, we can differentiate between
scholarships and BAföG for three quarters of the sample and this percentage
does not differ significantly by whether students turn down BAföG or not
(p > 0.1). Most of those who take up live outside their parents’ home and in
an urban area, whereas non-takers are much more likely to still live at their
parents’ home and in rural areas. 17% of the students currently live in East
Germany. As can be seen from the numbers of working hours, students who
do not take up BAföG work considerably more hours (p < 0.01) to support
their living.
Remarkably however, students who take out the money do not come
from families who are strikingly worse off financially, though non-takers are
somewhat less likely to come from a family where at least one parent holds a
college degree.
19 The concept of self-control is generally regarded as being stable over the course of life
(Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Arneklev et al., 2006) and recent evidence on the longitudinal
stability of time preferences elicited in an experimental set-up shows that individual time
preferences are also stable for most individuals (Meier and Sprenger, 2015). Harrison et al.
(2005) find no significant changes in risk aversion when assessed 6 months later.
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While about one third of the parents lived in the former GDR in 1989, the
descriptive difference between takers and non-takers is considerable: The
percentage of students with East German background is two thirds higher
in the group of those who claim the benefits and the difference is highly
statistically significant.
The same is true for older siblings as a potential source of support in
filing the BAföG application: The percentage of claimants in the group of
students with older siblings who have already claimed is twice as large as
the percentage of those who cannot draw upon older siblings’ experiences
(p < 0.01).
Finally, the percentage of the students rating themselves as very impulsive
and impatient is higher in the group of students who turn down the benefits,
whereas the willingness to take risk does not differ significantly (p > 0.1).
3.6 Non-take-up of BAföG
3.6.1 Estimated rates of non-take-up
Figure 3.2 reveals that about two in five students do not claim BAföG, though
eligible; the non-take-up rates range between 36% (NTUL) and 40% (NTU )
on average. Reassuringly, both rates do not differ much so that the impact of
potentially misclassified cases should be low.20
Moreover, we do not find statistically significant differences in the NTUs
(and beta error) over time, which reassures us once more that the non-
separability of BAföG and scholarships through 2006 is not an issue.21
To shed some more light on the relationships between our main variables,
we plot the deflated BAföG amounts from our microsimulation against the
parents’ deflated last year’s monthly net household income (figure 3.3). To
account for scale effects in consumption within the household, we use the
modifiedOECD equivalence scale. The simulated funding amounts for eligible
students, i.e., students with positive amounts, are depicted in dark grey,
the zero funding amounts for students fulfilling only the formal criteria in
light grey. As expected, the relationship between both variables is negative
with students from more affluent families being eligible for lower or zero
20 As our sensitivity check in section 3.9.3 shows, relaxing our restrictive assumptions de-
creases the beta error rate substantially. As these manual modifications do not affect the
regression results, we present the conservative results without any manual corrections only.
Corrected results are available upon request.
21 Although we do not find evidence for a time-trend or statistically significant differences
through 2006, we include separate year-dummies in all our regressions.
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Figure 3.2: The development of the upper and lower bound of the non-take-up
rate of BAföG over time
Notes: SOEP v30, 2002–2013, weighted with individual weights, without further controls. The
spikes indicate 95% confidence intervals.
funding amounts. At the same time, the variance in BAföG amounts over
parents’ equivalized income is high as it is not the income used for the
BAföG calculation. All in all, our microsimulation model seems to work
well in calculating sensible BAföG amounts and yields results comparable to
microsimulations from the SOEP-STSM (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2012, p. 130).
Moreover, we investigate which percentage of students is eligible by
parents’ income and whether eligible students from the lowest tail of the
income distribution, where benefits are higher, claim more often than eligible
students from higher income families, where benefits are lower (see also
Bargain et al. (2012)). Figure 3.4 shows the eligible students’ percentage
of all formally eligible students, the average benefit amounts of eligible
students, and both NTUs up to the 80% percentile of their parents’ household
equivalized incomes in the previous year (modified OCED-equivalent).
As can be seen from the grey dashed and dotted curves, BAföG is theo-
retically well targeted to the students from families with low income and/or
many children. Accordingly, nearly all students up to the second decile of
parents’ equivalized income are eligible to positive funding of EUR 400 on
average. After the third decile, the curves of the probability to be eligible and
the average funding levels slope steeply downward until less than 20% of the
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Figure 3.3: Simulated amounts of BAföG benefits over parents’ monthly
household equivalized income
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students are eligible to an average amount of EUR 270 in the eighth decile.
Factual target efficiency is, however, low: Students from the poorest families
are as likely to forgo aid than students from households with higher incomes
who are eligible to lower benefits. These results already suggest the limited
contribution of parents’ income and the level of funding available to explain
why a large percentage of the students does not take up BAföG.
3.6.2 Factors of non-take-up
In this section, we want to investigate more closely why students turn down
high subsidies. Table 3.2 gives an overview over coefficients and average
marginal effects (AME) from our multivariate analyses. We start with dis-
cussing the AMEs from the pooled Probit model in column 1 first, and outline
later differences with respect to the IV Probit (column 2), the TSLS model
(column 3), and the Heckprobit model (column 4).
The average baseline predicted probability of a student not to take up
BAföG is about 42%, which is roughly in line with estimates from the literature
on the NTU of social assistance in Germany reviewed by Bruckmeier et al.
(2013).
For every EUR 100 of benefits available each month, the probability to
turn down BAföG decreases by rather modest 4.4 percentage points (13.8%) on
average. Accordingly, the elasticity of the level of benefits with respect to the
NTU implies that an increase in BAföG by 10% decreases the probability not to
take up by 4.6%. To assess the economic significance of increases in the level
of the benefits further, we calculate the AME of changing BAföG from the
5th to the 95th percentile, keeping all other variables at their observed values:
On average, the probability not to take up BAföG decreases by roughly 20
percentage points from Pr(NTU=1)=0.54 to Pr(NTU=1)=0.33 when BAföG
increases from EUR 48 to EUR 500 (p < 0.05).
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The controls for the students’ living situation reveal that students living
in urban areas with, presumably, more employment opportunities are about
19 percentage points more likely not to claim BAföG. Those who profit from
low living costs because they live at their parents’ homes are 27 percentage
points more likely not to take up BAföG, whereas living in East Germany does
not significantly affect NTU, although the coefficient points to the expected
direction.
Investigating our proxies for information constraints, complexity of claim-
ing, and parents’ receipt of welfare benefits reveals two things: First, students
from families where another social transfer has been claimed in the previous
year are less likely to forgo BAföG funding. Yet, the effect is not statistically
significantly different from zero. Second, although neither having migration
background nor parents’ educational and financial situation affect the stu-
dents’ take up decision significantly, having an older sibling who has claimed
BAföG before decreases the NTU by 20 percentage points. The latter suggests
that support in managing the complex paperwork involved when claiming
BAföG is beneficial.
Moreover, there is strong support for our hypothesis that non-take up
differs between students socialized in East and those socialized in West
Germany. On average, students with an East-German background are about
15 percentage points less likely to reject the money, ceteris paribus. The
difference in non-take-up between East and West German background is
large and statistically different from zero at p < 0.05 over the whole range
of the BAföG benefits as displayed in figure 3.5.22 We closer investigate the
robustness of this finding in section 3.7.
With respect to the importance of time-inconsistent preferences, we
find a statistically significant interaction of impulsivity and impatience in
the expected direction of self-commitment to avoid overspending. In table
3.3, we show the predicted probabilities of NTU for high and low levels
of impulsivity and impatience, keeping all other variables at their observed
values. The predicted probabilities of students who are high in impatience and
low in impulsivity or vice versa do not differ significantly. Impatient students
who are very impulsive at the same time are, however, about 23 percentage
points more likely to reject the same benefit amount than are impulsive but
patient students. This difference is highly statistically significant. We find
a symmetrical effect of about 20 percentage points for impatient students
when we vary the level of impulsivity. The large double difference of about 23
percentage points (which represents the size of the interaction effect in terms
22 The gap is also robust to introducing an interaction between East German background and
parents’ incomes to our model, although this results in a high degree of multicollinearity.
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Figure 3.5: Impact of socialization on non-take-up of BAföG by simulated
benefits and by whether parents lived in East or West Germany in 1989
Notes: SOEP v30, 2002–2013, weighted with individual weights. The spikes indicate 95% confi-
dence intervals. Predicted probabilities were calculated from the Probit regression in table 3.2,
column 1. All other variables were held at their observed values.
of AMEs) is also statistically significantly different from zero (p < 0.05) and
in line with the sign and significance we find for the interaction effect in
terms of our Probit coefficients. To ensure that the effect is meaningful over
the whole range of BAföG amounts, we calculated contrasts for every EUR
50 of the BAföG amount as shown in figure 3.6a. The difference is stable and
statistically significantly different from zero over the whole range of possible
funding amounts (figure 3.6b). All in all, our results yield strong evidence for
the hypothesis that students with self-control problems restrict their future
funding sources as to avoid overspending. As expected, willingness to take
risks is not associated with non-take-up.
The second and third columns in table 3.2 present the results from running
instrumental variable regressions for the Probit (col. 2) and the linear proba-
bility model case (col. 3), using the individual maximum benefits amount and
an indicator for whether the student is independently funded as instruments.
As indicated by the Wald test of exogeneity and Wooldridge (1995)’s robust
score test, we do not find evidence for potential endogeneity of the benefits
amount, neither in the non-linear nor in the linear model. In line with this
and against the background that our correlation in the errors (u1, u2) in the
IV Probit is very low, our results are, by and large, unaffected by whether we
account for the potential endogeneity of the benefits amount or not. As IV
Probit and TSLS are also very similar, the somewhat stronger distributional
104
Table 3.3: Predicted probabilities for non-take-up of BAföG by different levels
of the students’ impulsivity and impatience
Very impulsive
No Yes Difference
Very impatient No 0.397***
(0.037)
0.366***
(0.058)
-0.032
(0.064)
Yes 0.396***
(0.078)
0.594***
(0.064)
0.199**
(0.095)
Difference -0.002
(0.077)
0.229***
(0.083)
0.230**
(0.116)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Unconditional, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: SOEP v30, 2002–2013, weighted. Predicted probabilities of the Probit in table 3.2, col. 1.
All other variables were kept at their observed values.
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Figure 3.6: Impact of impulsiveness and impatience on non-take-up of BAföG
by the simulated benefit amount
Notes: SOEP v30, 2002–2013, weighted with individual weights. The spikes indicate 95% confi-
dence intervals. Predicted probabilities were calculated from the Probit regression in table 3.2,
column 1. All other variables were held at their observed values.
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assumptions of the IV Probit do not harm our results. Reassuringly, the first
stage coefficients and p-values reported at the bottom of the table indicate
that both instruments are very strong—as does a Shea’s Adjusted Partial
R-squared of .80 from the first stage of the TSLS.23 Because our model is
overidentified, we can conditionally test the exogeneity assumption with
an overidentification test. As reported at the bottom of table 3.2, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the additional instrument is exogenous.
We check whether our specification in column 1 is affected by self-
selection in column 4, where we report results from our Heckman-type
Probit sample selection model. Only few students dropped out of our sample
because they had too much assets or income. Nevertheless, our hypothesis
that the errors of regression and selection equation are not correlated is re-
jected at p = 0.05. The correlation of the errors (u1, u2) is moreover negative
as is the highly statistically significant exclusion restriction, suggesting that
students who completed vocational training before studying have a lower
probability to remain in our sample of eligible. Although we find evidence
that sample selection is an issue, the resulting AMEs, especially for the ben-
efits level, are very similar to those from the straightforward Probit model,
presumably because the number of selected cases is low: The predicted prob-
ability to turn down BAföG slightly increases to 44%, and the elasticity of the
average non-take-up probability with respect to a 10% increase in the benefits
slightly reduces to 4.1%. The impact of East German background, siblings’
claiming experience, and debt aversion is somewhat more pronounced. All
other conclusions we have drawn from the Probit model (column 1) remain
valid.
Taken together, our results suggest that most students stay roughly within
the thresholds used for assessment of BAföG eligibility and family insurance
so that we find no evidence for endogeneity of the benefit amount if we
restrict our sample to students eligible for funding after own incomes are
deducted. Nevertheless, some students are likely to earn so much that they
lose their complete eligibility and select themselves out of the sample. This
sample-selection should be accounted for, so that the Heckprobit model
results in our preferred specification.
23 It is not straightforward how to test for weak instruments in pooled non-linear models
with cluster-robust standard errors and weighted data because there is no clear cut-off for
non-linear models to guide us when to reject the hypothesis of weak instruments. Yet, a
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic of 1376.11 from our weighted TSLS with cluster-robust
standard errors greatly exceeds the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values of F=19.93 for a
relative bias of 10% and provides additional evidence that the instruments are relevant.
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We run separate analyses to investigate the effect of the duration of
benefits as including this variable reduces our sample again.24 As expected,
the relationship between a high number of semesters and non-take-up is
positive, but slightly decreasing as we consider only students in the eligible
semester range (table 3.4): The more advanced the student is in her studies,
the higher the probability that she does not take up the benefits because the
period in which the claiming costs pay off is shorter.
3.7 Robustness checks
3.7.1 Different welfare preferences
The stable difference in NTU between students socialized in the East and in
the West might be either a masked difference in scale effects or the “welfare
trap”, given that East and West Germans differ significantly in claiming
other social benefits. Therefore, we add an interaction between our East
German background variable and the social benefit dummy to our preferred
model, the Heckprobit specification, and report results from the Probit as a
benchmark. Table A3.13 in the appendix displays the full results. We again
report predicted probabilities with their respective differences in table 3.5.
Table 3.5 highlights that the AME of the interaction effect equals -0.15
and is not statistically significant from zero (as are the coefficients of the
interactions in table A3.13). Accordingly, having drawn upon other social
transfers does not affect families with East and West German background
differently.
3.7.2 Parents’ financial support
As discussed earlier, the official BAföG calculation uses parents second-last
year’s incomes, unless students request to use parents’ last year’s or current
incomes. Our microsimulation model is, therefore, based on the assumption
that students request an update to more recent incomes if these are lower.
If parents’ income grows very fast and if parents use the surplus to support
24 The microsimulation accounts for the fact that only students in a certain range of semesters
are eligible to receive BAföG. We keep observations with missing information on the year
of enrollment in higher education in our sample used for the previous analyses if students
report to claim BAföG, assuming that they should accordingly still fall into the eligible
range of semesters. Inclusion of these observations does not affect our results.
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Table 3.4: Duration of receipt and non-take-up probability Pr(NTU = 1|X)
(1) Probit (2) Heckprobit
Coeff AME Coeff AME
Simulated BAfoeG amount♮ –0.151*** –0.049*** –0.145** –0.047***
(0.058) (0.018) (0.058) (0.018)
Female –0.086 –0.028 –0.076 –0.025
(0.147) (0.048) (0.142) (0.046)
Migration background –0.084 –0.027 –0.147 –0.047
(0.217) (0.069) (0.209) (0.067)
Academic year 0.376*** 0.044*** 0.342*** 0.042***
(0.116) (0.016) (0.112) (0.015)
Academic year2 –0.047*** –0.042***
(0.016) (0.016)
Living situation controls
Student living in urban area 0.574*** 0.183*** 0.522*** 0.169***
(0.167) (0.052) (0.163) (0.052)
Student living at parents’ home 0.856*** 0.277*** 0.830*** 0.273***
(0.188) (0.056) (0.184) (0.056)
Student lives in East Germany 0.282 0.090 0.304 0.097
(0.243) (0.077) (0.240) (0.075)
Parent and sibling controls
Log parental current gross labor income♮ –0.041 –0.013 –0.028 –0.009
(0.056) (0.018) (0.054) (0.018)
Parent(s) have college degree –0.133 –0.043 –0.105 –0.034
(0.163) (0.053) (0.155) (0.050)
Parents received social transfers –0.264 –0.085 –0.281 –0.091
(0.213) (0.067) (0.207) (0.066)
East German background –0.465** –0.151** –0.528*** –0.174**
(0.209) (0.068) (0.205) (0.068)
Older sibling claimed BAfoeG –0.663*** –0.205*** –0.700*** –0.220***
(0.201) (0.057) (0.199) (0.058)
Time-inconsistent preferences
Willingness to take risks (std) –0.052 –0.017 –0.048 –0.016
(0.070) (0.022) (0.068) (0.022)
Very impulsive –0.066 0.027 –0.051 0.036
(0.201) (0.055) (0.196) (0.054)
Very impatient 0.031 0.063 –0.021 0.052
(0.245) (0.061) (0.241) (0.060)
Very impulsive × Very impatient 0.530 0.590*
(0.356) (0.348)
Exclusion restriction (1st stage)
Vocational training completed –0.903***
(0.203)
Year controls X X
Observations 944 998
Baseline predicted probability 0.442 0.470
corr(u1,u2)=ρ –0.844
Wald test (ρ = 0, p-value) 0.057
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: SOEP v30, 2002–2013, weighted. ♮ = Deflated to base year 2007 and in hundreds of
Euro.
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Table 3.5: Predicted probabilities for non-take-up of BAföG by the students’
East German background and whether parents received other social transfers
last year
Other social transfer
No Yes Difference
East German Background No 0.501***
(0.042)
0.482***
(0.090)
-0.020
(0.089)
Yes 0.366***
(0.057)
0.196***
(0.074)
-0.170**
(0.081)
Difference -0.135*
(0.069)
-0.286**
(0.117)
-0.150
(0.120)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Unconditional, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: SOEP v30, 2002–2013, weighted. Predicted probabilities of the Heckprobit in table
A3.13, col. 2. All other variables were kept at their observed values.
their children financially, we might overestimate the students’ needs and,
accordingly, the importance of the level of BAföG benefits. This biases our
results only if the factors of income growth are not controlled for by the
socio-economic covariates in our model, and if the income growth is related
to an disproportional increase of the direct transfers to the offspring.
We add an indicator for whether parents supported the student financially
to columns 1 and 2 of table 3.6, which results in the loss of one observation
due to item non-response. The indicator is not statistically significantly
different from zero and does not affect the other coefficients much.
3.7.3 Different simulation quality
To rule out the possibility that our evidence of non-take-up is simply resulting
from poorer data quality for some cases, we construct indicators for whether
parents’ income is imputed by the SOEP and whether students, parents, or
spouses/partners round their gross income to EUR 100. As shown in table
3.7, these indicators are not statistically significantly different from zero and
provide no evidence that different simulation quality introduces bias to our
estimates.
Table 3.8 investigates whether the estimates differ when we restrict our
sample to those for whom we can differentiate between merit-based scholar-
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Table 3.6: Parents’ financial support does not impact on non-take-up
(1) Probit (2) Heckprobit
Coeff AME Coeff AME
Simulated BAfoeG amount♮ –0.128** –0.041** –0.127** –0.041***
(0.052) (0.016) (0.051) (0.016)
Age (centered) –0.006 –0.002 0.014 0.005
(0.033) (0.011) (0.033) (0.011)
Female –0.087 –0.028 –0.072 –0.023
(0.144) (0.046) (0.140) (0.045)
Migration background –0.094 –0.030 –0.170 –0.054
(0.211) (0.066) (0.204) (0.064)
Living situation controls
Student living in urban area 0.620*** 0.194*** 0.575*** 0.183***
(0.164) (0.049) (0.161) (0.049)
Student living at parents’ home 0.908*** 0.288*** 0.909*** 0.293***
(0.206) (0.059) (0.205) (0.060)
Student lives in East Germany 0.279 0.089 0.301 0.096
(0.235) (0.074) (0.234) (0.074)
Parent and sibling controls
Log parental current gross labor income♮ –0.037 –0.012 –0.019 –0.006
(0.056) (0.018) (0.055) (0.018)
Parent(s) have college degree –0.128 –0.041 –0.109 –0.035
(0.154) (0.049) (0.148) (0.048)
Parents received social transfers –0.268 –0.085 –0.273 –0.087
(0.205) (0.063) (0.200) (0.063)
East German background –0.458** –0.147** –0.521*** –0.170***
(0.204) (0.065) (0.201) (0.065)
Older sibling claimed BAfoeG –0.693*** –0.208*** –0.724*** –0.221***
(0.191) (0.053) (0.190) (0.053)
Parents’ financial support last year 0.161 0.051 0.127 0.041
(0.147) (0.046) (0.146) (0.046)
Time-inconsistent preferences
Willingness to take risks (std) –0.103 –0.033 –0.100 –0.032
(0.067) (0.021) (0.065) (0.021)
Very impulsive –0.099 0.032 –0.077 0.043
(0.198) (0.053) (0.194) (0.053)
Very impatient –0.001 0.070 –0.056 0.058
(0.237) (0.059) (0.233) (0.058)
Very impulsive × Very impatient 0.693** 0.743**
(0.353) (0.344)
Exclusion restriction (1st stage)
Vocational training completed –0.708***
(0.235)
Year controls X X
Observations 985 1040
Baseline predicted probability 0.416 0.443
corr(u1,u2)=ρ –0.753
Wald test (ρ = 0, p-value) 0.039
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: SOEP v30, weighted. ♮ = Deflated to base year 2007 and in hundreds of Euro.
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ship receipt and BAföG receipt, i.e., we limit the sample to those surveyed
after 2006. Our point estimates are, overall, similar to those from the full
sample. We find, however, no evidence for a significant sample selection
bias—most probably because the number of cases with self-selection is too
low.
3.7.4 Further robustness checks
We want to mention briefly that our results are also robust to several other
robustness checks (results available upon request):
First, until August 2015, students who were only preliminarily accepted
for their consecutive studies faced problems receiving BAföG without inter-
ruptions, e.g., when applying for a Master program before having completed
the Bachelor’s thesis. The number of students in our sample who are enrolled
in consecutive programs is, however, very low. Excluding these cases does
not affect our results.
Second, the introduction and the abolition of tuition fees of up to EUR 500
per semester at several German universities in some federal states fall into
our observation window. BAföG recipients were, generally, also obligated
to pay the fees and their parents were expected to increase their financial
support accordingly if possible. Evidence on whether the introduction of the
fees had an effect is mixed (Hübner, 2012; Bruckmeier and Wigger, 2014). We
construct an indicator based on the students’ place of living in a certain year
and merge information from federal amendments indicating which federal
state introduced tuition fees in which year. The indicator is not statistically
significantly different from zero and its inclusion does not affect our results.
Third, we investigate different specifications of our model. Adding further
variables to our models in table 3.2 (student married, age squared, parents’
relationship, student receives parental financial support, student has siblings,
parents had debts last year, Big Five personality traits, desired age of economic
independence as reported at age 17) neither increases model fit nor provides
any indication of potential omitted variable bias, so that we report the most
parsimoniousmodels only. Moreover, using a broadermeasure for the parents’
income, such as the parents’ household net income, does not affect the results.
Last, we find no indication of enough non-linearity in the data to justify
higher order polynomials of the BAföG amount.
111Table 3.7: Missing data does not impact on non-take-up (full sample)
(1) Probit (2) Heckprobit
Coeff AME Coeff AME
Simulated BAfoeG amount♮ –0.133** –0.042** –0.129** –0.042**
(0.054) (0.017) (0.053) (0.016)
Age (centered) –0.005 –0.002 0.016 0.005
(0.034) (0.011) (0.033) (0.011)
Female –0.095 –0.030 –0.081 –0.026
(0.145) (0.046) (0.140) (0.045)
Migration background –0.113 –0.036 –0.189 –0.060
(0.209) (0.066) (0.203) (0.064)
Living situation controls
Student living in urban area 0.635*** 0.198*** 0.580*** 0.184***
(0.161) (0.048) (0.159) (0.049)
Student living at parents’ home 0.831*** 0.266*** 0.841*** 0.273***
(0.195) (0.058) (0.192) (0.058)
Student lives in East Germany 0.313 0.100 0.330 0.105
(0.234) (0.074) (0.232) (0.073)
Parent and sibling controls
Log parental current gross labor income♮ –0.045 –0.014 –0.028 –0.009
(0.056) (0.018) (0.055) (0.018)
Parents have college degree –0.130 –0.042 –0.110 –0.036
(0.154) (0.049) (0.148) (0.048)
Parents received social transfers –0.273 –0.086 –0.273 –0.087
(0.203) (0.063) (0.197) (0.062)
East German background –0.471** –0.151** –0.537*** –0.175***
(0.204) (0.065) (0.201) (0.065)
Older sibling claimed BAfoeG –0.689*** –0.207*** –0.727*** –0.222***
(0.195) (0.054) (0.192) (0.054)
Data-quality indicators
Parents’ income imputed 0.070 0.023 0.060 0.019
(0.059) (0.019) (0.058) (0.019)
Gross income rounded 0.088 0.028 0.110 0.035
(0.128) (0.041) (0.125) (0.040)
Risk and time preferences
Willingness to take risks (std) –0.097 –0.031 –0.095 –0.031
(0.068) (0.022) (0.066) (0.021)
Very impulsive –0.117 0.028 –0.092 0.039
(0.200) (0.053) (0.195) (0.052)
Very impatient –0.010 0.070 –0.067 0.056
(0.241) (0.059) (0.235) (0.058)
Very impulsive × Very impatient 0.720** 0.764**
(0.355) (0.345)
Exclusion restriction (1st stage)
Vocational training completed –0.723***
(0.227)
Observations 986 1041
Baseline predicted probability 0.417 0.444
corr(u1,u2)=ρ –0.789
Wald test (ρ = 0, p-value) 0.042
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: SOEP v30, weighted. ♮ = Deflated to base year 2007 and in hundreds of Euro. All
regressions include year controls.
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Table 3.8: Simulation quality does not impact on non-take-up (sample after
2006)
(1) Probit (2) Heckprobit
Coeff AME Coeff AME
Simulated BAfoeG amount♮ –0.115* –0.037* –0.116* –0.037*
(0.067) (0.021) (0.067) (0.021)
Age (centered) 0.007 0.002 0.020 0.006
(0.045) (0.014) (0.048) (0.015)
Female –0.019 –0.006 0.006 0.002
(0.180) (0.057) (0.179) (0.057)
Migration background –0.095 –0.030 –0.139 –0.044
(0.253) (0.079) (0.245) (0.076)
Living situation controls
Student living in urban area 0.656*** 0.200*** 0.627*** 0.193***
(0.195) (0.056) (0.205) (0.059)
Student living at parents’ home 0.799*** 0.254*** 0.834*** 0.267***
(0.248) (0.073) (0.251) (0.075)
Student lives in East Germany 0.576** 0.183** 0.595** 0.187**
(0.278) (0.085) (0.281) (0.084)
Parent and sibling controls
Log parental current gross labor income♮ –0.056 –0.018 –0.045 –0.014
(0.080) (0.025) (0.081) (0.026)
Parents have college degree –0.070 –0.022 –0.066 –0.021
(0.193) (0.061) (0.190) (0.060)
Parents received social transfers –0.400 –0.123 –0.393 –0.122
(0.267) (0.079) (0.265) (0.079)
East German background –0.560** –0.175** –0.597** –0.188***
(0.235) (0.072) (0.237) (0.073)
Older sibling claimed BAfoeG –0.646*** –0.192*** –0.683*** –0.204***
(0.228) (0.062) (0.228) (0.063)
Risk and time preferences
Willingness to take risks (std) –0.126 –0.040 –0.127 –0.040
(0.079) (0.025) (0.078) (0.025)
Very impulsive –0.220 –0.002 –0.206 0.005
(0.236) (0.062) (0.239) (0.064)
Very impatient 0.058 0.099 0.022 0.093
(0.277) (0.073) (0.274) (0.072)
Very impulsive × Very impatient 0.784* 0.829**
(0.425) (0.421)
Exclusion restriction (1st stage)
Vocational training completed –0.848***
(0.308)
Observations 625 659
Baseline predicted probability 0.401 0.422
corr(u1,u2)=ρ –0.460
Wald test (ρ = 0, p-value) 0.533
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: SOEP v30, 2007–2013, weighted. ♮ = Deflated to base year 2007 and in hundreds of
Euro. All regressions include year controls.
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3.8 Discussion
This chapter investigates which percentage of eligible students do not take
up the German student financial aid, BAföG, and provides insights into the
explanatory factors of non-take-up. We explicitly account for endogeneity of
the level of benefits and students selecting themselves out of the group of
eligible.
Although the combination of a grant and zero interest loan is very lucra-
tive and classical economics would expect students to claim the aid amounts,
about two fifths of the students forgo funding. Students are more likely to
claim the benefits if the expected duration of funding is high. Moreover,
increasing the level of benefits by 10% reduces the probability of non-take-up
by about 4.1% on average when sample selection is taken into account. The
probability of non-take-up is, therefore, relatively inelastic with respect to
the level of benefits, though our estimate is about one third higher than those
found for non-take-up of social assistance in Germany (Anderson and Meyer,
1997; Riphahn, 2001). Our evidence of the existence of BAföG non-take-up
and its rather low benefit-level elasticity provide a novel explanation why
increasing the level of student financial aid cannot raise students’ university
enrollment substantially (Baumgartner and Steiner, 2005, 2006; Steiner and
Wrohlich, 2012).
We test hypotheses on various factors related to non-take-up behavior.
We find that students socialized in the former socialist East, where people still
have stronger preferences for high levels of social security and equality, are
considerably less likely to forgo the benefits, irrespective of whether parents
claimed other welfare benefits in the previous year. At the same time, students
with siblings who already claimed the benefits and are, thus, acquainted with
the formalities of claiming are more than 20 percentage points more likely to
take up BAföG. Debt aversion, to the contrary, is strongly associated with
higher probabilities of non-take-up.
Like most other studies investigating non-take-up of social benefits, we
have to rely on survey data to draw upon information of both eligible and
ineligible students and to be able to shed light on the reasons for non-take up.
The use of survey data is, however, associated with well-known limitations
such as measurement error or small sample sizes for specific subgroups.25
Furthermore, as survey data usually lacks direct measures of the reasons
to reject social benefits, we have to base our analyses on proxy variables that
generally yield conflicting expectations about the theoretical direction of
25 See Hernanz et al. (2004) for an extensive overview over (dis-)advantages of various data
sources for the analysis of non-take-up.
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the effects (Becker and Hauser, 2003, p. 149f) or do not allow to disentangle
competing explanations. We carefully account for potential endogeneity
arising from students’ endogenous choices of their incomes and do, therefore,
implicitly incorporate unobserved differences in, e.g., abilities or motivation.
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that some degree of omitted variable bias
remains. More specifically, further research is needed to assess whether
other behavioral economics explanations for students’ non-take-up of BAföG
do also matter, for example procrastination, mental accounting, or framing
effects (see Boatman et al. (2014) for an overview over the last two channels).
Due to our rather small sample size and the low within- and between-
variation, we restrict our analyses to pooled cross-sections. To the best of
our knowledge, sufficiently rich data sets allowing to account for unobserved
heterogeneity between students in a panel-design are not yet available. Once
appropriate data are available, rerunning our analyses in a longitudinal design
is an interesting avenue for future research. In case this data included repeated
measures of the real incomes and assets or allowed to merge external register
data on income, future studies should also account for measurement error as
done by, e.g., Hernandez and Pudney (2007).
Up to now, we can, nevertheless, conclude that a significant share of
students does not claim the student financial aid available. Non-take-up is
potentially detrimental to intergenerational educational mobility if these
students prolong their time to degree, graduate with worse grades, or fail
to graduate completely. As previous studies suggest (Triventi, 2014, e.g.),
dropping out without a degree is often a consequence of financial hardship
or long working hours.
Our results suggest that take-up is not easily increased by simply raising
the level of benefits. Against the background that we find strong evidence for
debt aversion resulting from students’ fear to spend the money they intended
to save, a policy implication would be to provide only the grant component
of BAföG as a default, instead of automatically embedding the loan into the
BAföG scheme.
Furthermore, filing applications online, which will be possible as of au-
tumn 2016, provides several starting points to facilitate the administrative
processes and to decrease the opportunity costs of claiming BAföG. For ex-
ample, information from students’ previous applications or from parents’
electronic income tax declaration could be prepopulated.
Finally, we are convinced that simplifying the overly complicated appli-
cation forms for BAföG would not only cut red tape, but also decrease the
number of students who are put off claiming and at risk of financial hardship.
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3.9 Appendix
These appendices outline briefly the complex calculation of the BAföG ben-
efits, the rough set-up of our microsimulation model and the sensitivity of
the NTU and beta error to necessary assumptions on our data. To reduce the
complexity of our descriptions, the following sections refer to the BAföG cal-
culation for a single student. If the student is married or lives in a registered
partnership, the calculation is similar, but based on the spouse’s or partner’s
income and living situation instead of on the parents’.
3.9.1 BAföG calculation
To illustrate the BAföG calculation, we draw upon a simple example, repre-
senting the standard case (see table A3.9). The example details the BAföG
calculation for a single 24-year-old student in 2015 who is not living at her
parents’ home. The student has neither own earnings, nor assets. Her brother
is in vocational training and earns EUR 6,000 per year. Their parents are
married; the mother is not employed, but the father earned EUR 38,000 in
2013 and EUR 44,000 in 2015 as an employee in a close-by company. The
father’s travel distance each day amounts to 5 km for a single journey.
First, we identify the income considered relevant for the calculation of
BAföG. The income relevant for BAföG is generally defined as the sum of
all positive earnings according to § 2 sect. 1 and 2 of the Income Tax Act:
incomes from agriculture and forestry, income from industrial or commercial
activities, income from self-employment, employment income, income from
investment of capital, rental income, and other income such as life annuities
or income from private sales business. Further income as of § 21 sect. 2a and 3
BAföG (earnings taxable outside Germany) must be added; public-sponsored
scholarships of up to EUR 300 (e.g., Deutschlandstipendium) are exempt from
these deductions. In our example, the starting point is the sum of parents’
gross incomes from employment in 2013, i.e., EUR 38,000.
To calculate the parents’ incomes relevant for BAföG (§ 21 and § 24
BAföG), the mother’s and father’s gross positive earnings are reduced by a
lump sum for income-related expenses26, payed taxes such as income tax,
church tax, solidarity surcharge, old age percentage reductions (§ 21 sect. 1
BAföG), and by flat-rate social security benefits (§ 21 sect. 2 BAföG). Some
forms of grant-aided privately funded pension schemes are also be subtracted.
26 In case the actual income-related expenses exceed the general lump sum amounts of cur-
rently EUR 1,000, the full amount of income-related expenses can be deduced. The same
holds for the student.
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Table A3.9: Exemplary BAföG calculation
Calculation of the parents’ BAföG-relevant income
Gross income from employment EUR 38,000.00
./. Income-related tax deductions (lump sum) EUR 1,000.00
./. Allowances for social insurance payments EUR 7,881.00
./. Income tax (including church tax and solidarity surcharge) EUR 3,214.72
= Parents’ income relevant for BAföG EUR 25,904.28
Monthly parents’ income relevant for BAföG EUR 2,158.69
Calculation of the sibling’s BAföG-relevant income
Vocational training pay (monthly) EUR 500.00
./. Lump sum allowance (see Tz 21.1.32 BAföGVwV) EUR 140.00
Sibling’s income relevant for BAföG EUR 360.00
Calculating parents’ income relevant for BAföG including allowances
Monthly parents’ income relevant for BAföG EUR 2,158.69
./. Basic allowance for the parents EUR 1,605.00
./. Basic allowance for the sibling reduced by sibling’s income EUR 125.00
= Parents’ income relevant for BAföG reduced by basic al-
lowances
EUR 428.69
./. Additional allowance for parents (50 %) and sibling (5 %) EUR 235.78
Parents’ income relevant for BAföG including allowances EUR 192.91
Calculating the BAföG amount
Basic needs EUR 373.00
+ Rent subsidy EUR 224.00
= Sum of needs EUR 597.00
./. Parents’ income relevant for BAföG including allowances EUR 192.91
= BAföG amount EUR 404.09
BAföG amount (rounded) EUR 404.00
Notes: Exemplary BAföG calculation for the standard case of a single, childless 24-year-old
student, living not at her parents’ place and having neither own earnings, nor assets.
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In our example, the father’s commuting expenses do not exceed the EUR
1,000 lump sum for income-related expenses, so that we reduce his gross
income by EUR 1,000 only. We calculate allowances for social insurance
payments, church tax, and the solidarity surcharge. After deducting all these
components and dividing the sum by 12, we arrive at the parents’ monthly
“income relevant for BAföG”, here equal to EUR 2,158.69. Note that the
“income relevant for BAföG” is neither gross nor net income but a special
measure used only for the BAföG calculation.
Only the parents’ and student’s incomes are considered in the calculation
of the income relevant for BAföG. Nevertheless, incomes of step parents,
children, and other dependents of the parents reduce parents’ allowances for
children who are not theoretically eligible for BAföG (§ 23 sect. 3 BAföG), see
table A3.10. In our example, the student’s brother is in vocational training and,
therefore, ineligible to claim BAföG. Nevertheless, the parents can protect up
to EUR 485 of their incomes to support their son financially. His training pay
reduces the parents’ maximum allowance, though: The family is allowed to
protect a lump sum of monthly EUR 140 from the son’s vocational training
pay. The remaining EUR 360 are, however, considered as income relevant for
BAföG and, therefore, deducted from the maximum parental allowance of
EUR 485. All in all, parents can, thus, only deduct an allowance of EUR 125
from their income relevant for BAföG.
Parents can further protect monetary amounts from being means-tested,
depending on their living situation. In the case considered here, both parents
are married and cohabiting, so that they can protect another EUR 1,605 for
their own use. After deducting both the allowance for parents’ own use
and for their son, the parents’ income relevant for BAföG reduced by basic
allowances amounts to EUR 428.69. From this amount, parents are, again,
granted an additional allowance equal to half of the income relevant for
BAföG plus another 5% for each dependent not theoretically eligible for
BAföG. As the student’s brother is ineligible for BAföG, the parents in our
example are granted EUR 235.78 as an additional allowance for themselves
and the brother.
Parents are expected to be able to use the remaining amount of EUR 192.91
to support their complete offspring financially. Therefore, the remaining
parents’ income relevant for BAföG including allowances is divided by the
number of dependents formally eligible to receive BAföG. The parents in our
example are expected to use the full amount of EUR 192.91 to support their
daughter. If the brother had been eligible, the monetary amount of expected
support would have dropped to EUR 96.46 as the parents’ applicable income
would have been divided by two.
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While parents are allowed to protect their full assets—except the interest
accruing from it which is part of the sum of positive earnings—, both the
student’s earnings and assets are subject to the means test.
The student’s maximum earnings without deductions are calculated as
follows (§ 21 and § 23 BAföG): Starting point of the calculation is the student’s
gross income for the respective year BAföG is claimed for. From this, EUR
1,000 of income-related expenses are subtracted as a lump sum, unless higher
factual expenses can be proven. Then, a certain percentage is deduced as a flat-
rate amount. The percentage depends on whether the student is compulsorily
insured as a student or as an employee in the retirement insurance and on
the type of employment. The default is compulsory insurance as a student
or as a student working in a job with compulsory insurance, resulting in a
flat-rate percentage of 21.3%. Furthermore, to calculate monthly amounts,
the remaining amount is divided by 12 months. Last, the respective exempt
amounts, depending on the student’s living situation (e.g., EUR 255, see table
A3.10), are deducted. The maximum gross income to be earned without
deductions is, therefore, EUR 4,884 a year or EUR 407 a month if the student
is in a minor employment—other than that, the student loses his or her family
insurance. With respect to own assets, students are expected to use every
euro exceeding a cut-off of EUR 5,200 for their education. As the student in
our example has neither own income nor assets, we can skip the means test
of own incomes and assets.
To calculate the student’s respective BAföG amount, we have to calculate
the sum of needs first. The basic need amount equals EUR 373 and can
be supplemented by additional amounts, depending on the student’s living
situation and age, see table A3.11. In our example, the student has her own
flat and is, therefore, also eligible to a rent subsidy of EUR 224. Because she is
childless and under age 25, she is still insured in her parents’ non-contributory
dependents’ co-insurance and does not qualify for other additional amounts
as of table A3.11. From the student’s level of needs, we deduct the parents’ and
student’s incomes relevant for BAföG including allowances and the student’s
assets above EUR 5,200. The resulting amount is the level of monthly benefits
to be cashed. For the student in our example, we have to deduct only the
parents’ income measure and arrive at a rounded BAföG amount of EUR 404.
3.9.2 The microsimulation model
This section explains the basic features of our microsimulation model and
details the most important assumptions made on the data.
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Our microsimulation model takes three main steps to set up the analytic
sample used for our analyses: First, we isolate the formally eligible students
and their siblings. Second, we prepare our data for the means test. More
specifically, we set up an income tax model, roughly following Schwarze
(1995), to calculate the incomes relevant for BAföG from the respective
gross income amounts. Third, we perform the means test by calculating the
students’ needs, subtracting the BAföG-relevant incomes, and accounting
for the relevant allowances. The third step entails the procedure detailed in
section 3.9.1.
As described previously, we determine the formal BAföG eligibility of all
students in the SOEP v30, 2002–2013, following § 2 et seq. BAföG. In other
words, we have to assess whether students are formally eligible to participate
in the means test. While we can easily assess whether students meet the age
requirement and are enrolled at an eligible higher education institution,27
we have to impose assumptions on the maximum funding period. Students
can receive funding for their first degree and during the respective average
period of studies (Regelstudienzeit). The average period of studies varies with
the desired degree, the subject of studies, and the type of higher education
institution. Lacking full information to construct individual-specific average
period of studies, we calculate weighted averages of the the average period of
studies at universities and universities of applied sciences, respectively, using
data from the Hochschulrektorenkonferenz (2012, p. 14ff). Accordingly, we
assume that students enrolled at universities of applied sciences are eligible
to four and students enrolled at universities are eligible to five years of BAföG
funding. These cut-offs are rather restrictive to prevent an artificial increase
in our NTU.
We abstain from further differentiating the maximum period of studies
by desired degree for two reasons: First, we lack information on desired
degrees and can only observe achieved degrees. Second, we have to rely on
annual data for the students’ enrollment status, so that we could not model
the slight differences between the maximum period of studies in different
degrees anyway.
Moreover, funding is granted on two further specific conditions. First,
students have to proof sufficient progress in their studies. This proof of
progress is due after completion of the fourth semester or, when their higher
education institution requires taking an intermediate examination before the
third semester, after completion of the second semester. Second, to remain
eligible, students must not change their field of studies after a certain number
27 We have to drop cases with missing information on the year of enrollment in higher
education from our data.
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of semesters. Lacking both information on grades and institution-specific
information about intermediate examinations, we cannot incorporate the
progress requirement. Because results from the representative student survey
of Middendorff et al. (2013, p. 312) show that insufficient progress is neither
important in students’ decisions to apply nor a relevant factor to explain
why students are not awarded the benefits, we consider this shortcoming
as negligible. Lacking information on the students’ field of studies, we can
neither incorporate harmful changes in subject of studies. Changes in subject
of studies are, however, also no frequent reason for why students forgo BAföG
funding (Middendorff et al., 2013, p. 312).
As detailed previously, the family can protect additionalmonetary amounts
for every sibling formally eligible to receive BAföG. To assess how many
siblings are formally eligible to receive BAföG, we merge information on sib-
lings from all survey waves of the SOEP. As the juridical distinction between
eligible and ineligible educational programs is very complex and is often
subject to individual case-by-case decisions, we cannot take into account
all details of § 2 sect. 1 BAföG with the data at hand. We proxy siblings’
eligibility, using information on their degree(s) previously attained, the type
of their current educational program, and whether they are enrolled as full-
or part-time students.
To set up the income tax model, we restrict our sample to eligible students
for whom we have enough information to calculate the students’ BAföG
amounts. We face missings from three main sources: First, data on the
students’ wealth were only collected in 2002, 2007, and 2012. Second, data
on parents’ old-age provisions were only collected in 2004, 2006, 2007, 2010,
and 2012. Third, data on church taxes payed were only collected in 2003,
2007, and 2011. As students’ assets rarely exceed the allowable thresholds,
missing information on assets are of minor importance for the quality of our
calculation. Missing information on parents’ old-age provisions and church
taxes payed are more important because they directly affect the respective
incomes relevant for the BAföG calculation. We follow Bruckmeier and
Wiemers (2012) and linearly interpolate the missing values from all three
sources for gap years. We have to discard cases where we do not even have
enough information to interpolate.
To compute the incomes relevant for BAföG, we have to calculate the
individual sum of all positive earnings as explained in section 3.9.1. We
compute the sum of all positive incomes for each individual in the household,
where possible. Income components such as profits or losses from investment
of capital and rental income are, however, only available on the household
level. We assume that these income components reduce or increase the
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income of the household head. As the income of married spouses enters the
means test as an aggregate amount anyway and as only few cases report
profits and losses at all, this assumption is innocuous for 94% of our sample.
The BAföG calculation uses parents’ second last year’s incomes as a
default. If subsequent incomes are lower, e.g., because of unemployment,
students can request using more recent incomes instead (see § 24 sect. 3
BAföG). We account for the possibility to update incomes by assuming that
rational students request using parents’ recent incomes if these are lower.
Therefore, to compute the BAföG amounts between the years 2002 and 2013,
we have to compute income taxes for the years 2000 through 2013.
Furthermore, we have to take into account income-related tax deductions
from the parents’ and students’ incomes. Usually, these are considered up
to a lump sum of EUR 1,000, unless higher expenses are proven for, e.g.,
commuting, moving, or working from home. We have enough information
to calculate the most important part of the income-related tax deductions,
namely commuting expenses. To calculate commuting expenses, we exploit
available information on the commuting distance (single journey), the days
worked (based on the annual working hours and taking into account infor-
mation on full or part-time employment), and the deductible amount per
kilometer in the respective year. We deduct the lump sum of EUR 1,000,
unless the commuting expenses exceed EUR 1,000. In the latter case, we
deduct the full commuting expenses.
Apart from that, we calculate further allowances for social security pay-
ments, but also income taxes, church taxes, and solidarity surcharges accord-
ing to the respective German laws in the respective year (§ sect. 2 BAföG
and German tax law (EstG)). The remaining BAföG calculation proceeds as
detailed in the previous section.
All in all, the assumptions we have to impose on our microsimulation
tend to underestimate parents’ and, to a less extent, students’ possibilites
to protect income from the means test. Therefore, we tend to overestimate
parents’ financial resources available to support their offspring. In other
words, our specification is rather restrictive. Restrictive assumptions are
generally associated with a higher beta error and a lower NTU (Frick and
Groh-Samberg, 2007). We discuss in the next section how relaxing the rather
restrictive assumptions affects both measures.
3.9.3 Reduction of beta error
The students’ level of needs is straightforward to calculate once the students’
place of living, age, and family situation are known. Assuming that the
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microsimulation model correctly calculates the students’ needs, there are
two potential explanations for a high beta error rate: First, students are
incorrectly classified as ineligible. As previously mentioned, our model
tends to overestimate true incomes relevant for BAföG because we cannot
incorporate all special allowances with the SOEP data. Accordingly, we tend
to underestimate the number of eligible students which increases the beta
error. Second, students are correctly classified as ineligible but their survey
information on BAföG receipt is misleading.
The first case is plausible when the parents’ or the students’ incomes (as
well as the students’ own assets) exceed the respective thresholds only by a
slight percentage. We study this possibility in models 1-4 of table A3.12. The
first row contains the model used for our analyses as a benchmark. In model
1, for example, we consider students whose parents’ relevant income or their
own relevant income and assets exceed their needs by 5%. Assuming that
students are classified as ineligible only because we overestimated their true
incomes relevant for BAföG by up to 5%, we reduce our simulated incomes by
the respective percentage and reclassify students from ineligible to eligible.
Doing so makes our model less restrictive and decreases the beta error rate
by 5.8% to 14.7%. The non-take-up rate is, however, very robust to this
correction and decreases by 0.5% only. We report the sensitivity of beta error
and NTU up to a correction of 20%. Although correcting incomes by 20% is a
substantial reduction in BAföG-relevant incomes and makes our model far
less restrictive, the non-take-up rate is only slightly affected. When compared
to our benchmark model, the beta error rate decreases, however, by 20%.
In cases where the income relevant for BAföG exceeds the students’
needs by far, but the student reports to have been funded, it seems more
plausible that the information on benefit receipt is misleading. For example, in
those cases where we cannot separate BAföG from merit-based scholarships,
students can correctly report both positive student financial aid amounts
and parents’ incomes far beyond the respective BAföG thresholds. In models
5-8 of table A3.12, we investigate the sensitivity to reclassifying students
from eligible to ineligible when the BAföG-relevant incomes are 10 times, 7.5
times, 5 times, and 2.5 times higher than the students’ needs. As we observe
less cases where the BAföG-relevant incomes exceed the students’ needs by
more than factor 10 than we observe cases where incomes exceed needs by
only factor 2.5, model 5 has the least, model 8 the most impact on our beta
error rate. The NTU is unaffected because we reclassify ineligible claimers
to ineligible non-claimers, and both cases do not enter the NTU. Models 5-8
show that the beta error rate can be decreased to 9.9%, assuming that all cases
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with incomes exceeding needs by more than 2.5 times are in fact ineligible
for BAföG.
Finally, models 9. - 12. combine both corrections. Reclassifying students
as eligible if their (family’s) BAföG-relevant incomes exceed their needs by
up to 20% and as ineligible if their (family’s) BAföG-relevant incomes exceed
their needs by more than factor 2.5 leads to a decrease in the beta error rate by
more than 50%. Nevertheless, the NTU is very robust even to these extensive
corrections.
All in all, this analysis shows that the NTU is almost unaffected, although
we allow for extreme and less realistic corrections of the incomes relevant
for BAföG. As sensible corrections do also not affect our multivariate results,
we decided to present results from the uncorrected model only (model 0).
Table A3.12: Sensitivity of NTU and beta error
Model Beta error rate (%) Non-take-up rate (%)
0. Reference 15.6 39.5
Correction if relevant income
exceeds needs by up to
1. 5 % 14.7 39.3
2. 10 % 14.1 39.1
3. 15 % 13.2 38.8
4. 20 % 12.5 38.7
Correction if relevant income
exceeds needs more than
5. 10 times 12.5 39.5
6. 7.5 times 11.4 39.5
7. 5 times 11.2 39.5
8. 2.5 times 9.9 39.5
Mixed
9. model no. 1 and no. 5 11.6 39.3
10. model no. 2 and no. 6 9.9 39.1
11. model no. 3 and no. 7 8.7 38.8
12. model no. 4 and no. 8 6.7 38.7
Notes: The reference model is the specification used in our main analyses.

127
Table A3.13: Robustness of East German background effect
(1) Probit (2) Heckprobit
Coeff AME Coeff AME
Simulated BAfoeG amount♮ –0.138** –0.044*** –0.134** –0.043***
(0.054) (0.017) (0.052) (0.016)
Age (centered) –0.007 –0.002 0.013 0.004
(0.034) (0.011) (0.034) (0.011)
Female –0.110 –0.035 –0.093 –0.030
(0.143) (0.046) (0.138) (0.045)
Migration background –0.115 –0.036 –0.188 –0.060
(0.206) (0.064) (0.199) (0.062)
Living situation controls
Student living in urban area 0.605*** 0.189*** 0.561*** 0.178***
(0.162) (0.049) (0.160) (0.049)
Student living at parents’ home 0.839*** 0.268*** 0.853*** 0.276***
(0.194) (0.058) (0.191) (0.057)
Student lives in East Germany 0.252 0.081 0.275 0.088
(0.232) (0.073) (0.232) (0.073)
Parent and sibling controls
Log parental current gross labor income♮ –0.030 –0.010 –0.013 –0.004
(0.055) (0.018) (0.054) (0.017)
Parent(s) have college degree –0.127 –0.041 –0.108 –0.035
(0.151) (0.048) (0.146) (0.047)
Parents received social transfers –0.043 –0.061 –0.058 –0.065
(0.272) (0.066) (0.263) (0.065)
East German background –0.338 –0.139** –0.409* –0.162**
(0.212) (0.065) (0.210) (0.066)
Older sibling claimed BAfoeG –0.702*** –0.210*** –0.735*** –0.224***
(0.194) (0.053) (0.192) (0.054)
East Germany × Social transfer last year –0.572 –0.546
(0.420) (0.411)
Time-inconsistent preferences
Willingness to take risks (std) –0.102 –0.032 –0.100 –0.032
(0.068) (0.021) (0.066) (0.021)
Very impulsive –0.101 0.028 –0.080 0.039
(0.197) (0.052) (0.193) (0.052)
Very impatient 0.002 0.067 –0.053 0.055
(0.236) (0.058) (0.232) (0.057)
Interaction effects
Very impulsive × Very impatient 0.655* 0.707**
(0.349) (0.341)
Exclusion restriction (1st stage)
Vocational training completed –0.681***
(0.231)
Observations 986 1041
Baseline predicted probability 0.417 0.444
corr(u1,u2)=ρ –0.750
Wald test (ρ = 0) 0.047
Joint sig. of East German (p-value) 0.028 0.019
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: SOEP v30, 2002–2013, weighted. ♮ = Deflated to base year 2007 and in hundreds of
Euro. Year controls included.
3.9.4 Additional tables

Chapter 4
The Role of Information in the
Application for Merit-Based
Scholarships: Evidence from a
Randomized Field Experiment
Stefanie P. Herber
4.1 Introduction
Student financial aid aims both at providing equal educational opportunities
and at promoting the most talented students in higher education. While
federal need-based aid emphasizes the goal to equate chances, federal merit-
based aid focuses on promoting talents. Both forms of financial aid share the
common feature that they are only effective if eligible students are aware of
their existence and both willing and able to complete the complex paperwork
involved when filing the application.
Regarding need-based financial aid, previous literature has built a case for
information asymmetries and different levels of (parental) assistance between
students of different socio-economic backgrounds (Scott-Clayton, 2013). A
lack of information and assistance helps to explainwhymany eligible students
of low socio-economic backgrounds do not file the complex application
for need-based student aid (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2006; King, 2006).
Therefore, providing information and assistance can help diminishing this
problem (e.g., Bettinger et al., 2012).
This chapter investigates whether information asymmetries are also rele-
vant with respect to merit-based aid in Germany, where scholarship holders of
129
130
non-academic backgrounds are considerably underrepresented (Middendorff
et al., 2009).
In contrast to the US, where state scholarship programs are simpler, more
transparent, and easier to apply to than need-based aid (Dynarski, 2004), or
the UK, where theHigher Education Bursary and Scholarship Scheme assesses
automatically whether the student qualifies for scholarships (Callender, 2009),
the German system ismuch less transparent. Scholarships in Germany are tax-
funded, but awarded by privately-owned providers in a highly competitive
selection process to high-achieving applicants. The government only sets
formal eligibility requirements, but leaves it to the 13 providers to define their
own eligibility criteria. Consequently, the criteria vary extensively and are
often not clear-cut. For example, most providers define no stringent grade
point average needed to apply. For other selection criteria, such as certain
personality traits, specifying cut-offs is impossible. This lack in transparency
leaves room for information asymmetries, risks inefficient talent loss of
high-achieving low socio-economic status students, and reinforces social
inequalities. The latter is further accelerated by numerous non-monetary
benefits from scholarships such as courses, personal support, and access to a
social network of many high-profile alumni, which boost scholarship holders’
careers after graduation.
In a randomized field experiment with over 5,000 German students, I
study whether information asymmetries deter qualified students from apply-
ing for merit-based scholarships and whether mitigating these information
asymmetries increases students’ application rates. I randomly allocated par-
ticipants to either the control or one of two treatment groups. In the first
treatment group, participants received general, publicly available information
on scholarships only. In the second treatment group, participants additionally
received tailored information on the application process and probabilities of
success, provided by a real, current scholarship holder. To ease identification,
the scholarship holder resembled the participant in several characteristics,
acting as a role model.
I consider two manifestations of information asymmetries that find ex-
pression in the design of the treatments.
First, prospective applicants must know the scholarship providers and
their respective application requirements. As currently only 1% of all German
higher education students are funded by these merit-based scholarships,
compiling the distinctive details of the respective application procedures is
challenging. This is especially true for students whose parents (and social
surroundings) have not studied and cannot contribute their own experiences
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with student financial aid applications. The general information treatment
addresses mainly this information asymmetry.
Second, potential applicants have to rate their own performance against
that of their competitors in the selection process. Although all students face
uncertainty about the sufficiency of their own qualification, non-academic
students are disadvantaged in various ways. On the one hand, they can rarely
benchmark their own performance against acquaintances who were success-
fully awarded a scholarship. On the other hand, the “cultural centeredness”
(Steele et al., 2002, p. 420) of the German scholarship body reinforces the
scholarship providers’ rather elitist appeal.1 Consequently, high-achieving
students of low socio-economic status might be afraid that stereotypes about
“the educationally deprived” affect their chances to succeed (Steele et al.,
2002, p. 422). The feeling not to fit into the scholarship system might put the
applicants’ performance in the selection process under a stereotype thread
or put students off applying entirely. A lack in role models of similar back-
ground to convey the credible assurance that students, who did not grow
up in a family of academics, can be equally successful is then both cause
and effect of a social selective scholarship system. The role model treatment
considered here aims, first, at breaking this cycle to increase non-academic
students’ sense of belonging to scholarship providers. Second, the role model
treatment intends to provide insider information similar to that shared by
parents or peers experienced with the German scholarship system.
My results provide evidence of information asymmetries and differences
in previous applications between academic and non-academic students. Both
treatments increased non-academic students’ poor baseline-knowledge about
scholarships. Moreover, non-academic students in the role model treatment
group doubled their applications for merit aid. Restricting the sample to the
most eligible students increases role model treatment effects substantially.
The general information treatment did, however, not affect application rates
for merit-based scholarships—potentially because it triggered the students’
own information search for other, less selective, aid programs, and increased
applications there. Furthermore, the treatments were ineffective for high-
achieving female students who judge their own overall academic performance
significantly less favorably than equally qualified men do.
This chapter adds to the existing literature in several ways. Up to now,
little is known about whether information asymmetries between students
of different socio-economic backgrounds matter also for high performing
1 Translated literally, German scholarship foundations are promoting endowment, rather
than providing aid on grounds of performance. Another example is that the Bavarian
scholarship programs are regulated in the “Bavarian Elite Aid Act”.
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students in higher education. To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is
the first field experiment analyzing the effect of information provision with
respect to merit-based scholarships and contributes to the sparse literature
on information interventions in competitive settings. Furthermore, previous
studies report mixed results as to whether the provision of information can
indeed trigger behavioral changes and how interventions should be designed
to do so. I shed further light on the design of interventions by testing whether
participants lack information per se or tailored information provided by a
similar role model. Finally, drawing on data on students’ decision to apply, I
can disentangle students’ self-selection into the pool of potential scholarship
holders frommany other factors influencingwhether they are indeed awarded
the scholarship. I focus on students’ applications because the scholarship
providers’ choice is limited to the pool of applicants. Therefore, from a policy
perspective, equal opportunities at the stage of applications are the basis to
secure an efficient and equitable allocation of funds.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. After a review of the relevant
literature in the next section, section 4.3 provides a short overview of the
institutional background of merit-based student aid in Germany. Section
4.4 details the experimental set-up. Section 4.5 describes the data and gives
brief descriptive analyses on heterogeneous information asymmetries and
application experiences at baseline. Section 4.6 reports results of the exper-
iment, and section 4.7 concludes. Supplemental tables, further details, and
robustness checks can be found in the appendix.
4.2 Previous literature
Although I am unaware of experimental studies about merit-based student
financial aid, numerous papers employ experimental set-ups to assess the
behavioral impacts of information provision on costs and returns of going
to college, or the availability of need-based student financial aid. Taken
as a whole, evidence on the effectiveness of information interventions is
mixed and depends both on the institutional context and the design of the
intervention.
More specifically, a first strand of the literature intends to close informa-
tion asymmetries by providing general information not customized to the
recipient (e.g., statistics or leaflets on the returns to education). When official
statistics are unavailable, not reliable, or poorly understood, a general infor-
mation treatment can effectively increase years of schooling (Jensen, 2010),
grades, and perceived returns to education (Nguyen, 2008) in developing
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countries or rural areas. In contrast to that, providing general information
in industrialized countries cannot effectively increase take-up of student
financial aid (Booij et al., 2012; Bettinger et al., 2012), college enrollments
(Carrell and Sacerdote, 2013), or channel enrollment to degrees with higher
educational returns (Kerr et al., 2014).
In industrialized countries with a broad coverage of publicly available
information, customized information or personal assistance has a higher
potential to affect behavior. Bettinger et al. (2012) study students’ completion
of the highly complex free application for federal student aid (FAFSA), which
is central to access funds from most student aid programs in the US. The au-
thors explicitly tested the advantages of providing personalized information
and counseling over providing general information on student financial aid.
They treated low-income students in all experimental groups with a brochure
containing general information on costs and benefits of studying and need-
based financial aid. The authors additionally provided one treatment group
with individual aid estimates and encouraged them to file the FAFSA. Over
and above both receiving general and personalized aid information, the third
group was also offered personal assistance in completing the FAFSA. Only
students in the personally assisted group were significantly more likely to
receive aid, enroll, and persist in college.
Contrary to that, recent studies show that customizing information can
positively affect low socio-economic status students’ choice of more promis-
ing institutions or degrees (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008; Hoxby and Turner,
2013; Hastings et al., 2015).
With respect to coaching and counseling, Bettinger and Baker (2011)
found that college students who received assistance in organizing their day
and planning their studies were significantly more likely to persist and grad-
uate. Likewise, Castleman et al. (2014) demonstrated in a recent study that
counseling recent high school graduates on financial aid matters, remind-
ing them of important deadlines, and assisting them with the paperwork
increased their retention at and completion of college significantly.
Many other studies provide evidence that coaching or counseling in-
creases the quality of educational choices and later labor market outcomes
(e.g., Carrell and Sacerdote, 2013; Saniter and Siedler, 2014; Borghans et al.,
2015), and might be even more cost-effective than increasing student financial
aid (Bettinger and Baker, 2011).
Other studies maximize the targeting of the information by sending role
models (or: peer counselors) with similar characteristics to students. Role
models enhance the credibility of the information provided, increase the
sense of belonging, and can induce participants to emulate them.
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Nguyen (2008), for example, treated poor fourth-graders in Madagascar
with three different interventions: A random group of students and their par-
ents saw statistics on average educational returns to school only. The second
treatment group met a person who shared his or her story of success with the
children. Within this group, students were additionally randomly sampled to
listening to the success story of a role model of high socio-economic back-
ground, or to a role model of shared, i.e., low socio-economic background.
The third treatment group received both treatments. The author shows that
both statistics and meeting a role model with shared characteristics can have
large effects on perceived educational returns, attendance, and achievement
of students of low socio-economic background. Combining both treatments
increases, however, also awareness of the heterogeneity in educational re-
turns and, therefore, reduces the positive effects of the statistics.
Dinkelman and Martínez A. (2014) take the same line with their inter-
vention on low-income eighth-graders in Chile. They let students watch a
15-minute film where role models of similar socio-economic status describe
financial aid possibilities. In consequence, the treatment increased students’
high school enrollments and reduced school absenteeism.
Moreover, role models can be effective in stereotyped contexts such as
math tests where women’s ability (e.g., Marx and Roman, 2002) or at univer-
sities where non-academic students’ performance is negatively stereotyped
(e.g., Stephens et al., 2014). In these contexts, role models need not even share
the stereotyped social identity (Steele et al., 2002, p. 428), though shared
characteristics can increase the role models’ effectiveness (Behncke et al.,
2010; Marx and Ko, 2012).
In contrast to all that, the evidence on information asymmetries in com-
petitive contexts such as applications for merit aid or at highly selective
institutions is sparse. Yet, one study investigates talented low-income stu-
dents’ application behavior at selective US-colleges. Hoxby and Turner (2013)
provided high-achieving students from low-income families with partly in-
dividualized, written information on the application process and personal
expected net college costs at selective institutions. Furthermore, the interven-
tion reimbursed treated students’ application costs at up to eight colleges and
also offered information for students’ parents. Hoxby and Turner (2013) find
economically and statistically significantly higher application and admittance
rates to highly selective colleges. The mix of financial and informational
incentives makes it, however, impossible to evaluate whether a gap in in-
formation or rather credit constraints were the decisive hurdle in students’
access to selective higher education. Furthermore, Wiswall and Zafar (2013,
2015) show that even high-ability students at an elite university are not per-
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fectly informed about returns from specific majors and that providing this
information affects their choices. Unfortunately, the authors do not comment
on heterogeneous effects by socio-economic background.
In sum, especially students of non-academic backgrounds should be more
likely to show positive treatment effects if information is tailored and they can
easily identify with a role model of similar socio-economic background. On
the contrary, general information seems to be rather ineffective in impacting
behavior. Up to now, we do, however, not know whether information asym-
metries matter also for students who are of low socio-economic background,
but score high in the achievement-distribution.
4.3 Institutional background
4.3.1 The German student aid system
As German colleges do not charge tuition, studying in Germany is relatively
cheap in international comparison. Financial student assistance is, likewise,
less pronounced when compared to countries charging high fees such as
the US or the UK. Nevertheless, this means at the same time that German
high schools usually lack a study adviser for student financial aid matters.
Consequently, gaps in knowledge about how to finance studying persist.
Need-based income-contingent aid as of the Federal Training Assistance
Act, short “BAföG”, is the most common form of financial support in Germany,
claimed by 17% of all enrolled German students in 2012 (German Bundestag,
2014). The state usually grants half of the BAföG amount as a subsidy, the
other half as an interest-free loan. The loan-component must be repaid within
20 years after a grace period of five years. On average, funded students draw
on a monthly funding amount of EUR 448 (Federal Statistical Office, 2015a,
p. 32), which is equal to about 60% of the minimum subsistence level of a
single person (German Bundestag, 2015, p. 8).2
The departments of the student services are responsible for counseling,
processing of the students’ applications, and calculating the respective fund-
ing amounts. These departments are closely associated with the respective
higher education institutions, making BAföG a well-known funding source
that students come across latest when they look for a room in one of the de-
partments’ student dormitories or charge their service cards for the canteens
also operated by the student services.
2 Therefore, most students have to rely on several financial resources. Therein, financial
support by parents and own income from working besides the studies or in the semester
break are most important (Middendorff et al., 2013, p. 593).
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In contrast to that, the scholarship culture is still rather underdeveloped
with currently not even 2% of all higher education students funded by some
form of merit-based aid.3 13 privately-owned foundations for the promotion
of young talent, called “Begabtenförderungswerke” (BFW), provide the most
common form of merit-based aid in higher education. The foundations are
privately owned and most of them pursue other goals over and above provid-
ing money for talented students, for example, political education, teaching of
values in Germany and abroad, or development assistance. Therefore, and
because the BFW are mainly funded by the German state, the merit-based aid
system as a whole is obligated to reflect the plurality of society. Accordingly,
each foundation is associated with a different facet of society: Several political
foundations provide scholarships. Each of these foundations is affiliated with
one of the parties in the German Federal Parliament. Moreover, there are
religiously associated foundations and those affiliated with companies or
trade-unions. Lastly, the ideologically neutral German National Scholarship
Foundation is the oldest and largest BFW, promoting more than 40% of all
funded scholars (German National Scholarship Foundation, 2014, p. 210).
The FederalMinistry of Education and Research is continuously extending
funding amounts to increase the amount of scholarship holders. In 2014, EUR
232.6 million were provided to support 26,900 students enrolled in bachelor’s
or master’s programs and 4,100 PhD students, summing up to about 1% of
the overall student body (Federal Statistical Office, 2015b; Federal Ministry of
Education and Research, 2015b). After the report of Middendorff et al. (2009)
on the social selectivity in the German scholarship system spurred notable
political and media attention (e.g. Kerbusk, 2009), special funds of EUR 8.2
million were placed at the BFWs’ disposal to increase the share of scholarship
holders from “underrepresented groups”.
Unlike BAföG, both the BFW and the merit-based scholarships they
award are completely separate of any (higher) education institution. This
has two important implications. First, neither the amount nor the receipt of
the scholarship is tied to visiting a certain university or being enrolled in
a certain program. Second, the German merit-based aid scheme requires a
high degree of the students’ own responsibility to get informed and to apply
of their own accord to each BFW separately in order to participate in the
respective selection processes.
Students usually apply for funding when they are enrolled in their first or
second semesters of higher education, though some BFW allow applications
for funding at the undergraduate level even before students officially enroll
3 Own calculation based on Federal Statistical Office (2014b); Federal Ministry of Education
and Research (2014a) and Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2015a) for 2013.
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at university (tables A4.15 to A4.17 in the appendix give an overview). If
the BFW also offers scholarships for Master’s studies, students are usually
required to apply before they start the program. From the respective pool
of applicants, each BFW selects then its own future scholars (see the next
section). When asked about acceptance rates, the BFW argue not to stick to
a fixed rate but to admit all promising applicants.
Different to the US where students can claim both need- and merit-based
aid simultaneously, German students have to decide between claiming need-
based and merit-based aid. The latter is, however, clearly more favorable: Not
only carry scholarships the advantage that they need not be repaid, they pay
also higher aid amounts. Accordingly, the basic monthly scholarship awards
are geared to the income-contingent BAföG amounts but supplemented by a
monthly lump-sum amount of EUR 300. The resultant maximum award of
EUR 970 is enough to concentrate fully on studying.
Beyond its financial advantages, a BFW scholarship signals high moti-
vation and achievement of those who succeeded in the highly competitive
selection process. A BFW scholarship is, therefore, considered a distinc-
tion worth being included in the curriculum vitae. Because the BFW aim at
promoting and developing highly skilled young academics who are willing
to take over social responsibility, funded scholars profit from many oppor-
tunities: The BFW provide conceptual support, such as interdisciplinary
seminars, study trips, summer academies, personal support, and mentoring.
With respect to their later career, funded scholars profit, moreover, from a
rich alumni network which meets regularly and includes many high-profile
politicians, researchers, and managers. Given that students of non-academic
homes can draw on less financial resources and lack both counseling by
college-experienced parents and a highly qualified network, they should
benefit most from merit-based scholarships.
Apart from the most prominent form of merit-based aid provided by the
BFW, a plethora of small private or institutional providers award scholarships
to a small number of students. For example, some universities, companies,
and cities provide merit-based scholarships to students born in the region
or enrolled in a certain subject of studies. In comparison to the BFW, these
scholarships are generally less focused on academic merit and impose more
specific and more transparent criteria. As these scholarship providers are
small and often only operating in a specific area, they are largely unknown
and face far less competition. These scholarships are, therefore, potentially
easier to win than the BFW scholarships (Pabst, 05.04.2015). Nevertheless,
they do also usually pay less lucrative amounts than the BFW scholarships.
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4.3.2 The application process for merit-based aid
The federal law only regulates that students are eligible to receive funding of
the BFW “if their talent and personality promise outstanding performance
during their studies and in working life” (Federal Ministry of Education
and Research, 2014b, p. 3, own translation). They must furthermore meet
some formal requirements, e.g., having a permanent residence permit and
being enrolled full-time at a state-approved higher education institution. The
further refinement of the aptitude criteria and the selection process is left to
the discretion of each BFW.
Most BFW establish the following criteria to assess applicants’ aptitude:
First, applicants have to demonstrate “high performance” in high school or
college. Second, applicants have to play an active part in society, politics,
or culture, i.e., must be socially engaged, preferably compatible with the
mission of the respective institution. Third, qualifying students must show
responsibility, motivation, and dependability. Fourth, they should identify
with the provider’s alignment and goals, e.g., applicants at a Catholic BFW
should identify with Catholic values. However, providers may put different
emphases on the relative importance of these components and may also judge
the “total package”. Most BFW establish application thresholds with respect
to acceptable age and semester ranges. Some BFW apply additional criteria,
such as explicitly considering the applicant’s socio-economic background.
All in all, regulations and thresholds differ strongly between providers (tables
A4.15 to A4.17 in the appendix give an overview).
Whether students meet the requirements to be funded during their studies
is usually assessed in a very competitive procedure of several stages. For
example, the German National Scholarship Foundation requires applicants to
take an extensive test on their chances of academic success. After passing the
aptitude test, they are invited to a selection seminar involving two interviews
and a group discussion on short papers presented by the candidates. In 2013,
28.2% of the participants in the selection process were awarded a scholarship
(German National Scholarship Foundation, 2014, p. 211).
The federal government explicitly supports the high heterogeneity in the
application requirements and the selection processes to secure plurality in
the scholarship body. Nevertheless, the resultant complexity increases the
applicants’ transaction costs to find an appropriate BFW. Because friends or
parents with scholarships are much more common sources of information
and motivation to apply than the high school or university,4 non-academic
4 A subsample of 376 participants in the experiment was funded by a BFW scholarship at
wave 2. I exploited this coincidence by asking them additional questions after the general
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students are more likely to lack important insights into the merit-based aid
system. Accordingly, heterogeneous application requirements might equally
well rather be detrimental to plurality.
Moreover, personality traits and volunteer work being core qualification
requirements, it is impossible to define standardized eligibility cut-offs for
sufficient qualification. Although academic merit should be easily quantified
and compared, only a minority of BFW define a grade point average candi-
dates must meet to successfully apply (grade point average (GPA) better than
2.0 on a five-point scale, 1.0 representing the best possible grade). In contrast
to the transparent criteria underlying the provision of BAföG, students are
highly dependent on forming expectations about their chances to succeed
when applying for a scholarship.
4.4 The scholarship information experiment
The scholarship experiment was framed as a two-wave online survey on
study finances with special focus on scholarships. I conducted the first survey
between late October and early December 2013, and the second survey around
half a year later (April/May 2014), i.e., in the first weeks of the winter and
summer lecture periods, respectively.5 To incentivize participation, students
had the possibility to participate in a lottery which was tied to completing
both waves.
4.4.1 Wave 1
For wave 1, I recruited participants via universities’ official mailing lists where
possible but also by means of printed posters and online study groups. The
goal of the first survey was to gather information on the respondents’ socio-
economic and study background, to assess their knowledge of the German
part of the second survey, containing items on the sources that had informed them about
the existence of BFW scholarships and the people who made them applying (multiple
selections were possible). 36% were informed by friends and 22% by their parents, while
18% mentioned to have participated in an information program at their high schools or
universities. Only 4% reported that an instructor at university or school had provided
information on scholarships. More than half indicated that their parents had brought them
to apply, 46% state that friends were the motivating factor. School teachers were named in
35% of cases and university lecturers in only 19%.
5 A third wave was conducted inMay 2015, i.e., one year after the secondwave, to give insights
into whether students’ scholarship applications were successful or not. Unfortunately, the
response rate of students who applied after wave 1 was too small to conduct reliable analyses.
Nevertheless, the data could be exploited to fill about 100missings of time-invariant variables
from wave 1, e.g., with respect to parental academic background.
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scholarship system and to proxy their eligibility for a scholarship. Further-
more, I questioned participants on previous applications for scholarships.
After completing the questionnaire, respondents were randomly assigned
to the control group or one of the two treatment groups. It is unsettled
whether German students, especially freshmen, know of the rarely awarded
scholarships at all and whether confronting them with potentially publicly
available information on scholarships does already exert an effect. Therefore,
I did not provide the control group with any general information. Along
the same line of reasoning, I provided both treatment groups with a general
information text to ensure their basic scholarship knowledge and the second
treatment group’s understanding of the role model interview.
More specifically, I randomly allocated participants to one of the following
groups:
Control group: The control group was directly filtered to the last page where
official university e-mail addresses were collected to invite participants for the
second survey. As the universities’ computing centers provide each student
with a single university e-mail address once enrolled, I am able to restrict the
sample to enrolled students and detect duplicates in my data.
General information treatment group: Participants were exposed to a text
containing general information about merit-based scholarships, the amount
of monthly funding, and formal application requirements. Text and graphics
intended to offer objective information without explicitly encouraging stu-
dents to apply. The wording was similar to an official website of the BFW
Working Group (2013), especially when describing the respective application
requirements. The text stressed, however, that students should gather more
detailed information from the BFW directly.
Role model treatment group: The role model treatment group also received
the general information text the information treatment group read, but was
additionally provided with “custom-fit” insights through a written, personal
testimony of a (real) student funded by one of the BFW.6 I asked role models
to answer a set of questions concerning personal benefits from scholarship
and application requirements with a focus on the importance of academic
achievement and social engagement. Role models should further detail the
application and admission procedure, and estimate the chances to win a schol-
6 For the sake of credibility of and identifiability with the information and the scholarship
holder, I decided to actually conduct interviews with 34 real scholars rather than con-
fronting the participant with artificial vignettes. As I show later in the appendix, results are
insensitive to potential slight variations between texts.
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arship if belonging to a group currently underrepresented in the scholarship
body. Although answers to these questions were tailored to the requirements
of the specific BFW, all interviews shared a motivating tenor and stressed that
an application, although strenuous, is worth the trouble. As the treatment
focused non-academic students, role models also emphasized that students
of non-academic backgrounds have equal chances to succeed and should not
shy away from applying.
To avoid bad fit between role model and participant, e.g., a participant
identifying with a left-wing party being matched with a scholar from a BFW
associated with a conservative party, students were allocated to a role model
based on their political and/or religious association. In order to achieve good
matches, an algorithm (see appendix 4.8.1 for details) selected the interview
which had the highest accuracy of fit with respect to field of studies and gender
between the interviewed scholarship holder and the respondent. In other
words, I established similarity on observed and controlled characteristics
rather than additionally randomizing the degree of similarity.7
All interviewswere headedwith awarrant of apprehension (name, subject
of studies, educational institution, semester, educational path to university)
and showed the scholar on a casual photograph, so that participants could
easily learn about the role model’s characteristics.
4.4.2 Wave 2
Six months after the first survey, I invited approving students to access the
second questionnaire via a personal link in their e-mail. The second survey
aimed at updating information from the first survey, observing whether stu-
dents’ knowledge on scholarships changed, and refining judgment about their
possible eligibility for a scholarship. Most importantly, I asked respondents
whether they applied for a scholarship between both waves. As both person-
ality traits and cognitive abilities are selection criteria for scholarships, the
second survey included a short measurement of the Big Five Inventory BFI-S
(Gerlitz and Schupp, 2005) and an untimed 12-item short-form of Raven’s
Advanced Progressive Matrices APM test (Raven et al., 1988), developed by
Bors and Stokes (1998) and administered online.8
7 Slight differences in the quality of matching did not affect participants’ application rates
significantly (see tables A4.11 and A4.12 in the appendix).
8 In order to prevent attrition caused by an excessively long first wave, I decided to shift data
collection of the BFI-S and the APM to wave 2. As the treatments are unlikely to affect
measurement of personality and cognitive test scores and because both BFI-S and APM can
be considered as relatively stable over time as indicated by acceptable test-retest stabilities
(Hahn et al., 2012; Bors and Stokes, 1998), this should not affect the results.
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4.5 Data
4.5.1 Descriptives
As students potentially eligible to receive a scholarship are the target group
of this study, I restrict the sample to students enrolled in both waves. After
removing 574 cases, including PhD students, recent graduates, and college
drop-outs, 8,817 students who completed the first survey remained. Of these,
64.3% also finished the second interview.9 Response rates for the second
survey are also very similar between groups (controls: 65.0 %, info treatment:
64.2 %, role model treatment: 63.6 %) with differences between groups not
being statistically significant (chi-squared test: χ2 = 1.29, p = 0.53). More-
over, using the wave 1 data set and regressing participation in wave 2 on the
treatment dummies, the later baseline controls, and the interaction of both
does not raise differential attrition concerns. Listwise deletion of participants
with non-response on at least one of the items used as control variables (1.6%
of the sample) results in a final analytic sample of 5,531 participants equally
spread over groups.
In the final sample, participants study at about 180 different colleges
(universities and universities of applied sciences), so that more than 40%
of all German colleges are represented. I emphasize here, though, that the
sample was not drawn on a representative basis as the population of students
formally eligible to apply for a scholarship was unknown. The results and
conclusions are, therefore, only internally valid.10
The following paragraphs describe the analytic sample and draw com-
parisons to the general student body, where possible. I focus on discussing
means for the control group if not indicated otherwise.
Table 4.1 displays descriptive statistics within and between the three
experimental groups. As shown in the last two columns, characteristics are
balanced over groups, indicating that randomization was successful.11 As
9 More than one third of wave 2 non-respondents (12.2% of those who finished wave 1) could
not be contacted due to typos in the e-mail addresses collected. The high share of mistakes
in e-mail addresses is probably due to the fact that most universities provide their students
with randomly created, and hence hard to remember, addresses to prevent spam for and
identification of the respective students.
10 Nevertheless, a self-selected sample, which is likely to represent the more committed
students, is an appropriate potential target group for information campaigns of the BFW.
11 Members of the first treatment group were, however, marginally less likely to have applied
for other scholarships (p<0.1). Applying procedures correcting for alpha inflation, e.g.,
Bonferroni-Holm, no statistically significant differences were found on an overall signifi-
cance level of 1%. Figure A4.2 in the appendix shows that kernel density plots for the Big
Five Inventory between groups are very similar.
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is often the case in survey-based studies, female respondents are largely
overrepresented, compared to official register data amounting to 48% fe-
male students (Federal Statistical Office, 2014c). More importantly, however,
the representation by educational background is in range with recent rep-
resentative student-level data reporting that 50% (20. Sozialerhebung 2012
by Middendorff et al. (2013)) of the surveyed students are of non-academic
background: Here, 52% of the participants are of non-academic background,
meaning they descend from families where no parent achieved a college
degree.
Compared to official register data for the sampling period (Federal Sta-
tistical Office, 2014a), students in my sample are more than 2 years younger
(23 years, not reported) and have completed less semesters. I intended to
sample students at an early stage of their studies as the BFW target students
in their first semesters. Moreover, the students here are far more likely to
be enrolled at a university (87% here vs. 58% in the register data). The over-
representation of university students is a common phenomenon in survey
data, even if drawn on a representative basis (and amounting to 74% in the
20. Sozialerhebung 2012, for example).
Turning to key controls for the following analyses reveals that current
holders of BFW scholarships (6%) are overrepresented as their share in the
general student population amounts to only 1%. 16% of the students had
already applied for a scholarship at a BFW, and 14% had applied elsewhere
for a scholarship. Strikingly, the application rates by educational background
differ only with respect to the BFW scholarships but not with respect to
scholarships of other providers: While 14% of the non-academic students
had applied at a BFW, the respective percentage of the academic students
is more than one third higher (19%). At the same time, a similar proportion
of academic and non-academic students had applied elsewhere (15% and
14%, χ2 = 0.04, p = 0.84). In contrast to the BFW, the non-BFW providers
sometimes address students in financial hardship or of low socio-economic
background directly, thereby likely to reduce information asymmetries by ed-
ucational background. At the same time, however, many non-BFW providers
also impose less challenging eligibility criteria, so that more non-academic
students might qualify for other scholarships but not for the more selective
BFW scholarships. In sum, this pattern already suggests that either a larger
proportion of academic students is qualified to apply at a BFW or that non-
academic students lack awareness of the profitable opportunities only BFW
scholarships open up.
To proxy students’ eligibility to receive a scholarship, the further analyses
control for the fit of application requirements. As described above, dual degree
144
students (12%), those studying in their second course of studies (4%), or part
time (1%) are mostly ineligible to receive scholarships. Most providers require
applicants to be at least younger than 35 years—which nearly all students in
the sample are. Qualified applicants should officiate volunteer work (which
half of the sample does) and show above-average academic performance.
Because one third of all students in the sample were college freshmen in
wave 1, they were not able to report grades of their studies yet.12 Therefore,
I used the study grades at baseline, where available, and substituted these by
high school GPA if missing (2,010 cases).13
Representative data on students’ average academic performance during
their studies is unavailable in Germany. Taking information on high school
GPA from the “mostly representative” (Ramm, 2014, p.10) Studierendensurvey
2013 by Simeaner et al. (2014) as a benchmark suggests that high school GPAs
in the sample here are overall similar but slightly better—which is reasonable
because students in my sample are younger and average high school GPAs
ameliorate continuously over cohorts.14 About 45% of the sample here falls
into the “high performance” group which is, according to the BFW that
impose explicit study GPA-cutoffs, defined as a GPA better than 2.0 on the
German five-point grading scale. 46% of the sample scores between GPA
2.0 and 2.9 (medium performance), only 9% scores lower than that. Despite
the potential slight overrepresentation in study entrance grades, average
cognitive test scores of 7.21 (S.D. = 2.70) are very close to results of the
original offline version (mean = 7.15, S.D. = 2.34) used by Bors and Stokes
(1998, p. 393).
As discussed earlier, delimiting the subsample with a viable chance to
apply is difficult. Defining eligible students as students with high academic
performance, who are younger than 35 years, neither dual degree students nor
studying in their second course of studies, and have officiated volunteer work
within the past 12 months, a share of 21.4% of this sample can be considered
12 There are also subjects of studies, e.g., Law, where the first semesters are not graded at all
and grades are, naturally, missing.
13 This strategy should be unproblematic as students have to demonstrate their academic
ability when applying for scholarships and will also have to use their high school diploma
if they did not receive any college grades yet. Furthermore, if I used achievements as
reported in the second semester, I would be unable to rule out bias introduced by potential
treatment-related changes in achievement.
14 Data from the German Kultusministerkonferenz shows that high school GPAs ameliorated
by roughly 2% between 2009 and 2013 over all German states. Grade inflation was most
pronounced in North Rhine-Westphalia and Thuringia, where GPAs ameliorated by more
than 5% (see figure A4.3 in the appendix).
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as potentially eligible. This fraction reduces to 19% when I subtract current
scholars. All these shares are equally spread over groups.
If not indicated otherwise, all analyses control for socio-economic and
study-related characteristics, fulfillment of application requirements, the re-
spective baseline levels of the dependent variable (applied at a BFW or applied
at other non-BFW providers), and baseline scholarship receipt. Cognitive
test scores and personality traits are added as indicated.
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4.5.2 Application determinants
There are, of course, several reasons why students of non-academic back-
grounds are underrepresented in the scholarship body. For example, a lower
share of qualified students of non-academic backgrounds must translate into
an equally reduced share in the overall scholarship body. Nevertheless, re-
cent evidence suggests that differences in college grades between academic
and non-academic students are very small (Delaney et al., 2011; Aspelmeier
et al., 2012).15 Even if the probability to meet the requirements was, however,
unrelated to socio-economic characteristics, the selection process could in-
troduce selectivity. College-experienced parents might, for example, coach
their children to perform better, or students of non-academic background
might perform worse when in a situation of stereotype threat.
Providing information can only exert an effect on a more equitable social
composition if equally talented students of non-academic backgrounds are
already underrepresented at the stage of applications. To explore whether
this is indeed the case, I specify a logit model where I regress applications for
a BFW scholarship up to the first survey on a set of socio-economic, college,
and eligibility controls (table 4.2).
As expected, the application requirements are highly relevant determi-
nants of the application decision with academic performance, volunteer work,
and meeting the age requirement being most important.16 Keeping all these
factors at their observed values, students at universities of applied sciences
are predicted to be about four percentage points less likely to report a previ-
ous application than students enrolled at universities. As the share of students
who work besides their studies is higher in the applied sciences group, this
effect is likely to capture more time constraints and a smaller financial need
to apply for a scholarship.17
Furthermore, the results in column 1 suggest that respondents’ socio-
economic background influences application behavior. All else equal, the
predicted probability to report an application was 2.5 percentage points
(=18%) lower for students of families without academic experience than for
students from academic homes. High achieving university students with
15 To the best of my knowledge, evidence for Germany is not available so far.
16 Of course, students in their second course of studies and students who are too old to be
eligible may have applied earlier. The dummy flagging respondents older than 34 years
does therefore also capture a time trend of scholarships being less frequent and known at
the time they would have been eligible to apply.
17 Students’ or parents’ financial resources might be simultaneously affected by scholarship
receipt (high income reduces the scholarship amount; scholarship funding increases financial
resources). Lacking appropriate data, I cannot address this issue, unfortunately.
149Table 4.2: Determinants of the application for a merit scholarship: Logit model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female –0.016 –0.012 –0.023** –0.021*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Semester 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-academic background –0.025*** –0.023** –0.026*** –0.024**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Applied sciences –0.040*** –0.038*** –0.046*** –0.044***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Other educational institution –0.030 –0.032 –0.024 –0.026
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Medium performance –0.157*** –0.152*** –0.143*** –0.137***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Low performance –0.162*** –0.160*** –0.155*** –0.153***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Older than 34 years –0.121*** –0.121*** –0.120*** –0.121***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Dual studies –0.036** –0.033** –0.033** –0.030**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Second degree –0.028 –0.026 –0.032 –0.030
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Other non-eligible studies –0.016 –0.013 –0.022 –0.017
(0.064) (0.065) (0.061) (0.062)
Volunteer work 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.160***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Party identification 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.023** 0.024**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Cognitive test score 0.022*** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.005)
Openness –0.002 –0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Conscientiousness 0.039*** 0.040***
(0.005) (0.005)
Extraversion 0.007 0.011**
(0.005) (0.005)
Agreeableness –0.012*** –0.013***
(0.005) (0.005)
Neuroticism –0.005 –0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Observations 5531 5531 5531 5531
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.158 0.162 0.171 0.176
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Each column reports average marginal effects from a separate logistic regression
on the probability that the participant had applied for a BFW scholarship at baseline.
I conduct a principal component analysis and orthogonal varimax rotation (total ex-
plained variance = 65.28%) on the Big Five Inventory before extracting the five factors
by regression scoring.
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an average number of semesters (4.4), meeting all application requirements
and reporting a party identification, had a 5.2 percentage points (=12.4%)
lower predicted probability to have applied if of non-academic background
(p < 0.01).
Omitted variable bias can, however, explain differences in applications
if personality or cognitive abilities drive both application behavior and are
correlated with socio-economic background. Therefore, I include covariates
for cognitive test scores (col. 2) and personality traits (col. 3). It is well
established that conscientious students who are likely to be motivated and
to behave achievement-oriented perform better in college (e.g., O’Connor
and Paunonen, 2007). Accordingly, I find that conscientious participants are
predicted to be about four percentage points more likely to have applied (col.
3), over and above controlling for cognitive test scores (col. 4). Participants
with high levels of agreeableness, being less assertive in their behavior, are
predicted to be less likely, while extroverted individuals more likely to have
applied when cognitive test scores are added. Nevertheless, none of the
controls can close the application gap between students of different socio-
economic backgrounds (col. 4).
What is striking, once personality traits are added, is that women are less
likely to have applied. In the full specification, their predicted probability is
4.3 percentage points (10.9%) lower (p = 0.05) when considering eligible uni-
versity students with average values on personality, test scores, and number
of semesters.
Although I am not claiming causality here, the results provide some evi-
dence that not only students of non-academic backgrounds but also women
are already underrepresented when applying for scholarships, keeping el-
igibility constant. The lower application probability of women confirms
the significantly smaller share of female scholarship holders in the German
National Scholarship Foundation detected by Kuhlmann et al. (2012).
4.5.3 Information asymmetries
Is the decision to abstain from applying related to a lack in knowledge about
scholarships? When asked about reasons for not applying, participants at-
tach most importance to insufficient knowledge on application requirements,
followed by insufficient volunteer work, and grades (table A4.14 in the ap-
pendix). Table 4.3 shows that students who had never applied at a BFW up to
wave 1 were indeed poorly informed about scholarships. More than half of
the participants indicated to be very or rather uninformed about scholarships,
while only 9% stated to be informed or very informed.
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Table 4.3: Knowledge level of non-applicants at baseline (wave 1)
Mean (S.D.)
Subjective knowledge level
(Very) informed 0.09 (0.29)
Partly informed 0.36 (0.48)
(Very) uninformed 0.55 (0.50)
Knowledge on characteristics
Amount correctly estimated 0.10 (0.30)
No provider known 0.36 (0.48)
Correct answer with respect to:
Eligible even if not in upper half of very good grades 0.46 (0.50)
Own application without proposal possible 0.80 (0.40)
Amount need not be repaid 0.71 (0.46)
No strict grade requirements for prolongation 0.22 (0.42)
Knowledge indicator
Sum of correctly answered 2.92 (1.35)
Observations 4622
Notes: Participants who indicated not to know the answer to the question and
those who failed to provide the correct answer were coded as 0, participants
who came up with the correct answer were coded as 1. The “Knowledge indi-
cator” sums participants’ correct answers from all six objective knowledge
items in the table.
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This pattern is also found in participants’ abilities to answer questions
about scholarships correctly. Only 10% of the non-applicants were able to
provide an estimate of the scholarship amount within an interval of EUR 50
around the true value of EUR 800.18 Apart from that, more than one third
could not name a single scholarship provider.
Several yes-no items tried to further assess students’ perceptions of schol-
arships. Nearly half of the students knew that an application is possible
without top margin grades. Most participants were informed about the pos-
sibility to apply at the BFW directly and knew that a scholarship need not
be repaid. Yet, about 80% thought that a strict grade point average existed,
which, if not met, led to a loss of funding.
In a nutshell, participants were inadequately informed and especially
lacked knowledge on the flexibility of requirements. Summing up correct
answers, respondents answered, on average, slightly less than half of the six
items correctly. Less than 1% of the respondents answered all items correctly
(not reported).
To explore information asymmetries, I regress the number of correctly
answered questions on a set of controls, including eligibility requirements.
To prevent reverse causality, I restrict the sample to those who had not
applied at a BFW up to the first wave. The sample includes, therefore, both
respondents totally unaware of scholarships and those who might have
considered applying but decided against it. I run an ordered logistic regression,
and, to facilitate interpretation, evaluate the results at the probability to
answer five of the six questions correctly.19 Table 4.4 reports average semi-
elasticities. The average semi-elasticity indicates the average percentage
change in the probability to answer five out of six questions correctly when
the respective covariate increases by one unit, keeping all other variables at
their observed values.
Unsurprisingly, academic achievement is, again, associated strongest
with a high predicted probability of above-average knowledge: The predicted
probability to answer five questions correctly is about 66 (116) percent lower
for participants with moderate (low) instead of high academic achievements,
ceteris paribus. Dual study students usually ineligible to receive scholarships
are predicted to be 21 percent less likely to provide five correct answers.
18 Respondents were asked to name the scholarship amount equivalent to EUR 500 of BAföG.
Respondents therefore needed to know that the scholarship amount equals BAföG, but that
scholarship holders receive a lump-sum payment of EUR 300 on top.
19 Estimates across all other cut-offs are shown in the appendix exemplary for the specification
of column 1 in table 4.4 (see figures A4.4 and A4.5 in the appendix). Patterns for the other
specifications are similar.
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Older students tend to be better informed, possibly because they had more
opportunities to meet scholarship holders during their studies in comparison
to young students. The socially engaged who are more likely to meet funded
scholars during volunteer work, are predicted to be about 14 percent more
likely to answer five questions correctly.
The predicted probability of above-average knowledge for a non-academic
at university with an average number of semesters, meeting all eligibility
requirements is about 16% (p < 0.01) lower than that of a comparable student
with college-educated parents. Calculating the same average semi-elasticity
with respect to gender, women’s predicted probability is about 26% (p < 0.01)
percent lower than that of similar men. These results are only slightly affected
when controlling for potential differences in cognitive abilities in column 3.
To explore in how far this effect is mitigated by informal knowledge
within the social network, I add a dummy for acquaintances with a scholar-
ship holder (col. 2). People who indicated to know a (former) scholarship
holder had substantially higher predicted probabilities to be informed. As
significantly less non-academic students were acquainted with a scholar than
their counterparts from academic homes (χ2 = 59.16, p = 0.00), the differ-
ence in knowledge between academic and non-academic students drops by
about one quarter but is not completely offset. Note that the inclusion of
the informal knowledge dummy does not affect the gender gap. As I cannot
reject the hypothesis that men and women differ in their probabilities to
know a scholar (χ2 = 0.86, p = 0.35), the results suggest that information
asymmetries might be a relevant obstacle for non-academic students but
probably not for women. The same holds for including cognitive test scores
in column 4.
In column 5, I isolate the effect for those who had actively looked for
information but then decided against applying by adding a dummy on own
information search.20 The influence of grades, volunteer work, and dual
studies is reduced, indicating that the most eligible did indeed inform them-
selves and were thus better prepared to answer the questions. Strikingly,
gaps with respect to academic background and gender increase, emphasizing
that non-academic and female students were also less likely to have looked
for information.
20 As only respondents who had not applied for scholarships and were not planning to do so
at baseline received this question, the sample size reduces to 2,681 students.
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Table 4.4: Ordered logit model for scholarship knowledge: average semi-
elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female –0.289*** –0.290*** –0.260*** –0.263*** –0.324***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.070)
Semester 0.031*** 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.017*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Non-academic background –0.177*** –0.138*** –0.165*** –0.127*** –0.287***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.066)
Applied sciences –0.051 –0.046 –0.032 –0.029 –0.188*
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.102)
Other educational institution –0.038 –0.018 –0.064 –0.042 –0.185
(0.166) (0.167) (0.168) (0.168) (0.243)
Medium performance –0.657*** –0.643*** –0.629*** –0.617*** –0.346***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.076)
Low performance –1.155*** –1.089*** –1.116*** –1.054*** –0.666***
(0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.108)
Older than 34 years 0.471** 0.474** 0.470** 0.472** 0.290
(0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.298)
Dual studies –0.209*** –0.202*** –0.199*** –0.192*** –0.126
(0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.101)
Other non-eligible studies 0.330 0.408 0.379 0.450 0.686
(0.363) (0.370) (0.357) (0.363) (0.502)
Volunteer work 0.141*** 0.096** 0.140*** 0.096** –0.007
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.066)
At least one acquaintance 0.449*** 0.439*** 0.301***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.068)
Cognitive test score 0.125*** 0.117*** 0.134***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.034)
Actively looked for information 1.086***
(0.076)
Observations 4622 4622 4622 4622 2671
Baseline predicted probability 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.057
P-value overall Brant test 0.775 0.688 0.624 0.530 †
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The table shows average semi-elasticities from an ordered logit model. Average
semi-elasticities are calculated for the probability to answer five of the six items cor-
rectly. Figures A4.4 and A4.5 in the appendix show how average semi-elasticities vary
over cut-offs. The sample is restricted to those who had not applied for a scholarship
up to wave 1. †=Too few observations in some sub-groups to compute the Brant test.
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4.6 The effects of information provision
4.6.1 Method
In the following, I analyze intent-to-treat (ITT) effects for five dependent
variables, all of them measured at the time of the second survey: the number
of correctly answered knowledge items, whether participants applied for a
merit-based scholarship at a BFW or at other providers, whether they thought
about applying, and, finally, whether they actively engaged in gathering more
information about scholarships.
I estimate all ITT effects by specifying the following model:
yi = β0 + β1 · INFORMATION+ β2 · ROLE MODEL+ x′i · β3 + ϵi, (4.1)
where yi is the respective outcome variable for student i at the time of the
second survey. The treatment dummies INFORMATION and ROLE MODEL
indicate whether students received only general information, or whether
they received the role model treatment. β1 and β2 represent the intent-to-
treat effects of the information and role model treatment, respectively. As
previously mentioned, the role model treatment also included the information
treatment. Therefore, β2 represents the composite effect of both treatments
with respect to no treatment. xi is a vector of baseline controls. ϵi represents
the error term, estimated using robust standard errors.
When the dependent variable is the number of correctly answered knowl-
edge items, I omit the constant from equation 4.1 and estimate an ordered
logit model. yi becomes a latent variable of the students’ scholarship knowl-
edge, observed in one of the seven categories from zero items to six items
answered correctly. For the ease of interpretation and similar to the previous
analyses of students’ information asymmetries (table 4.4), I report average
semi-elasticities for the probability to answer five of the six knowledge items
correctly.
For all other binary dependent variables, I run simple linear probability
models with ordinary least squares (OLS); non-linear specifications yield,
however, similar results.
Being interested in non-academic students’ application probabilitiesmainly,
I investigate heterogeneous ITT effects by adding interactions between the
treatment dummies and the students’ educational background in most of the
analyses.
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4.6.2 Results
Treatment effects on scholarship knowledge
Table 4.5 shows whether the treatments increased scholarship knowledge at
the time of the second survey for the whole sample (col. 1–2) and by educa-
tional background (col. 3–6). Columns 1 and 2 indicate that both treatments
increased the knowledge about scholarships significantly.21 The average
predicted probability to answer five of the six knowledge questions correctly
increased by about 12 percent in both the information and the role model
treatment group (col. 1). Adding personality traits and cognitive test scores
slightly decreases the estimates. Decomposing the sample by educational
background reveals that the effects are twice as large and only statistically
significantly different from zero for non-academic students for whom the
information was designed and who were worse informed at baseline.
Table 4.5: ITT effects on knowledge: Ordered logit model
All Non-academic Academic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information treatment 0.120** 0.111** 0.146** 0.142** 0.089 0.073
(0.047) (0.047) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067)
Role model treatment 0.119** 0.113** 0.159** 0.157** 0.072 0.060
(0.048) (0.048) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Big5 Controls X X X
Cognitive test scores X X X
Observations 5195 5195 2726 2726 2469 2469
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: ITT effects reported as average semi-elasticities from an ordered logit model (cut-
off at 5 correctly answered items) with respect to the control group. Each estimation
controls for all covariates of table 4.1, including the baseline level of the respective
dependent variable.
Treatment effects on applications for scholarships
This section investigates whether the better knowledge about scholarships
carried over to students’ higher application rates at wave 2. Table 4.6 presents
21 Results without covariates for this and all following specifications are very similar. I
report covariates-adjusted results only as these are more efficient and take care of potential
remaining differences between groups. Unadjusted results are available upon request.
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the impact of both treatments on applications at a BFW (col. 1–3) and at
other scholarship providers (col. 4–6). As a reference point, the bottom of
the table contains the predicted probabilities to apply for a scholarship at
wave 2 for the control group. I start with discussing the treatment effects for
applications at a BFW.
Considering the whole sample, column 1 reveals that less than three
percent of the students applied for a BFW scholarship between wave one
and wave two. Moreover, neither of the two treatments had a statistically
significant effect on applications.
Decomposing the sample again by educational background shows that
the role model treatment increased non-academic students’ application rates
by highly statistically significant 2 percentage points (col. 2–3), though. In
other words, in comparison to the respective control group, where only
1.9% of the students with non-academic background applied for a BFW-
scholarship, the role model treatment more than doubled non-academics’
application probabilities. In contrast to that, the respective treatment effect is
not statistically significant for students of college-educated families (p > 0.1).
Although non-academic students in the general information treatment group
are equally likely to answer objective knowledge questions on scholarships,
their probability to have applied for a BFW scholarship is not significantly
affected (col. 2–3) and marginally significantly smaller than the ITT of the
role-model treatment (p < 0.1). Therefore, only the role model treatment
increased a sense of belonging, allowed students to look behind the scenes,
and to accumulate insider information relevant to decide in favor for applying
themselves. As a consequence, ITT effects found in the second treatment
group can be considered as stemming from the interview text and not from the
general information text which was also provided to the general information
group.
Turning to students’ application probabilities for other scholarship oppor-
tunities not provided by the BFW (col. 4–6 in table 4.6) shows that the effect
pattern between both treatment groups reverses. Participants in the general
information group were 1.5 points more likely to report applications for
non-BFW scholarships, though the effect is only marginally statistically sig-
nificant. At the same time, the coefficient for members of the other treatment
group is negligibly small and insignificant, though not significantly smaller
(p > 0.1, col. 4). The negative signs of the interactions with educational back-
ground point to a smaller effect for academic students, yet, the interactions
are not significantly different from zero (col. 5-6). This is in line with the
observation that baseline application rates for non-BFW scholarships were
already very similar for academic and non-academic students (see table 4.1).
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Table 4.6: ITT effects for full sample and heterogeneous effects: OLS
Application at a BFW Application elsewhere
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information treatment 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.015* 0.019* 0.019*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Role model treatment 0.005 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Academic background –0.004 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.006 0.007
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Interaction effects
Info × Academic –0.012 –0.012 –0.007 –0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Role model × Academic –0.032*** –0.032*** 0.000 –0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
Big5 Controls X X
Cognitive test scores X X
Observations 5195 5195 5195 5195 5195 5195
Pred. probability to apply between W1 and W2 (control group)
All 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.055 0.055 0.055
Non-academic 0.019 0.019 0.050 0.050
Academic 0.034 0.034 0.060 0.060
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: ITT effects reported with respect to the control group. Each estimation controls for
the covariates of table 4.1, application at baseline and the receipt of other scholarships
at baseline. Additional covariates or interactions with both treatment groups are added
as indicated. 334 participants were dropped because they were already funded by a
scholarship (parallel funding not possible).
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Treatment effects on short-run behavior
To better understand why the general information treatment increased partic-
ipants’ applications for non-BFW scholarships but did not affect applications
for BFW scholarships, I investigate whether the treatments had similar ef-
fects on intentions to apply and own information search.22 Table 4.7 contains
regression results for the dependent variables having thought about applying
for any scholarship (col. 1–2) and having actively looked for more information
after the treatment (col. 3–4).
In the control group, about 42% of the students had thought about apply-
ing at the time of the second survey. Both treatments increased the share
of those who had thought about an application by a small but significant
amount. Although both treatments had an equally large impact on whether
participants considered applying (p > 0.1, col. 1–2), only the general infor-
mation treatment triggered own active information search between wave 1
and wave 2. The effect for participants in the role model treatment group who
were provided with extensive information is significantly smaller (p < 0.1,
col. 3) and not statistically significant overall. That the treatment effect in
the information treatment group is not statistically significantly different
from zero is not surprising as the general text provided only basic informa-
tion about scholarships and urged participants to go online to look for more
extensive information. In this vein, students in the information treatment
group might have come across other, probably more suitable or less chal-
lenging, scholarship opportunities and applied there, while those treated
more extensively restricted their attention to applying at a BFW. As outlined
previously, the selection criteria of other, smaller scholarship programs are
often more transparent and have less competitive and complex selection
processes. Publicly available information is, therefore, more helpful when
gathering information on non-BFW scholarships than when cutting one’s
way through the more complex information on scholarships provided by one
of the BFW.
Treatment effects on applications of the most eligible students
Because the majority of the students in my sample are not eligible to receive
scholarships, the treatment effects presented so far are only a lower bound
of the true effects. To purge the sample of mostly ineligible students, table
4.8 restricts the sample to an approximation of the target population. I start
22 Unfortunately, only those who had never applied for any scholarship at baseline and did
not intend to do so before the treatment were asked whether they had actively looked for
information or thought about applying.
160
Table 4.7: ITT effects on pre-application outcomes: OLS
Thought about
applying†
Active information
search†
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information treatment 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.036** 0.034*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Role model treatment 0.044** 0.044** 0.004 0.006
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Big5 Controls X X
Cognitive test scores X X
Observations 2670 2670 2670 2670
Pr(y=1) at W2 (control group)
All 0.419 0.419 0.233 0.233
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: ITT effects reported with respect to the control group. Each esti-
mation controls for all covariates of table 4.1, including the baseline
level of the respective dependent variable. † These items were only
given to respondents who had not applied for scholarships and were
not planning to do so at baseline.
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by dropping all students likely to be ineligible to apply at most BFW because
they are too old or study in ineligible programs (col. 1–2). Then, I also drop
students beyond the most favored range of semesters (col. 3). In column 4, I
exclude moderately and low performing students and in column 5 also those
who exert no volunteer work. Columns 6 and 7 keep, in addition to column
3, only the high performing students. I depict results without educational
background interactions for the first sample reduction (col. 1) and the most
restrictive sample (col. 6).
Columns 1 and 6 without interactions reveal that both treatments remain
insignificant in the sample of most eligible students. As students in the
general information group applied at higher rates elsewhere, irrespective
of their factual eligibility to receive BFW scholarships,23 ITT effects in the
general information group do not increase between columns 1 and 6 and stay
negligible in size and statistical significance. Although the ITT effects in the
role model group increase up to 2.2 points in column 6, the effect is still not
statistically significant.
Contrary to that, heterogeneous ITT effects for non-academic students
are statistically significant in all specifications (col. 2–6, col. 7) and rise
steadily up to 6.6 percentage points (col. 7). In the specification including
only students with volunteer work and high academic performance (col. 5),
application rates for non-academic students in the role model group are
about twice as large as the respective control group benchmark. In the most
restrictive specification for formally eligible, high-achieving students in the
eligible semester range (col. 7), application rates in the role model treatment
group exceed the respective control group benchmark by more than factor 5.
As can be seen from the bottom of the table, the predicted probabilities for
the control group to have applied for a BFW-scholarship differ significantly
between non-academic (row b) and academic students in all specifications
(row c): While academic students in the control group were increasingly
more likely to have applied for a scholarship if they are highly eligible, even
highly eligible non-academic students in the control group were up to 7
percentage points less likely to have applied. The role model treatment
closed the gaps in application probabilities between students of different
educational backgrounds almost completely.
23 Students ineligible for BFW scholarships have not applied less often for other alternatives
when I repeat the analysis from table 4.8 but restrict the sample up to the least eligible par-
ticipants. ITT estimates are similar to the unrestricted sample and larger in the information
treatment group.
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Success of applications
How likely is it that the non-academic students who applied after the treat-
ment are indeed awarded the scholarship? Unfortunately, I cannot assess this
question directly because the response rate of applicants assessed in a third
wave 1.5 years after the first was too low to conduct meaningful analyses.
Nevertheless, I can investigate whether the success probabilities of stu-
dents who had applied before wave 1 differed by educational background.
Table 4.9 reports OLS-estimates for the subsample of those who reported
a BFW-application at baseline. More specifically, I regress an indicator of
having applied (un-)successfully on several covariates. The estimates show
that non-academic students were not statistically significantly less successful
than comparable academic students.
These results are confirmed when I broaden the focus to applications up
to wave 3. I do not find evidence that students of non-academic background
who applied for the scholarship after wave 1 have a different likelihood to be
awarded the scholarship (χ2 = 0.43, p = 0.51).24
Furthermore, I asked students who were already financed by a BFW-
scholarship at wave 1 to assess, in how far the probability to be awarded a
scholarship is affected if applicants are of low socio-economic background
(but, other than that, similar to all other applicants). Respondents could
choose between the categories “very negatively”, “rather negatively”, “no
influence”, “rather positively”, and “very positively”. 76% assumed that the
probability to be awarded the scholarship is rather or very positively affected
if applicants are of low socio-economic background, ceteris paribus. Answers
to this question differed not significantly by respondents’ own socio-economic
backgrounds (χ2 = 3.37, p = 0.50). This assessment is also in line with the
stated goal of the BFW to increase the share of underrepresented students.
All these results confirm the descriptive findings of Kuhlmann et al.
(2012) who report no statistically significant differences in general acceptance
rates by (non-)academic background for the German National Scholarship
Foundation and even higher acceptance rates for first-semester students
without parental college degree. Taken together and against the background
that additional funds to increase the percentage of underrepresented groups
in the merit-based aid system are available, a higher number of qualified
24 The likelihood to participate in the third wave differed not significantly between students
of non-academic and academic background (χ2 = 0.12, p = 0.72), and both groups were
equally likely to participate in wave 3 if successfully awarded a scholarship (χ2 = 0.67,
p = 0.41).
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applicants of non-academic background should most likely also translate into
a higher number of scholarships awarded to them.
Table 4.9: Success probabilities for applications at baseline: OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Socioeconomic background
Female –0.034 (0.031) –0.031 (0.031) –0.009 (0.031)
Semester 0.074*** (0.013) 0.067*** (0.012) 0.066*** (0.012)
Semester2 –0.003*** (0.001) –0.003*** (0.001) –0.003*** (0.001)
Non-academic background –0.035 (0.030) –0.029 (0.029) –0.023 (0.029)
Type of institution
Applied sciences 0.044 (0.059) 0.030 (0.058) 0.042 (0.056)
Other educational institution 0.110 (0.117) 0.084 (0.110) 0.100 (0.112)
Academic performance
Medium performance –0.065* (0.036) –0.073** (0.035) –0.074** (0.036)
Low performance –0.159 (0.104) –0.220** (0.099) –0.231** (0.095)
Volunteer work 0.268*** (0.027) 0.248*** (0.027)
Personality traits
Openness 0.012 (0.014)
Neuroticism –0.062*** (0.015)
Agreeableness 0.020 (0.014)
Extraversion 0.029* (0.015)
Conscientiousness 0.012 (0.015)
Cognitive abilities
Cognitive test score 0.014 (0.015)
Observations 897 897 897
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.048 0.095 0.107
Predicted probability of success 0.299 0.299
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The sample is restricted to students who mentioned to have applied at a BFW at baseline.
The dependent variable equals 1 if the student received the scholarship as reported at baseline
and equals 0 if the student did not receive the scholarship.
Differences between men and women
To follow up briefly on the gender effects I found with respect to information
levels and former applications, I investigate in table 4.10 whether these
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effects carry over to gender-differences in treatment effects.25 Surprisingly,
the role model treatment did not affect women’s application probabilities for
merit-based scholarships significantly, whereas the effects are statistically
significantly different from zero for men. This finding corroborates once more
that information asymmetries are not key to explain why female students
apply less often (see section 4.5.2) and are less likely to persist in the selection
process of the German National Scholarship Foundation, although equally
eligible (Kuhlmann et al., 2012).
Table 4.10: ITT effects of application for a BFW-scholarship, by gender: OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Information treatment 0.001 (0.005) –0.000 (0.007) 0.000 (0.007)
Role model treatment 0.005 (0.006) –0.003 (0.007) –0.003 (0.007)
Male –0.006 (0.008) –0.004 (0.008)
Interaction effects
Info ×Male 0.003 (0.011) 0.003 (0.011)
Role model ×Male 0.026** (0.013) 0.026** (0.013)
Observations 5195 5195 5195
Pred. probability to apply between W1 and W2 (control group)
(a) All 0.026 0.026 0.026
(b) Female 0.027 0.027
(c) Male 0.023 0.023
P-value (c)=(b) 0.618 0.617
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: ITT effects reported with respect to the control group. Each estimation controls
for the covariates of table 4.1, application at baseline and the receipt of non-BFW
scholarships at baseline. Additional covariates or interactions with both treatment
groups are added as indicated.
One possible explanation for the finding that equally qualified women
abstain from applying might be the underestimation of their own abilities
and the lower level of confidence about their own performance (e.g., Deaux
and Farris, 1977; Chevalier et al., 2009). Another explanation is women’s
generally higher average performance in college (Vincent-Lancrin, 2009). If
women compare their own achievement to that of their peer group, their
25 The results for a sample restriction similar to table 4.8 are even more pronounced and yield
zero effects for women but larger effects for men. Because sample sizes for men become
relatively small when cutting down the sample, the results (available on request) have to be
interpreted with caution, though, and are therefore not reported here.
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self-assessment might be lower just because the average level of performance
in a female-dominated peer group is higher.
To investigate these channels, I run an ordered logistic regression of
participants’ self-assessed academic performance with respect to their peers
on several covariates: gender, study grades, field of studies, a three-way-
interaction of gender, study grades, and field of studies plus their composite
terms, cognitive test scores, high school GPA, type of institution, semester,
and personality traits. I cluster the standard errors at the respective higher ed-
ucation institution to account for differences in grading and quality between
universities. Keeping the factual study grades constant, I find that men are
significantly more likely than women to evaluate themselves as “much better”
than their peers if their study GPA is better than 3.0 (see figure 4.1). While the
average predicted probability of men with top grades to evaluate their own
performance as “much better” amounts to 32%, the respective average proba-
bility of women is about one third lower. Lacking objective measures for the
peer groups’ performance, I cannot assess, however, whether it is women’s
lower self-consciousness or their different reference point that drives their
worse self-assessment.
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Figure 4.1: Linear predictions of students’ subjective performance, evaluated
against their peers
Notes: Results from an ordered logit regression. Dependent variable: own study GPA is much
worse (1), worse (2), the same (3), better (4) or much better (5) than the study GPA of peers
at the same higher education institution in the same subject of studies and semester.
Independent variables: see text.
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4.7 Conclusion
Two thirds of all German merit-based aid holders come from families where
at least one parent achieved a college degree, whereas students of academic
background only make up half of the overall student population (Middendorff
et al., 2009, p. 24). Middendorff et al. (2009) argue that the likelihood to
encounter students of non-academic backgrounds in the group of qualified
students is lower than the likelihood to come across students whose parents
have studied. Studies on differences in academic abilities between students
who have already made their way to higher education are, however, not
available for Germany. Yet, international evidence suggests that gaps in
college grades are very small (Delaney et al., 2011; Aspelmeier et al., 2012)
and not comparable to socio-economic differences in grades at earlier stages.
As the German merit-based aid system is very intransparent and the selec-
tion process of new scholarship holders is complex, it seems more reasonable
that information asymmetries contribute to explaining the underrepresenta-
tion of non-academic students. This chapter is the first to investigate whether
non-academic students qualified to receive merit-based scholarships apply
indeed as frequently and are equally well informed about scholarship oppor-
tunities as are similar students of academic homes. If qualified students of
college inexperienced families apply less often, although they might profit
most from the scholarships’ advantages, the merit-based system cannot un-
fold non-academic students’ talent, thereby allocating funds inefficiently, and
undermining its social mandate.
The findings from this chapter provide first evidence that participants
in a field experiment were indeed significantly less informed at baseline if
descending from families without academic experience. Keeping educational
achievements, cognitive test scores, important application requirements, and
a range of other covariates constant, students of non-academic backgrounds
were also significantly less likely to report former applications for merit-
based aid. Therefore, even if students of all socio-economic groups are
equally likely to succeed in the application process for scholarships, the
smaller share of non-academic students’ applications will carry over to their
underrepresentation in the scholarship body.
Nevertheless, if lower application rates are mainly resulting from infor-
mation asymmetries, providing information about scholarship opportunities
is a very inexpensive instrument to influence students’ choice sets after leav-
ing high school. The findings here suggest that providing information on
scholarships increased non-academic students’ knowledge on scholarships
and led them to consider applying. Moreover, factual application rates of
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non-academic students six months later doubled with respect to the control
group when a scholar with similar characteristics shared custom-fit informa-
tion. As not all scholarship providers’ application deadlines fell into the time
span of six months, it is very likely that the treatment effects would be even
larger if applications were questioned 9 or 12 months later. Moreover, these
results represent a lower-bound estimate of the effect as the sample contained
a majority of students formally ineligible to apply for funding. Restricting
the sample to the highly eligible students increases the intent-to-treat effects
for non-academic students in the role model treatment group substantially.
At the same time, providing publicly available information alone in-
creased the awareness of scholarships in general and triggered applications
for other, less selective ones. Yet, general information was not suitable to
affect applications for highly selective merit-based aid. This finding is in
line with previous evidence from the information interventions literature,
suggesting that providing general information exerts no behavioral outcomes
in industrialized countries (Booij et al., 2012; Carrell and Sacerdote, 2013;
Kerr et al., 2014). Therefore, the decisive information asymmetry is not the
ignorance of mere facts about scholarships, but rather the information that a
similar person made it.
I find no differences in the baseline probabilities to succeed between
applicants of different socio-economic backgrounds. As it is a declared goal
to increase the number of scholars from underrepresented groups, the higher
number of qualified students’ applications is very likely to translates into a
higher number of scholarship winners.
My results do, however, also suggest that female participants’ applica-
tions were unaffected after offered detailed information, while men seem
to have embraced the opportunity to apply. The findings from this chapter
provide evidence that women underestimate their own abilities with respect
to their peers—may it be because they are generally less confident about their
own performances or because the average level of performance in a female-
dominated peer group is higher. As merit-based scholarships are awarded in
a highly demanding selection process and the role model treatment provided
detailed information on its competitiveness, gender differences in compet-
itiveness might also explain why women in the second treatment group
did not apply more often. A wide range of studies provide evidence that
women shy away from competition, while men embrace it and even perform
better when competing (Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004;
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Morin, 2015). With respect to merit-based
aid, Kuhlmann et al. (2012) provide evidence that women having been rec-
ommended to the largest German scholarship providing institution are less
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successful in the assessment centers than their male counterparts, although
equally well qualified. Learning about details of the later selection process
might, therefore, shift women’s lower odds to succeed in the process to an
earlier stage: Anticipating the challenge to compete and potential problems to
prevail in the process, women might abstain from applying in the first place.
More evidence is, however, needed to investigate reasons for the gender gap
and assess whether the findings from this non-representative sample can be
generalized to the full student population. Accordingly, prospective studies
should include a direct measure of participants’ tastes for competition and
level of self-confidence to set limits to possible reasons of the gender gap.
Some BFW have already established small mentoring programs where
current scholarship holders get in touch with students from underrepresented
groups and share information on scholarships. These programs are highly
cost-effective as scholarship holders act on a volunteer work basis. The
results from this chapter suggest that these programs can indeed be a fruitful
and inexpensive endeavor to promote nonacademic students.

171
4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Robustness to matching quality
A matching algorithm allocated each member of the role model treatment
group to the most similar role model. To draw from the pool of available role
models, the algorithm matched political party identification and religious
denomination in a first step. If several role models were available on that
basis, a role model of the same field of studies and/or gender was randomly
selected. For 1% of participants, the algorithm could not select a matching role
model in the first step, e.g., if the participant indicated to be socially engaged
in a religious denomination not covered by the German BFWs. In that case,
only field of studies and/or gender were matched. If there was more than one
most similar role model, the algorithm randomly allocated the participant
to one role model. Due to this procedure, the level of similarity to the role
model differed slightly between participants and might have introduced bias.
If a higher quality of matching positively impacted participants’ applica-
tion behavior, controls accounting for similarity to the role model should be
significantly positive. Adding controls for all matching dimensions (dummy
= 1 if characteristics coincide, 0 otherwise) in column 1 of table A4.11, I do
not find any of the dummies statistically significantly different from zero. To
explore whether matching quality might have been more important for stu-
dents of non-academic backgrounds or women and could therefore account
for significant treatment effects found, I interact these variables with similar-
ity controls in columns 2 and 3. I do again not find statistically significant
effects. I rerun these analyses in table A4.12 but sum up the total number of
similarities. Taking participants who were matched on half of the matching
criteria as a reference group, those matched worse should have been less and
those matched better should have been more likely to apply if similarity had
a positive and relevant impact. Again, no clear pattern with respect to signs
of coefficients evolves and none of the dummies is statistically significantly
different from zero. Additionally, both the differential effect for students of
non-academic backgrounds and women are robust to the inclusion of simi-
larity indicators. Potentially different matching qualities between different
student groups can, therefore, not explain different application rates.
It is luring but false to conclude from this analysis that similarity to the
role model did not matter at all. As I had to maximize similarity in order to
secure the relevance of the provided information for the treated, the variation
in matching quality between participants is rather small, thereby impeding
the probability to detect significant effects. Moreover, not all information to
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Table A4.11: Influence of similarity on applications in the role model
treatment group
(1) (2) (3)
Non-academic background 0.024*** –0.037 0.022***
(0.008) (0.069) (0.008)
Female –0.019* –0.018* –0.110
(0.010) (0.010) (0.073)
Matching criteria
Same party –0.015 0.002 –0.045
(0.016) (0.019) (0.035)
Same religious denomination –0.033 –0.082 –0.047
(0.034) (0.052) (0.055)
Same field of studies 0.006 0.014 0.020
(0.009) (0.012) (0.017)
Same gender –0.002 0.004 –0.021
(0.010) (0.011) (0.028)
Interactions with matching criteria
Same party * Non-academic –0.031
(0.031)
Same religious denom. * Non-academic 0.103
(0.065)
Same field * Non-academic –0.014
(0.017)
Same gender * Non-academic –0.010
(0.019)
Same Party * Female 0.055
(0.039)
Same religious denom. * Female 0.031
(0.066)
Same field * Female –0.024
(0.020)
Same gender * Female 0.034
(0.029)
Observations 1730 1730 1730
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The table contains results of OLS regressions of the application in wave 2 for
the second treatment group only. Results from non-linear models are similar. Each
estimation controls for the covariates of table 4.1, including former applications
at a BFW and the former receipt of other scholarships at baseline. All similarity
dummies are equal to 1 if the characteristics of the participant and the role model
coincide and 0 otherwise.
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Table A4.12: Influence of similarity on applications in the role model treat-
ment group by number of similarities
(1) (2) (3)
Non-academic background 0.023*** 0.028* 0.022***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.008)
Female –0.019* –0.018* –0.048
(0.010) (0.010) (0.032)
Number of similarities
One of Four 0.012 0.025 0.004
(0.033) (0.037) (0.058)
Three of four 0.015 0.011 –0.013
(0.011) (0.013) (0.034)
Four of four –0.003 0.012 –0.035
(0.010) (0.014) (0.033)
Interactions with no. of similarities
One * Non-academic –0.025
(0.068)
Three * Non-academic 0.005
(0.021)
Four * Non-academic –0.027
(0.020)
One * Female –0.018
(0.060)
Three * Female 0.034
(0.036)
Four * Female 0.039
(0.035)
Observations 1730 1730 1730
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: See notes of table A4.11.
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assess the overall degree of similarity was collected for all participants. For
example, participants were only asked about their religious denomination if
socially engaged in church. Attachment to church might be most relevant
for participants with volunteer work in church. Nevertheless, religious but
socially not engaged participants could also feel close to a matched role model
of a religious BFW, although I cannot control for this match.26
To explore whether overall fit between participant and matched BFW
mattered, I regress participants’ scholarship applications on a self-reported
evaluation of personal fit with the BFW they were matched to.27 Note that the
self-assessed fit item asked respondents to evaluate the similarity to the BFW
funding the role model rather than to the role model. Therefore, I cannot
separate the effect of similarity between participant and the BFW’s association
from the effect of similarity between the participant and the specific role
model. Table A4.13 reveals that a good or very good self-assessed fit increases
the probability to have applied by highly statistically significant 3.6 and 3.7
percentage points.
A last issue addressed here is whether slight differences in content or
writing style between interview texts might have influenced application rates
significantly—apart from similarity to the role model. I regress application be-
havior on dummies for all 34 interview texts, taking the text which was most
frequently drawn by the algorithm as the reference category, and controlling
for the quality of matching (not reported, results available on request). I find
only one of the 33 interview dummies statistically significantly different from
zero on the 5%-level—which is in line with a usual rate of false discoveries in
multiple testing. Moreover, this text was shown to less than 10% of partici-
pants in the role model treatment group and should, therefore, not affect the
results.
26 Religious denomination was coded to be similar (=1) if participants reporting volunteer
work within church were matched with a BFW of equal religious denomination. Religious
denomination was coded to be dissimilar (=0) if matched with a BFW of other religious
denomination. Participants without religious volunteer work were coded as 1 if matched
with a non-religious BFW. This coding takes into account that religious BFWs favor ap-
plicants socially engaged in church and with the same religious denomination. I also
tested an alternative coding setting the similarity dummy only for those participants to
1 who were matched according to their religious engagement, considering all others as
unmatched. Although this coding introduces an imbalance between religious and not
religious participants—the latter always considered to be matched worse even if they might
perfectly identify with the matched non-religious role model—the similarity dummy stays
statistically insignificant.
27 The self-assessed fit question in wave 2 was worded as follows: “Please think back to the
last survey. You have read an interview with a < male/female > scholar of < name of
the BFW >. If you wanted to apply for a scholarship, how good would this BFW fit your
personal political, religious, and ideological attitude?”
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Table A4.13: Influence of self-assessed fit on applications in the role
model treatment group
(1) (2) (3)
Non-academic background 0.031** 0.030** 0.030**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Female –0.023* –0.020 –0.021
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Self-assessed personal fit with BFW
(Very) good fit 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
(Very) bad fit 0.009 0.008 0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Matching criteria
Same party –0.012
(0.020)
Same religious denomination –0.040
(0.049)
Same field of studies 0.013
(0.012)
Same gender 0.007
(0.013)
Number of similarities
One of four –0.009
(0.040)
Three of four 0.020
(0.016)
Four of four 0.003
(0.016)
Observations 1110 1110 1110
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: The table contains results of OLS regressions of the application in wave 2
on a set of covariates for the second treatment group only. Results from non-
linear models are similar. Each estimation controls for the covariates of table 4.1,
including former applications at a BFW and the former receipt of other scholar-
ships at baseline. Reference category of the self-assessed fit variable is “partly,
partly” fit between the respondent and the matched BFW. I dropped those who
answered “don’t know” (approximately 12% of cases) and for whom self-assessed
fit is, accordingly, missing.
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4.8.2 Additional figures
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Figure A4.2: Differences in the Big Five Inventory between experimental
groups
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Figure A4.3: Grade inflation in German high school leaving certificates
Notes: Average GPAs of high school certificates in all 16 German states over time. Data
source: Sekretariat der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland IVC/Statistik (2015).
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